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 1 
Abstract 
 
Enacting Sincerity: 
Nerval and the Cultural Politics of Imagination 
 
by 
 
Catherine Beryle Talley 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in French 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Suzanne Guerlac, Chair 
 
 
 This dissertation proposes a new reading of the work of Gérard de Nerval (1808-1855), 
placing him alongside Walter Benjamin’s Baudelaire as an insightful critic of modern life. During the 
1840s and 1850s, the literary field in France was increasingly shaped by bourgeois values like 
sincerity, originality, and authenticity, and by the individualism that they underpinned, restricting 
authorized forms of writing and of subjectivity. I argue that Nerval’s writing constitutes an astute 
opposition to this transformation of literary subjectivity and the limitations it placed on imaginative 
experience and practice. Rather than merely reflecting the author’s own psychological crises (as is 
usually claimed), Nerval’s writings strategically reinvent the literary text as a site of new forms of 
collective imaginative practice. 
 By considering Nerval’s work as a journalist, playwright, critic, and travel writer, as well as a 
poet, I draw out Nerval’s engagements with specific institutions and discourses, from censorship 
and intellectual property law to the national philosophy curriculum and literary criticism journals. 
From these local engagements emerges a shrewd critical voice that speaks directly and explicitly to 
the influence of bourgeois culture on the literary field. I argue that, though he is traditionally read as 
a figure of Romantic isolation and eccentricity, Nerval should rather be understood in relation to 
figures like George Sand and Maurice Barrès, writers who advocated a renewal of communal ties 
(albeit from very different political perspectives). Unlike these contemporaries, however, Nerval 
approaches community as a formal challenge, as well as a theme. He explodes the framework of the 
individual writing subject through, for example, a pervasive intertertextuality that constantly relates 
his texts to other writing and reading experiences. My project thus rejoins the critical tradition that 
emphasizes the failure to coincide with oneself as the essential feature of Nerval’s writing practice. 
However, I give this “failure” a productive and strategic value rather than the tragic valence 
attributed to it by psychoanalytic readings, be they psycho-biographical or post-structuralist. The 
mobility and porousness of the Nervalian writing subject are a formal innovation that generates a 
literature of community rather than self-expression. 
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Prologue 
On Reading Nerval 
 
 
Nerval’s most famous poem, “El Desdichado,” was first published in 1853, not by its author, but by 
his sometime friend and collaborator, Alexandre Dumas, père. Dumas included the cryptic sonnet in 
a column he devoted to Nerval in Le Mousquetaire, citing the poem as evidence for his depiction of 
the younger writer.1 The depiction was an ambivalent one at best, a sort of smiling jibe at Nerval’s 
eccentricity. The Nerval of Dumas’s “Causerie” is “le plus rêveur de tous les poètes” [“the dreamiest 
of all poets”], a man at the mercy of his wayward imagination (“cette folle du logis” [“that 
madwoman in the attic”]) who sometimes allows those around him a glimpse of the strange world in 
which he lives.2 “El Desdichado” functions in Dumas’s portrait as a kind of trace of what the 
normal observer can never really see, serving as a souvenir from the distant land of Nerval’s mind, 
that “pays des chimères et des hallucinations” [“land of chimeras and hallucinations”].3 
 Dumas’s “Causerie” emphasizes the indexical function of the sonnet-souvenir, framing the 
poem with a story in which it serves as another sort of trace: 
 
Jugez-en. Il y a quelques jours, il passe au bureau; nous n’y étions pas, chose rare. Il 
s’informe de nous, et en nous attendant il prend une plume, du paper, et nous laisse 
ces vers en manière de carte de visite. 
 
[Judge for yourselves. A few days ago, he comes by the office; we were, 
exceptionally, not in.  He inquires about us, and while he waits for us he takes up a 
pen, some paper, and leaves us these verses as a calling card.]4 
 
This image of the calling card is a telling one, encapsulating the complexities of Dumas’s depiction 
of Nerval. The poem is remarkable, on the one hand, for the carelessness of its casual composition; 
one can almost imagine Nerval perched on the edge of Dumas’s desk scrawling the fourteen lines 
without even properly seating himself. On the other hand, however, this merely dashed-off poem is 
intended—both in Dumas’s office and in his article—as a meaningful trace of its author. It 
functions less like a poem (signifying its author by embodying his expressive labor) than like the 
signature a homemade calling card might bear, emerging effortlessly from the signatory’s pen and yet 
standing in for him absolutely. 
                                                
1 “Causerie avec mes lecteurs.” Translations are my own except where otherwise noted. I will return to Nerval’s response 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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 As the paradigm of Nerval’s writing, the calling card-sonnet suggests a kind of artlessness 
that cannot but surprise readers of Nerval. So spontaneous a production appears as merely an 
emission of its author, a status that seems to belie the beauty and intensity of the writing. And yet 
that seems to be precisely the crux of matter for Dumas: whatever beauty and intensity, whatever 
poetry there might be in Nerval’s poem (as in his other writing), they are to be traced not to Nerval 
himself but to the imperious imagination that exceeds and subjugates him. Nerval is but a kind of 
medium for his own hallucinations. And so it is that Dumas cautions in his “Causerie” against 
mistaking Nerval for a member of the ranks of professional writers; write though he may, Nerval 
earns the status of writer here only through the condescension of those more worthy of the title. 
 The cruelty of such a portrait among friends—exploiting as it did public knowledge of 
Nerval’s recent psychological crises—need hardly be pointed out. Yet the depiction of Nerval in the 
“Causerie” cannot easily be dismissed on such grounds, for the simple reason that it has been so 
vigorously echoed by critics in the century and a half since. Setting aside differences in tone, the 
image of the calling card provides an economical way of thinking the family resemblance among the 
vast majority of readings of Nerval. In the image of the calling card-sonnet, we can recognize 
common assumptions about the relationship of writer to writing and about the place of truth that 
determine the way Nerval has been read. 
 We might say that the calling card does for Dumas what the symptom has done for so many 
other critics and scholars, locating the significance of Nerval’s writing in a psychic reality that 
precedes and dominates it, and reducing the practice of literary production to a largely instinctive 
and almost involuntary self-expression. Rather than formal choices to be understood as constituting 
a poetics, the complexities of the Nervalian text have been interpreted as traces of a deeper (most 
often tragic) psychological truth. Nerval’s imagination has been understood not as a creative faculty, 
but as an incurable (if compelling) illness. 
* 
In the readings that follow, I propose to replace Dumas’s emblem of the calling card with another 
that orients a very different approach to Nerval’s writing (figure below). Nerval left this other card in 
1843 at the Cairo home of the great engineer Linant de Bellefonds—a visit dutifully made by many 
French travellers in Egypt, including Gustave Flaubert and Jean-Jacques Ampère, as well as by 
Nerval and his traveling companion, Egyptologist Joseph Fonfrède.5 This might seem to be a far 
more straightforward carte de visite than “El Desdichado,” bearing as it does only a pair of names and 
an address. I would like to suggest, however, that this improvised calling card has much to say about 
both the indexical status of the 
Nervalian text and the sort of 
subjectivity of which it might be the 
trace. The treatment of the name 
here gets to the heart of the nature 
of the first person we encounter in 
Nerval’s writing. 
 Nerval’s name casually 
jotted below Fonfrède’s brings to 
mind Nerval scribbling “El 
Desdichado” in Dumas’s office, 
producing another unconventional 
carte de visite. It conjures up another image of him: a man patting his pockets in search of that most 
basic of social accessories and coming up empty handed, except for a serviceable pencil. And yet the 
                                                
5 Jean-Marie Carré, Voyageurs et écrivains français en Egypte, 9. 
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fact of the card’s bearing only a name rather than a poem casts its casualness in a new light. The 
extemporaneous character of the sonnet seemed to prove that it flowed directly from deep within 
the psyche of its author, but the improvisation of the penciled name rather troubles the connection 
between the text and the man to which it supposedly refers. It after all goes against the basic 
convention of the calling card whereby the man is represented by the name set in print (nearly as 
good as stone). If Fonfrède’s name upholds that promise of stability, Nerval’s name announces itself 
by juxtaposition as a profoundly fleeting trace. The penciled name is liable to smudge and so to 
brouiller les pistes (cover the tracks) of the referential link. 
 What’s more, the names on the card are themselves far less forthright signs than names 
claim to be. The calling card that conventionally carries the official identity of the bearer here carries 
instead a pair of names whose status is entirely ambiguous. In the first place, “Fonfride” represents 
an altered spelling of Fonfrède’s name that he seems to have been experimenting with during this 
period—though inconsistently enough that Nerval could razz him in a letter a year later about the 
confusion it caused: Fonfride? Fonfriede? Fonfreude?6 In the second place, Nerval’s name is 
equivocal here since it is, in fact, not his real name. By 1850, Gérard Labrunie used the name 
“Gérard de Nerval” for everything but correspondence with his family and his doctor, but when he 
penciled that name on this carte de visite in 1843, he was still using it only intermittently, and it still 
bore the traces of its first use, in the printed announcement of a never-published novel about a 
canard (the signature on a hoax about a hoax).7 How, then, is the name on the calling card to be 
understood? Is it an alias, a sobriquet, or a joke?8 Even if the future adoption of “Nerval” inflects its 
significance here, the name can’t help but read as an irresistible comical addendum to the newly-
minted “Fonfride,” inscribing the staid calling card with a pair of made-up names. 
 The shift in tone evident in such a joke is not the least important of the reorientations this 
other calling card offers to reading Nerval, putting the lie to the invariably gloomy attitude of the 
sane toward Nerval-the-madman (regardless of the affect he himself presents). Such a move is not 
merely tonal, however, but enables a radically different conception of the status of Nerval’s work. 
Taking the joke of the penciled name “seriously” in its humor, or at least in its irreverence, 
introduces the possibility of conceiving of it as a critical gesture: not symptom but tactic. The 
immediate passage from text to psychology is halted and the relationship between subject and text 
appears as a problem that must be explored in the writing itself. The relation between poetics, 
subjectivity, and the creative impetus of the imagination is restored in all of its complexity.    
 It is this relation that I propose to explore in the readings that follow. Subjectivity will thus 
remain as a central theme, but one of which Nerval will be taken as a thinker rather than merely a 
victim or a medium. The texts will reveal themselves to be both more light-hearted and more serious 
than they have often been seen: not burdened with the weight of an imminent personal tragedy but 
now the sites of real productive labor and invention. 
                                                
6 Letter to Joseph de Fonfride, 14 March 1844 in Œuvres complètes, 3:920-21. On the ongoing confusion surrounding 
these two spellings and Nerval’s use of both, see Lise Scheier, “« FONFRIDE (DE), voyageur en Orient” in Seul dans 
l’orient lointain, 47-48. Nerval’s comical view of the pseudonym is suggested as well by a letter to Gautier from Cairo 
where he refers to his companion only as “Le Fonfride” (letter of 2 May 1843 in Œuvres complètes, 1:1395-97). 
7 Michel Brix, “Hoax et canards nervaliens,” 128-29. I will return to the question of signatures and pseudonyms in 
Chapter Three. 
8 Gautier notes Nerval’s continual use of pseudonyms, linking them to a dissimulation we no longer associate with the 
name “Nerval”: “Comme Stendhal, il aimait à dissimuler sa personnalité sous différents pseudonymes; quand il se sentait 
reconnu sous son faux nez, il le jetait et prenait un autre masque et un autre domino” [“Like Stendhal, he liked to hide 
his personality behind different pseudonyms; when he felt that he had been recognized beneath his disguise, he cast it 
off and took up another mask and another cape”] (Histoire du Romantisme, 115). 
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Introduction 
 
 
Aussi l’écrivain comme tel n’est-il pas malade, mais 
plutôt médecin, médecin de soi-même et du monde. 
 
[Moreover, the writer as such is not a patient but 
rather a physician, the physician of himself and of the 
world.]  
Deleuze, “La littérature et la vie”1 
 
 
Recovering Relations 
Nerval is a paradoxical figure in the French literary canon, at once marginal and central. He is not a 
major writer: he produced neither the monumental body of work of an Honoré de Balzac or an 
Émile Zola, nor the influential and controversial work of a Charles Baudelaire or a Gustave 
Flaubert. In a century of –isms, he made no grand programmatic statements and fathered no literary 
movement. He produced no particularly major works, not a novel, not a successful play, not a 
complete volume of poems. His grand works are ephemeral, like his serialized travel writing, or are 
collections of shorter, more modest texts. He has no clear role to play in the stories most often told 
about 19th-century literary history, about the development of major genres. 
 And yet, Nerval is hardly insignificant to the literary history of 19th-century France. He does 
in fact have a place in many accounts of the painful aftermath of Romanticism, whether as a belated 
Romantic or as a proto-Modernist. Perhaps more important, he is a writer’s writer, read and 
commented by authors as different as Maurice Barrès, Marcel Proust, and André Breton. In his own 
day, Nerval lived at the center of the literary world. If he wasn’t one of its stars, he nonetheless had 
important literary relationships with many of them: he translated Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and 
Heinrich Heine, participated in Victor Hugo’s Cénacle, collaborated with Dumas, and was a lifelong 
friend of Théophile Gautier. He was active in every corner of the literary field, not only as the poet 
and autobiographer readers know best, but also as a translator, playwright, journalist, critic, essayist, 
travel writer, and would-be diplomat. He is to be found at the edge of the frame of many important 
literary goings-on, as he was at that most iconic of literary events, the battle of Hernani. 
 Nerval’s position is a strange one, then: at the center but never quite in focus. It may be true 
that, carefully considered, the significance of his literary contributions is not in keeping with the 
centrality of his position. Perhaps the dispersion of his literary production and reputation among 
various minor genres accounts for his minor status. But it is not literary factors alone that have 
                                                
1 In Critique et clinique, 14/Essays Critical and Clinical, 3. 
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contributed to his marginalization. His reputation has in fact never been a primarily literary one, not 
since his first psychological “crisis” in 1841. Although it would be 1852 before he was hospitalized 
again for this psychosis (variously categorized as monomania and theomania), his madness 
immediately became the primary critical fact. While Nerval was still in the maison de santé in 1841, 
Jules Janin published what amounted to an obituary to Nerval’s reason and, as Jean-Luc Steinmetz 
observes, “Dans cette étude inaugurale, Janin déjà tendait à former une image de Gérard dont il n’est 
pas dit que la postérité parviendra jamais à se défaire. Nerval est donné comme une présence. 
L’œuvre semble secondaire.” [“In this inaugural study, Janin was already forming an image of 
Gérard that, it must be admitted, posterity has never managed to let go of. Nerval is given as a 
presence. The work seems to be secondary.”]2 This apocryphal image of Nerval, reproduced a 
decade later by Dumas, is one readers still know: doux Gérard, bon Gérard, that hapless eccentric. He is 
known as a “poet,” certainly, but less in the sense of a serious writer than in that of a dreamer, ill-
suited for life’s practicalities. He is a figure of irrationality, nostalgia, and melancholy; whatever 
importance his writing has is as a symptom of this. Nerval’s marginality as a writer can be primarily 
attributed to this image, so that what has allowed his work to be overshadowed is not its small 
stature but the outsized proportions given, over and above it, to his psychology. 
 Steinmetz describes the history of Nerval’s reception among 19th- and early 20th-century 
writers as one of non-lecture (non-reading), in which readers’ ideas and feelings about the man have 
often replaced serious grappling with what is challenging in the work.3 The same might be said, in a 
certain sense, of much of the reading that has been done in Nerval studies since. The erudite 
scholarship and attentive analysis that have proliferated since the late 1940s have nonetheless 
continued to give absolute primacy to the explanatory power of Nerval’s psychology. Thematic, 
psychoanalytic, and biographical readings all assume that the coherence of the work might be found 
in the man’s mind, whether in its structures or in its history.4 The frame of reference for studies of 
Nerval is overwhelmingly personal and the logic of his writing is understood to be symptomatic, 
even in analyses that are interested in the historicity of literature.5 The significance of his work is 
developed internally to the writing and the psyche that produced it, both presumed to be radically 
isolated from the “real world” in which Nerval lived. His imagination, whether psychological or 
textual (two things often assumed to be one and the same), is a foreign land with its own laws, in 
which he lives alone. The social marginality that attended Nerval’s madness is compounded in this 
scholarly approach to his writing that removes it from any vital relationship to its historical moment. 
 This fundamental assumption has significantly shaped the findings of Nerval studies, 
orienting readers’ approaches to his writing. First and perhaps most obviously, the assumption that 
the writing is a psychological symptom leads scholars to focus on the forms of his writing in which 
the psychological element is most evident. They privilege the texts in which readers encounter a 
first-person narrator who looks like Nerval himself, reading them as autobiography even where they 
are clearly marked otherwise (as in the case of the nouvelles (stories) “Octavie” and Sylvie).6 This is, 
perhaps, why readers know Nerval primarily as a lyric poet and a writer of something like auto-fiction 
                                                
2 Steinmetz, Reconaissances, 75. See also Janin, “Gérard de Nerval.” 
3 Ibid., 98. 
4 See, for example, the thematic readings of Jean-Pierre Richard, Georges Poulet, and Kurt Scharer; the psychoanalytic 
readings of Michel Jeanneret and Shoshanna Felman; and the biographical readings of Claude Pichois and Brix. 
5 See, for example, Paul Bénichou’s L’école du désenchantement. 
6 See, for example, L’école du désenchantement, where Bénichou claims that “Octavie,” Sylvie, and Aurélia do not obey the 
same logic as the rest of Nerval’s corpus, partaking instead in a redemptive, autobiographical mode. Biographies of 
Nerval, too, fall into this assumption, often including as biographical episodes drawn from texts that are not explicitly 
autobiographical, as though there were no meaningful distortion between the œuvre and the man. See Gérard Cogez, 
Gérard de Nerval; and Pichois and Brix, Gérard de Nerval and Dictionnaire de Nerval. 
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rather than as a playwright or an essayist. Given the assumption that the truth his writing tells is a 
truth about his self, the most significant texts must be those in which the self is to be found 
apparently speaking about itself. The figures that appear in these ostensibly personal works—Valois 
and Italian landscapes, intertwined vines and roses, girls—are sought out in his less personal works, 
so that the corpus as a whole is given meaning as an echo of the autobiographical. 
 This logic is sometimes taken a step further, so that the text that most explicitly manifests 
Nerval’s madness is used as a kind of key to understanding everything else. So it is that Aurélia, ou Le 
Rêve et la vie [Aurélia, or Dream and Life] is made central to Nerval’s corpus, though it was unfinished at 
the time of his death and its final form was determined by Gautier and his editors.7 Recounting the 
hallucinations Nerval experienced while hospitalized for his crises, Aurélia is taken to be the truest of 
his writing, and all of the writing that came before is read for the ways it foreshadows those final 
revelations and the suicide that interrupted them.8 Reading Nerval in this way, scholars generate 
habitually gloomy interpretations of Nerval. He appears as a man trapped inside his own illness, 
doomed to repeat the same unsatisfied desires until he can bear it no longer. What charm he has is 
bittersweet: the twinge of nostalgia and the poetry of longing. This charm does nothing to alleviate 
the mood of failure that hangs over the work and the man.  
 From the assumption that Nerval’s writing is a psychological symptom there thus follows a 
set of methods that echoes and reproduces that assumption. Once imagination is taken to be 
passive, an involuntary state from which he cannot escape (an illness), then his writing becomes a 
mere expression of that state and takes on the qualities that have been assigned to it. So it is that the 
habits of reading described above are so closely linked: privileging Nerval’s psychological singularity, 
presuming his isolation, abstracting his works to a single imaginary, and highlighting the tragic 
dimension of the writing all partake in the same logic. Nerval’s subjectivity is restricted to the 
imagination (exiled from the real) and his poetics is made an index of that confinement. Based on a 
common assumption (conscious or not), these habits maintain Nerval in the marginal position 
created for him by the incomprehension of his contemporaries. They are the habits that have made 
his centrality within the literary field invisible and obscured the relations his works forge with the 
world around him. They are, then, the habits that must be broken if we want to understand better 
the complexity of Nerval’s minor but central position, and profit from the unique perspectives it 
opens. 
 Some recent work in Nerval studies has begun to break these habits and to consider aspects 
of Nerval’s writing that had previously remained hidden, turning away from primarily symptomatic 
reading. This is perhaps most evident in the wave of studies that give serious consideration to 
Nerval’s occasional writing, as well as to the material conditions under which he wrote, calling 
attention to the situated and relational nature of the work.9 But such a shift is evident, as well, in 
studies that call into question the abstract unity attributed to Nerval’s corpus, instead probing the 
dynamism and complexity of subjectivity and aesthetics in his writing and questioning the poetic 
                                                
7 This is most evident in Richard’s “Géographie magique de Nerval,” where he claims that “sous le masque du 
chroniquer ou du librettiste se trahit à chaque instant le vrai Gérard, celui d’Aurélia, des Chimères ou du docteur Blanche” 
[“the real Gérard, the Gérard of Aurélia, the Chimères, or Doctor Blanche, is constantly peeking out from beneath the mask 
of the columnist or librettist”] (18; my emphasis). The same logic underlies Patrick Bray’s reading of Nerval’s 
“généalogie fantastique,” which gives the hallucinatory document great hermeneutic significance as a prefiguration of the 
concerns at stake in Sylvie and Aurélia; see “Lost in the Fold.” 
8 There is occasional controversy about whether Nerval might not have taken his own life, but rather been killed for one 
reason or another, circulating as he did in dangerous neighborhoods at night. 
9 Hisashi Mizuno’s work makes particularly great strides in this direction; see also Richard Sieburth’s translation and 
introduction of Les Faux Saulniers. Brix has also shifted increasingly toward this kind of work with his studies of Les Faux 
Saulniers and of Nerval’s journalistic writing. 
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aims of the work.10 The most promising recent studies bring these approaches together, reading 
Nerval (newly liberated from his psychological prison) as a critic of his historical situation, and 
reading his writing (no longer a passive symptom) as a poetic engagement with that situation.11 
Remarkable in all of these studies is the shift in affect evident in their readings of Nerval: behind the 
lament of hopelessness that has long dominated, one increasingly hears the humor and irony of 
Nerval’s writing, with all their creative and critical productivity.  
 My work in this project joins these recent studies and aims to further their extension and 
transformation of the way that Nerval might be read, while turning more definitively away from the 
imminent tragedy of Nerval’s suicide and the constant specter of his madness that often continue to 
haunt them. This means a further shift in the assumptions with which we approach Nerval. While 
recent studies have opened up the possibility that the fundamentally personal, subjective problem at 
the heart of Nerval’s writing might be less isolated and less abstract than had previously been 
assumed, even the most transformative of those studies has ultimately tended to keep that personal 
problem at the center of their understandings of his writing. I have here attempted to radically 
displace that psychological problem, as it has most often been understood. I have stripped the 
problematics of illness and symptom of their primacy, in order to free Nerval’s writing from its 
isolation and get at what it might reveal when read from the perspective of its relationality.  
 I have approached Nerval first and foremost not as a madman, but as a writer producing 
work in mid-19th-century France and in conversation with that context. In order to do this I have, 
like Hisashi Mizuno and Richard Sieburth, turned my attention from Nerval’s more lyrical and 
personal writing to the generically complex, serialized works that wear their worldly engagements on 
their sleeves. I have oriented my approach to Nerval’s writing through readings of Les Faux Saulniers 
(The Salt Smugglers ), Les Nuits d’octobre (October Nights), and Les Illuminés (The Illuminati), rather than 
Aurélia. I have reconsidered more ostensibly personal works like Sylvie and Les Chimères in light of 
more worldly ones, rather than vice versa, listening for the ways in which broad, apparently abstract 
reflections refer to local, concrete analyses, and seemingly personal concerns are grounded in 
history. 
 I have also sought to draw out Nerval’s worldly engagements, both in the texts where they 
are evident and in the texts where they are subtler. Rather than assuming a personal frame of 
reference for Nerval’s writing, I have looked for the places where he has specific interlocutors or 
refers to particular cultural and social phenomena. I have found that these moments of engagement 
entangle his work most often with particularly literary concerns: on the one hand, contemporary 
shifts in literary aesthetics (the rise of Realism, properly so-called, and the dominance of 
Romanticism in the theater); and on the other, the range of institutional forces that aimed to shape 
those aesthetics. Some of these institutions are legal (as with the National Assembly’s censorship of 
the press in Les Faux Saulniers or the ongoing debates around intellectual property law that Nerval 
studied as an aspiring diplomat), and some of them cultural (as with the conservative criticism and 
pedagogical apparatus addressed in Les Nuits d’octobre). I have taken these concerns to be central to 
the significance of Nerval’s writing, which I read in relation to them as a series of tactical responses. 
Nerval thus becomes a guide through the literary field of the mid-19th century, uniquely elucidating 
precisely because of the ambivalence of his literary position. My project puts his minor status to 
work, drawing out as much as possible the oblique and illuminating account of literary history that 
he offers. 
                                                
10 See, for example, Jacques Bony, L’Esthétique de Nerval; Philippe Destruel, L’écriture nervalienne du temps; and Gabriel 
Chamarat-Malandain, Nerval ou l’incendie du théâtre. 
11 Ross Chambers’s work on melancholy and in Loiterature moves in this direction, though it sometimes treats the writing 
as a historical symptom; the most striking and exciting case is Keiko Tsujikawa’s Nerval et les limbes de l’histoire. 
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 Making Nerval’s minor status a critical asset has required me to reframe my thinking about 
his madness—not disregarding it, but changing its hermeneutic status. Rather than looking for 
illness directly manifested in the writing, I have rather sought the ways in which the experience of 
psychological crisis and, just as importantly, psychiatric treatment might have shaped Nerval’s 
thinking about the society in which he lived. Psychology and subjectivity have thus continued to be 
important problematics for this project, transposed in a Foucauldian key rather than a Freudian or 
Lacanian one. I have sought to draw on Nerval’s unusually intimate engagement with subjectivity as 
a social apparatus in order to uncover what Nerval might reveal about its history and then to 
theorize how his engagement with that history might have shaped his poetics. 
 Putting Nerval’s minor status to work has also meant finding ways to mine the critical 
contributions of a writer who is insistently not systematic or programmatic. His work does not 
declare or explicate its engagements; it is fragmentary and wandering—it has been called 
“loiterature” and described as “eccentric,” literally off-center or outlying.12 Yet the apparent lack of 
tension and application in his writing has emerged in my readings as one of the primary tools in 
Nerval’s critical arsenal: what looks merely errant is often pointedly evasive and exposes the cracks 
in the ideologies that constrain it, not by naming them, but by slipping through them. In order to 
understand what is at stake in this evasive criticism, I have had to attempt to theorize what Nerval 
so adamantly leaves untheorized, to find the coherence in what is so persistently fragmentary. I have 
tried to do this in a way that takes account of the mobility of Nerval’s writing, without unduly fixing 
this thought that offers unprecedented insights into the period precisely by way of its errancy. The 
authorial consciousness I attribute to Nerval is one inferred, read between the lines of his writing, 
and is not meant to create after the fact the authoritative voice that is missing from the texts, but 
simply to make legible their fleeting, unassuming coherence. My theorizing interventions have been 
intended, above all, to change the way we read the errancy and fragmentation of Nerval’s writing: I 
have sought to recast this wandering and dodging as an inventive poetics that retains and recreates 
relationality in an increasingly individualized literature, rather than reading it as a sign of 
incommunicable esoterism. 
 
Individualism and Its Discontents 
The problem of individual isolation that has so deeply shaped Nerval studies is, in fact, a deeply 
historical problem in mid-19th-century France, and one that profoundly shaped the experience of 
Nerval’s generation. Nerval began his literary career as an adolescent during the late years of the 
Restoration, breaking onto the literary scene with a well-received translation of Goethe’s Faust in 
1827. However, the vast majority of his writing belongs to the years of increasing social and 
economic transformation under the July Monarchy, Second Republic, and early Second Empire, 
during the two decades preceding his death in 1855. The July Revolution made a definitive turn away 
from any possibility of reviving ancien régime social institutions, as Charles X had hoped to do, aided 
by increasing urbanization that eroded longstanding social solidarities by drawing people away from 
their native regions, as well as by the movements toward centralization and “Frenchification” that 
sought to do away with all that constituted the specificity of those regions. 
 The story is familiar: people were broken free from the complex, local social networks that 
had previously defined their identities and ordered their lives, and were cast instead into the vast 
anonymity of market relations. The development of capitalism in France was, it must be noted, far 
slower than in England, and this period was not yet witness to the kind of large-scale 
industrialization occurring across the Channel. France in fact retained a primarily agrarian economy 
until late in the century. Yet the social fabric of France was irrefutably altered during this period: 
                                                
12 See Chambers, Loiterature; and Daniel Sangsue, Le récit excentrique. 
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artisanal labor struggled to compete as it became subject to the fungibility of expanding markets 
(aided by improved transportation and communication), and the small communities centered around 
dying industries were broken up and absorbed into towns and cities, in which the specificity of a 
neighbor was replaced by the functional identity of worker, manager, owner. Young men seeking to 
distinguish themselves in the professions or through government service were drawn to Paris for 
studies and opportunities, where they joined a flood of workers in a ballooning metropolis into 
which they were aggregated more than integrated. Even being careful not to overplay the effects of a 
still-incubating industrialization, it is clear that the mid-19th century was a period in which 
longstanding social solidarities were broken, and a new kind of subject was created: one not 
identified by its relations, but rather self-contained: the atomized, isolated subject that made up the 
discrete, interchangeable unit of market relations.13 Along with the transformation of subjective 
experience that so interested Walter Benjamin comes the birth of the modern individual.14 
 These are accounts of the mid-19th century that literary scholars and historians know well 
and that ground many readings of the significance of post-Romantic literature as a form of cultural 
opposition. The broad strokes of such a history prove helpful in reading Nerval, particularly in the 
case of Sylvie, which can be read as an allegory of the painful break with the past wrought by 
modernization, as I will show in Chapter Two. And yet to understand what it meant to live and to 
write during this period, particularly in Nerval’s case, we must look beyond these grand narratives of 
modernization. As descriptions of life in the July Monarchy, Second Republic, and early Second 
Empire, these narratives need to be supplemented to account for both the slowness of economic 
development in France and the disjuncture between economic and political liberalism. The 
transformation of France from an agrarian to an industrialized nation was very much still in process 
during this period, and so was lived not only as the inexorable creep of “progress” but also as a 
series of distinguishable changes and acts. What’s more, not only market implementation but also 
market ideology was slow to gain a solid foothold in France. Even under the “Bourgeois Monarchy” 
of Louis Philippe, political power was primarily held not by the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie, 
but by the professional and administrative bourgeoisie, which harbored deep ambivalence about 
commercial values. Despite the government’s pro-business policies, the bourgeoisie that 
collaborated with the nobility to govern France was conservative (both cautious and moralizing) and 
put off by the naked self-interest of capitalism. The transformation of France during the mid-
century was produced both by economic development and by the politics of this ruling class, two 
forces that often seem wholly contradictory. 
 While economic liberalism was slowly bearing its fruit in France, then, state politics retained 
a distinctly authoritarian character. The ruling bourgeoisie, represented during the July Monarchy by 
Doctrinaire politicians including Pierre Paul Royer-Collard and François Guizot, saw the Revolution 
of 1789 as historical progress and paid lip service to its values—particularly liberty. They were 
anything but republicans, however, and argued that protecting freedom required precisely limiting 
freedom, ensuring that it did not fall into the kind of insurrectionary excess seen in the Revolution. 
Proponents of liberal monarchy, the Doctrinaires established a very limited electoral base during the 
July Monarchy by setting high income requirements, thereby ensuring governance of the many by 
the few. This was the balance that would ensure social order and prevent the chaos of democracy, 
                                                
13 Market relations are precisely relations that cannot be lived as such, as relations between people, because of the 
illusion through which they appear to be relations between things. See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Section 1, Chapter 4 
on commodity fetishism. 
14 See, for example, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” in Illuminations. 
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ensuring that state power remained in the hands of those men who had demonstrated their moral 
capacité through their economic solidity.15 
 The conservative liberalism of the French state in fact remained remarkably consistent 
throughout the political upheavals of 1848-52. The provisional government of the Second Republic 
was hardly democratic-socialist, and the eventual republican government favored a conservative 
conception of the republic as family, property, and religion, immediately beginning to dismantle the 
radical aspects of the constitution, including the National Workshops.16 This government was led by 
the Party of Order, which was in many ways the inheritor of Doctrinaire ideology and whose 
conservatism would finally outweigh its royalism, bringing many of its members (though not the 
most notable) around to support Louis Napoléon after his 1851 coup averted further democratic 
insurgency. The Party of Order unsurprisingly shared the Doctrinaires’ concern for maintaining 
social order over the demands of liberty and against socialist claims for equality. Despite the 1848 
revolution, then, state power was relatively consistent during the mid-century in its authoritarianism 
and conservatism, its fear of savage democracy and social upheaval. That upheaval was, among other 
things, bad for business, and repressive policy ensured that the interests of capital would be 
protected. 
 We must take this repressiveness into account when we consider the way that both 
subjective experience and the literary field were transformed during the mid-19th century, adding to 
broad narratives of commercialization and fragmentation. The changes associated with 
modernization during this period were not only an inexorable wave sweeping the nation, but were 
also encountered as a series of local debates and policies. In addition to the change in structures of 
experience brought about by urbanization and increasing commercialization, subjectivity was actively 
shaped by institutions—legal, academic, and critical, as well as, of course, psychiatric. If liberal 
society was an aggregate rather than a community, the individual took on added importance as the 
base unit of that aggregate: it was of individuals, conceived of as such (as integral, self-contained, 
individual selves) that bourgeois society was made. Everything boiled down to individual action and 
the selves that originated it, and so those selves became increasingly significant objects for 
government even as they became increasingly anonymous and atomized. In the absence of the 
intricate legislation of behavior operated by now-defunct social solidarities and hierarchies, French 
subjects had to be trained to be self-governing. 
 Maintenance of social order required the creation of very particular kinds of subjects. As in 
Smith’s invisible hand, individuals had to be brought together by some unifying force, and so had to 
be internally driven by conformity. While exalting the individual, then, conservative social policy also 
sought to constrain him: he must be free to act, but within limits. The importance of this project of 
shaping selves can be seen in the centrality of education to the Doctrinaire government of the July 
Monarchy. Guizot’s 1833 law establishing public primary education throughout France, and his 
colleague Victor Cousin’s 1832 reform of the secondary curriculum, together saturated the nation 
with the ideals of citizenship in the liberal monarchy. Cousin’s philosophical and pedagogical 
apparatus in particular was instrumental in engineering a duality of individualism and conformism 
suitable to the (male) bourgeois subject. Under Cousin, pedagogy in secondary schools was reshaped 
to achieve what was, according to Jarrold Seigel, “[t]he fundamental goal of education as [Cousin] 
conceived it”: “to form individuals whose sense of their own reflective independence and autonomy, 
and their spiritual unity with others, was shaped for them by the pedagogical authority and practice 
                                                
15 On the Doctrinaires, see for example Sara Maza’s The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie; though her overarching argument 
against the existence of the bourgeoisie is a problematic overstatement of the case, she gives a detailed account of liberal 
politics under the Restoration in Chapter Five, “The Political Birth of the Bourgeoisie, 1815-1830” (131-60). 
16 Peter McPhee, A Social History of France 1780-1880, 178. 
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of the state.”17 Cousin’s brand of spiritualist philosophy was the cornerstone of the required 
curriculum for all recipients of the bac and so had a platform from which to diffuse the technologies 
of the self by which it would shape individuals and their relationships to society, as Jan Goldstein 
has demonstrated.18 
 This philosophy, like that of Descartes and Maine de Biran, began with an a priori, pre-
reflective self and derived everything else (including ontology) through the application of reflection 
to that self.19 Individual psychology was the basis for all other knowledge, and introspection was the 
first act of philosophy.20 The bourgeois subject thus had the pleasure of possessing within himself 
the fundamental cause and origin of all efficacy.21 But this individual, self-possessed in what Seigel 
calls his “reflective independence and autonomy,” was not unconstrained: his freedom was subject 
to the impersonal reason that governed Cousin’s spiritualist philosophy.22 In Goldstein’s analysis, 
“the Cousinian combination of ‘personal will’ and ‘impersonal reason’ flattered the possessor of the 
moi that he enjoyed a thrilling degree of individuality and efficacy yet at the same time guaranteed 
that he would not rock the boat.”23 The bourgeois subject was the free, first cause of his own 
conformism, deriving (from) himself the strict reason that he enforced, even upon himself. 
 Bourgeois individualism can thus be thought of as having two poles: the myth of the self-
possessed individual and the constraining force of conformism, in the form of reason. The 
rationalism of this philosophy is explicitly intended, as it is in the thinking of Biran or Alexis de 
Tocqueville, as a check on the imagination, a faculty liable to run wild and draw the self beyond the 
bounds of its abilities.24 This imagination is not merely a mental faculty, but is understood to have 
very real political consequences: imagination is closely associated with freedom, and excesses of the 
imagination with the excesses of democracy epitomized by the Reign of Terror. Thus we see that the 
limit on democracy required to guarantee social order is produced not only through direct political 
means like limitations on electoral rights, but also indirectly through the creation of orderly subjects, 
as well as ongoing legal and critical interventions to keep the bourgeois subject on the right path. 
The transformation of subjective experience throughout the mid-19th century was operated in part 
through the concerted efforts of the state and its proponents. Individuals encountered head on 
institutions that were designed to mold them, whose intentions might be laid bare and contested. In 
addition to the familiar narrative of modernization as a great inexorable process that produced 
opposition as a sort of symptom, the story of cultural transformation during the mid-19th century 
might thus also be told as a series of skirmishes on the sites where that transformation was newly 
asserting itself. 
 
Subjectivity, Imagination, Poetics 
Scholarship on literature during this period tends to read it in relation to that broader narrative of 
modernization. On the one hand, the liberal monarchy restored careers open to talent, and as young 
men were drawn to government service and the professions, literature made more than its fair share 
of recruits thanks to its comparatively low barriers to entry. At the same time, however, the 
                                                
17 Seigel, The Idea of the Self, 477. 
18 See, in particular, Chapter Five, “Cousinian Hegemony” in The Post-Revolutionary Self. 
19 Seigel, 475. 
20 Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self, 192. 
21 Ibid., 180. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., Part I, “The problem for which psychology furnishes a solution.” See also Matthew Maguire, The Conversion of 
Imagination, Chapter Six, “Rousseau and Restoration: Imagination and Memory,” and Chapter Seven, “The Gravity of 
Illusion: Alexis de Tocqueville.” 
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patronage that had supported men of letters during the Ancien Régime and even the Restoration 
disappeared, leaving writers to truck their wares on a market where there was now a glut of available 
talent. In most cases, this meant that the writer was little different from a laborer, wielding his pen as 
another might wield a hammer, and struggling to piece together a living: the starving artist, dreaming 
of transcending that condition and achieving the status of a Victor Hugo or an Alexandre Dumas. 
 Though they most often emerged from the bourgeoisie, these young men made up the labor 
force of one of the first French industries to be highly commercialized and so found themselves at 
odds with bourgeois values. The difficulties presented by the logic of the market as such were only 
compounded by the notoriously conservative taste of mid-19th century bourgeois literary consumers 
that determined what was saleable literature (closely linked, of course, to the moralizing values that 
underpinned their identity as bourgeois). Even when it was more heterogeneous, and so less 
constrained by bourgeois conservatism, the literary public demonstrated all of the inertia and 
conformism of aggregated masses, drawing literature ever downward toward the lowest common 
denominator. Mass literature, exemplified by the daily press, was thus considered by many to be 
fallen literature, no longer an art but a mere trade. The possibility of an “authentic” literature that 
might operate on a logic truly distinct from that of the masses was increasingly seen by high-minded 
writers to require the isolation of literature from the market. From Gautier’s refusal of decorum and 
moralism in the preface to Mademoiselle de Maupin, to Flaubert’s sendup of uncritical conformity in 
the Dictionnaire des idées reçues, many assertions of the value of literature in the mid-19th century were 
grounded in its radical heterogeneity within an increasingly flat, commercial culture. Literature was 
imagined as a space in which the imagination of the writer need not be constrained by the lack of 
imagination of the public and a space apart from the reign of bourgeois values—a space of 
“symbolic resistance” or “opposition”: the refusal of homogenized market culture and the 
manifestation of values foreign to it.25 
 Nerval in many ways fits into this narrative of literature and modernization. His career is 
marked by the jockeying and compromise associated with the literary market. We find him writing 
for various newspapers of differing political stripes, and sometimes discern the contortions in his 
texts required to pacify his editors.26 As a playwright, too, we see Nerval struggling to write a 
commercially successful work, trying out different genres and collaborations in pursuit of a hit he 
never achieved. And yet we do not find in his writing the same sorts of disavowals of the literary 
public and market as we find in Gautier or Flaubert. Nerval’s writing echoes the oppositional 
character of much other modernist literature: his writing manifests a deep irony and suspicion with 
regard to the values of bourgeois subjectivity—values that sought to confine the self within 
reasonable bounds.27 These values (authenticity, integrity, originality) are perhaps not obviously 
insidious, as they seem to affirm the freedom of the individual by isolating it from external forces 
                                                
25 On “symbolic resistance” and “opposition” in 19th-century French literature, see, respectively, Richard Terdiman, 
Discourse/Counter-Discourse, and Chambers, Room for Maneuver. 
26 This can be either aesthetic or explicitly political. Hisashi Mizuno identifies the careful balance of political subversion 
and caution that allowed Nerval to publish Les Nuits d’octobre in the pro-Louis Napoléon Illustration, as well as the careful 
selection of Sylvie (a relative outlier in his œuvre) for publication in the spiritualist Revue des Deux Mondes. See Mizuno, 
“Nerval face au réalisme” and “Sylvie de Gérard de Nerval et la Revue des Deux Mondes.” I will return to this question in 
Chapter Two. 
27 “Modernist” is no doubt an imperfect characterization here. Writers like Gautier and Nerval might be better classed 
under Paul Bénichou’s rubric of the “school of disenchantment,” or as “second-generation” Romantics along with 
Baudelaire. Nonetheless, “modernist” accomplishes two useful things here: first, it takes into account the directions in 
which Gautier and Baudelaire will move and so foregrounds their innovations rather than framing them as a reactive 
post-script to Romanticism (the sterility of disenchantment, the frustration of the idéal); second, it marks a kinship 
between highly varied literary projects in the second half of the century—Gautier, Baudelaire, Flaubert, Mallarmé—
which all struggle to create a literature apart from the debasement of mainstream culture. 
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that might compromise its autonomy. But they in fact belong to the controlling mechanism of 
conservative ideology, indicating a vague but powerful boundary around authorized behavior and 
thought. 
 Rather than making sweeping condemnations, however, Nerval’s writing pays meticulous 
attention to the ways in which these values made their way into the literary field, reshaping this space 
apart in the image of the ideal bourgeois subject. As I will explore in Chapter One, for example, Les 
Nuits d’octobre points up the complicity between the moralizing literary criticism of the Revue des Deux 
Mondes (promoting unity in the work and integrity in the writer) and the repressive Cousinian 
pedagogical apparatus. Likewise, my reading of Lex Faux Saulniers in Chapter Three draws out the 
ways in which the legislation of authorial authenticity by the Press Law of 1850 was intricately 
bound up with the prohibition of fiction and the creation of a narrow range of authorized 
journalistic writing. In Chapter Four, I draw out the resistance throughout Nerval’s œuvre more 
broadly to the ideal of authorial originality that underpinned proposed extensions of intellectual, and 
specifically literary, property rights. In all of these readings, Nerval’s writing is shown to highlight 
the close connections between those values that seem to ground the self in itself and restrictions on 
the imagination, creating a nuanced account of how literature is impoverished by its subjection to 
bourgeois values. In this way, Nerval’s precise engagements with literary institutions provide a 
microscopic view of the ideological constraints facing literature in the mid-19th century—a view that 
not only supplements but also deepens more telescopic accounts of the period, revealing how large-
scale transformations were enforced and contested on the local level.  
 What’s more, this view adds a concern largely absent from the perspective framed by 
Gautier, Baudelaire, or Flaubert. Nerval shares with these other writers, more central to the canon of 
19th-century French literature, an attention to the destruction of the imaginative subject by 
modernization and a spirit of poetic innovation in response to that destruction. In Nerval’s 
understanding of that destruction, however, imagination and individualism are articulated in a very 
different way. In readings of other authors of the period, it is common to observe the resistance they 
demonstrate toward the impoverishment of imaginative subjectivity and literary creation understood 
as a byproduct of the nefarious conformity of bourgeois society. The rise of the daily press and mass 
culture, in particular, are common culprits in accounts of this period, enforcing a discursive 
anonymity that stands as a barrier to authentic literature. It is this anonymity that writers are often 
understood to be attacking: a writer like Flaubert, for example, reveals its stupidity through citational 
irony, among other procedures, while Stéphane Mallarmé refutes it by way of a vindication of radical 
individuality and originality.28 Baudelaire moves between these two tactics, shifting from the 
hyperindividualism of his aesthetic elitism in the 1840s—correlate of his dandyism—to the deep 
irony of the prose poems, embodied in his ever more impeccable impersonation of bourgeois 
dress.29 Speaking more broadly, scholars often narrate the movement of a whole strain of French 
literature (particularly poetry) toward aestheticism as a progressive isolation of the authentic, creative 
subject from the compromising effects of the anonymous mass of bourgeois individuals. To avoid 
the debasement of banality, writers withdraw (at least theoretically) into the space of literature where 
they might retain an individuality of another kind. 
 In Nerval’s writing, however, the opposition between bourgeois and aestheticist 
individualism can only be a false one. The conception of the bourgeois public as a conformist mass 
is not separated here from the individualistic ideology that enables that conformism, and so the 
withdrawal into individualism cannot be seen as a viable escape from conformism. The bohemian 
cannot prevent his absorption into the bourgeoisie and the flattening of his imaginative life through 
                                                
28 See Terdiman, Discourse/Counter-Discourse. 
29 See Richard D. E. Burton, Baudelaire and the Second Republic. 
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a vindication of his own originality.30 The values that would underpin individualistic imaginative 
autonomy are precisely those that underpin the conformist myth of autonomy (authenticity, 
integrity, originality), so the writer cannot be “authentically” authentic, on his own terms, nor “truly” 
original, because the primacy of those values already draws him within the logic of banality he seeks 
to exclude from the literary field. The writer, when he takes on these values for himself, becomes 
just an earnest property holder of a different kind (as in intellectual property debates centered 
around the question of inheritance, as I will discuss in Chapter Four). Put another way, the 
individualism that atomizes individuals into the units of a banal social aggregate cannot be escaped 
by a withdrawal into an aesthetic individualism. In attempting to redeem itself against the mass in 
this way, literature only intensifies the logic of the mass itself. 
 The contradiction inherent in aestheticism is not made explicit in this way in Nerval’s 
writing, but is indirectly drawn out by locating modernization’s destruction of the imagination not in 
the rise of mass culture, but in the production of individuals through the demolition of older forms 
of social solidarity. While he remains largely silent on the hegemony of the modern literary public 
and the compromising effects of the market, Nerval returns again and again to the imaginative 
richness of forms of collective and popular practice that have become outmoded. His oft-observed 
nostalgia is to be understood in this sense, rather than as purely personal and autobiographical: it is 
an awareness of the value of cultural forms that nourished the imagination, and of their destruction 
by modernization. In the most evident manifestation of Nerval’s concern for the cultural past, the 
urbanization and centralization that eroded the specificity of local and regional cultures during this 
period is addressed through the figures of the folk song and festival that reappear throughout his 
“Valois cycle”—the texts written about the region of the first French kings in which both the 
French nation and Nerval himself spent their infancy.31 At the center of Nerval’s interest in young 
girls singing and elaborate communal rites lies the inscription of these practices within a community, 
both synchronic and diachronic. The song and the festival draw their imaginative intensity and their 
cultural value from the way that they embed individual experience in a dense fabric of shared 
experience, a ground that does not limit but rather enriches subjectivity and imagination.32 
 In addition to these traditional cultural forms, Nerval also takes up the rationalization of 
culture (including the realm of fiction that might seem immune to such transformations) through 
frequent considerations of forms of popular fiction that do not coincide with the highly 
commercialized forms of mass culture. The recurring treatments of cultural phenomena like 
superstition, legend, canard journalism, and freak shows has received astonishingly little scholarly 
attention, and deserves to be critically examined alongside folk practices, which are decidedly more 
prevalent in Nerval studies. These forms will be addressed in detail in Chapters One and Three, but 
I will observe here more generally that their epistemological ambiguity, neither naïve nor quite the 
manageable fiction of suspension of disbelief, appears as a disappearing form of interpenetration of 
imagination and life that modern society does not tolerate. The problematic of the fluidity of dream 
and life that is so frequently analyzed in Nerval studies returns here in an altered form, not as a 
                                                
30 It is worth noting Nerval’s complex relationship to bohemianism. He was closely associated with bohemian groups of 
the 1830s, like the petit cénacle and the group in the Impasse du Doyenné, but seems always to have been somewhat 
marginal to many of their practices (including their dandyism). On the other hand, Nerval might be thought of as out-
doing their bohemianism, given his lifelong refusal to keep normal hours or reside at a fixed address; indeed, his friends’ 
fascination with his “eccentricity” throughout his life suggests that he ran counter to social norms in a more profound 
and unsettling way. See, for instance, Gautier’s Histoire du romantisme.  
31 This cycle centers around apparently autobiographical texts like many of those in Les Filles du feu and Promenades et 
Souvenirs, but could also be seen to include texts like Les Faux Saulniers and Les Nuits d’octobre where the focus is not on 
personal memory. 
32 Nerval’s thinking resonates here with Benjamin’s; I will return to this question in Chapter Two. 
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question of personal hallucination or reverie, but as a matter of shared cultural forms that play on 
the vitality of the imagination, irreducible to truth or falsehood. 
 Through these two sets of cultural forms, Nerval displaces the imaginative integrity that 
modern literature must recuperate, from the rarefaction of the creative individual to the revival of 
collective creative practices. So it is that the art par excellence for Nerval, the art he uses to figure the 
mechanisms and potentialities of creative production in general, is not painting as for Baudelaire and 
Gautier, but theater, that most social of art forms. In addition to his work as a playwright and 
theater critic, Nerval turned often in his other writing to the dramatic arts: not only in the 
fascination with the figure of the actress as artist and woman in Les Filles du feu and Pandora, which I 
will return to in Chapter Two, but also in the investigations of the theater as a creative space and a 
social milieu that come to the fore in Le roman tragique and Nerval’s short-lived editorial project, the 
journal Le Monde dramatique. The quintessential form of imaginative production is to be found in the 
shared performances and the embodied artifice of theatrical création (understood with all of its 
French ambiguity). The theater as such provides Nerval a site for theorizing the operations of 
collective creative practice, and finds echoes in a wide range of practices that fascinate him, from 
disguise and dress up to the theatricality of the aristocracy in the ancien régime. A whole range of 
imaginative practices is thus grounded in the figure of the theater, which stands as the potential 
modern home to the kinds of collective culture that interest Nerval (though the theater in its 
contemporary form is hardly satisfactory, as I will show in Chapter Two). 
 Nerval’s interest in the cultural cost of the break with tradition and community places him in 
an entirely different narrative of literary history than that of the oppositional, modernist writers I 
have been discussing (Gautier, Baudelaire, Flaubert, Mallarmé), one concerned with disappearing 
rural and regional values.33 His investment in the cultural vitality of rural forms of communal life and 
culture resonates, for example, with George Sand’s pastoral utopianism of the late 1840s. In novels 
like François le Champi and La Mare au diable, Sand depicted the naivety of rural life with the explicit 
intention of reawakening the modern reader’s aesthetic sensibility, lost through alienation from la vie 
primitive (the primitive life).34 In light of his Valois writings, it also becomes clear why Nerval should 
have held such significance for someone like Barrès, whose mourning for the loss of the terroir (land 
or, literally, soil) also identified the subjective price of the break with tradition and community.35 
Unlike Sand and Barrès, however, Nerval is not interested in the rural as a timeless ideal of naivety 
and authenticity. The Valois region that is at the center of so much of his writing is not nostalgic, 
reactionary, or belated; in fact, it does not even stand in clear opposition to Paris as a traditional 
topos opposed to a modern one, but is a historically dynamic setting in its own right.36 The arrival of 
                                                
33 Nerval’s concern with local and traditional culture in fact partakes in a widespread and politically important fascination 
with regionalism throughout the 19th century. See Stéphane Gerson, Pride of Place. Gerson’s argument makes a fascinating 
complement to historical work suggesting that rural ties were far from having been destroyed at mid-century. Gérard 
Noiriel argues, for example, that local ties remained far stronger than is usually supposed even after workers moved to 
Paris; see Les Ouvriers dans la société française, XIXe-XXe siècle. Likewise, Eugen Weber discusses in Peasants into Frenchmen the 
ongoing work of modernizing the countryside through the end of the 19th century. The mid-century anxiety about the 
loss of vernacular cultural ties and the fascination with reviving it are particularly interesting in light of such work, which 
suggests that such interests were born more of the unevenness of modernization than of a sudden transformation of life. 
34 See Sand’s prefaces to François le Champi and La Mare au diable. 
35 See, for example, Barrès’s 1897 novel Les Déracinés, where his thinking about the self and the nation is grounded in 
links to territory and the dead. See, also, Barrès’s discussion of Nerval in his speech upon being received into the 
Académie Française in 1907. 
36 Neither is the Valois a private space, entirely cut off from history; cf. Chambers, Mélancolie et opposition, 99; and Bray, 
“Lost in the Fold,” 44. The Valois is neither an a-historical or an anti-modern space, but can rather be seen as a key 
element to the modernism of Nerval’s writing, if we understand modernism as Frederic Jameson defines it in 
Postmodernism as “the result of incomplete modernization” (366). 
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bourgeois values and mass culture in the Valois happens, as it were, before Nerval’s eyes and he is 
an attentive observer of the cultural transformation that ensues, particularly in Sylvie. He not only 
documents, but also dissects, that gradual transformation, demonstrating as much insight into the 
operations of modernization as he does grief for the world it destroys. Modernization is not treated 
only as a loss, as though redemption might require a step back in time, but rather reveals the 
potential for adaptation and reformulation of collective practice as much as its irrevocable loss. 
 Also unlike Sand and Barrès, Nerval does not attribute obvious political significance to the 
collective culture he explores and mourns, be it socialist or nationalist.37 Traditional culture is not 
merely a theme or a figure in his writing, deployed for extra-literary ends. It does not represent a 
point of social origin to which readers must be inspired to return, but rather functions as a point of 
reference for the literary project in which Nerval and his readers are engaged. The problem of the 
destruction of imaginative practices is for him above all a poetic problem to which poetic innovation 
must respond. 
 In this sense, Nerval’s writing might perhaps be better understood in relation to the hope 
invested in folksongs and popular poetry as a source of regeneration for literature by writers like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Étienne Pivert de Senancour, Mme de Staël, and even the Hugo of the 
ballades.38 But while Nerval’s experiments with the musicality of poetry in the early 1830s shared this 
kind of literal recuperation of popular formal elements (the primacy of melody over rhyme, for 
example), his work of the 1840s and 50s draws more indirect inspiration from popular forms.39 The 
collective practices that interest him are neither nostalgically presented nor faithfully mimicked, but 
are rather studiously explored: they are analyzed as models whose logic, rather than their mere form, 
might provide the basis for literary innovation.40 The Valois provides the experimental space in 
which that innovation might be fostered, in which literature might be reconceived as a form of 
collective imaginative practice. In Sylvie, as I will show in Chapter Two, this privileged function of 
the Valois is evident within the story itself, where the narrator passes through a series of shared 
performances that begin with traditional practices and test the limits of adaptation and deformation 
that would still maintain the essential experience—folksong, festival, disguise, role-playing. But the 
Valois also serves this function poetically in Les Faux Saulniers and Les Nuits d’octobre, where the 
passage out of the rule-bound, Parisian discursive space into the Valois allows for radical formal 
experimentation, which I will discuss in Chapters One and Three. 
 The inventive poetics that Nerval elaborates in the space of the Valois was created on the 
model of forms of collective culture that lie at the heart of his writing. Those forms—folk practices 
like songs and festivals, on the one hand, and popular fictions like superstition and canards, on the 
other—display two essential features that illuminate the complex operations of subjectivity and 
imagination in Nerval’s writing. First, Nerval draws on forms of imaginative practice in which the 
subject of experience is at once individual and collective. This is most obvious in the case of the folk 
                                                
37 The difficulty of identifying Nerval’s political commitments is well documented. While there is consensus in the recent 
scholarship I discussed earlier as to the oppositional nature of Nerval’s writing and even behavior, there is exceedingly 
little evidence as to his politics, per se. There is, to begin with, a dearth of explicit, documented political statements or 
actions; see, for example, Francis Dumont’s Nerval et les bousingots, which attempts to find coherence in the scattered 
evidence. Then, too, as Mizuno consistently observes, Nerval published in newspapers and journals of various politics 
and the degree to which editorial demands shaped his writing cannot be known for certain. It is in the light of this 
political uncertainty that I have sought the critical and visionary significance of Nerval’s writing in nuanced local 
engagements and their implications without trying to map them onto political positions. 
38 On 18th- and 19th-century interest in reviving the folksong, see Bénichou, Nerval et la chanson folklorique. 
39 Nerval gestures to the connection between his early poetry and his interest in the folksong in La Bohème galante, where 
the structure produces a series: odelettes, musical scores, folksongs. 
40 In this sense, the reading of Nerval I am proposing shares much with the Jacques Rancière’s reading of Mallarmé as 
reinventing poetry to fill the void left by collective religious and monarchic rites. See Mallarmé: La politique de la sirène. 
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festival, in which the individual’s embodied experience of personal participation is doubled by the 
sense of enacting an experience that belongs to others—not only the other participants but also 
generations past. Individuals are aware of performing or repeating a practice that exceeds them as 
individuals, while simultaneously participating on their own behalf, so that the act is ultimately a 
relational one. The connection established between individual and collective here is, for Nerval, the 
source of the intensity and imaginative richness these practices offer. In them the imagination draws 
individual subjectivity outside of itself, but not by transcending the self through the ideal as for 
someone like Baudelaire. It is rather the possibility of a vivid experience of connection and 
relationality that provides the density and substance of subjective experience. 
 The second key feature of the collective cultural forms that Nerval explores engages their 
participants in fictions that generate a particular kind of belief. Just as these forms allow for a 
disjunctive conjunction between individual and collective, they demand a combination of lucidity 
and belief that is crucially not suspension of disbelief. In Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s model, there is a 
clear division between the writer who creates the illusion and the readers who consume it; there is a 
clear division as well between the space of the real and the space of the fiction into which readers 
enter by bracketing it, by identifying it as a space of illusion in which they will not bring their lucidity 
to bear. In Nerval’s model, these kinds of divisions are not established, and the poles of lucidity and 
illusion are contained within every participant, in a space entirely contiguous with the “real.” 
Returning to the festival model, we might think of this operation of belief as what differentiates the 
festival from the theater. In the theater as Denis Diderot, for example, theorizes it, the actor makes 
the audience feel something, creates an illusion for them, insofar as he himself feels nothing and 
remains entirely outside the illusion.41 But in the festival, every participant is at once actor and 
audience, responsible both for creating the artifice of the illusion and for enjoying the illusion—
despite their awareness of it as illusion. Lucidity and illusion exist together here, without one 
overtaking the other: the festival participants are neither unfeeling nor delusional.42 The same can be 
said of the audiences of popular fictions: legends, freak shows, and the like. These forms cannot 
simply be chalked up to the backwardness or stupidity of people who can’t tell reason from 
superstition, but neither are they fictions in the way of the novel. Rather, they engage an entirely 
different epistemological attitude, in which contradictory beliefs can be held simultaneously, in 
which fiction is a mode of the real. In all of these cases, there is no privileged rationalism from 
which the imagination is a clearly contained exception; these cultural forms rather create experiences 
in which the imagination coexists with other faculties within the heart of life. 
 By way of their imbrication of the individual and the collective, as well as lucidity and 
illusion, the forms of collective imaginative practice that interest Nerval provide a new way of 
understanding his poetics. Nerval’s writing does not, as I’ve said, correspond to established genres, 
and particularly to fictional genres—which perhaps explains why scholars are so quick to assume the 
autobiographical status of his work: if literary form here conforms to no recognizable generic logic, 
that must be because it conforms so completely to the subjectivity it expresses. But in exploring the 
folk and popular cultural forms that interest Nerval, it becomes clear that literary form in his writing 
does indeed correspond to generic logics, though of genres not properly literary. Even if he never 
completed a novel, his is a body of work deeply concerned with the nature of fiction, if fiction is to 
be understood as a form of imaginative experience associated with a variety of lived and textual 
practices. That is to say, fiction is a subjective phenomenon in Nerval’s writing. That is to say, too, 
that fiction is not symptomatic. The conjunctive disjunctions of self and other, reality and illusion 
found throughout his works are not delusional, not traces of a “real” subjective illness. They must be 
                                                
41 See Diderot, Paradoxe sur le comédien. 
42 See Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert, where he criticizes the inauthenticity of theater in favor of the fête publique. 
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understood rather as approximations and adaptations of cultural forms that might save literature 
from becoming just another domain of the bourgeois individual. Nerval’s resistance to a coherent, 
individual writing subject is not psychotic, but poetic—a historically-situated literary innovation that 
troubles the operations of literature in order to get beyond an exchange between two individuals, 
writer and reader. As I will explore further in Chapter Four, the plurality and mobility of the writing 
subject allow writer and reader to circulate together through its different identities, bringing the 
imaginative acts of writing and reading much closer together. Writer and reader take up relations like 
those of festival participants, and literature becomes a collective practice on the model of folk and 
popular culture. In a radical reversal of the longstanding assumptions of Nerval studies, I will show 
Nerval’s body of work to be entirely opposed to isolation. It does not close in upon itself, creating a 
private imaginative universe, but rather ceaselessly opens itself up, drawing in other texts and other 
voices in order to recuperate imagination as a form of collective life. 
 The chapters that follow demonstrate the profoundly relational nature of Nerval’s writing: 
first, by foregrounding the way the texts are situated in conversation with cultural institutions and 
transformations; and second, by showing that the poetic difficulty of the texts should not be 
attributed to a failure of subjectivity, but rather to an opening of subjectivity and a move beyond it. 
The first in each pair of chapters reads one of Nerval’s most obviously occasional texts, helping to 
draw out the situation and the stakes of the reading of the more canonically “literary” text that 
follows. 
 In Chapter One, I situate the serial Les Nuits d’octobre [October Nights] in the mid-19th-century 
no man’s land between Champfleury’s Realism and the Idealist aesthetics of conservative critics, two 
opposed camps that nonetheless unwittingly cooperate to marginalize the imagination. I argue that 
by pushing empiricism beyond the limits of rationality and employing dream as a mode of ironic 
argumentation, Nerval vindicates imagination as a literary and a phenomenological mode. In 
Chapter Two, I read Sylvie, ou Souvenirs du Valois [Sylvie, or Memories of the Valois] in light of Nerval’s 
critique of conservative Idealism, uncovering the historical reflection at the heart of the story. I 
argue that, through the opposition of the figures of the actress and the peasant girl, the story 
represents the impasses of modernization, but also reflects on how imaginative forms might 
transcend those impasses, exploring and performing sincerity as a kind of fictional practice. 
 In Chapter Three, I read Les Faux Saulniers [The Salt Smugglers] as a critique of the 
marginalization of both fiction and collective writing practices operated by the July 1850 Press Law, 
arguing that by presenting a variety of storytelling forms and voices, Nerval asserts the vitality of 
fiction beyond the limits of the novel and creates a mobile, poly-vocal writing subject always just out 
of reach of the law. In Chapter Four, I consider the poly-vocality of Nerval’s poetics in relation to 
the conceptions of originality at stake in contemporary debates as to the nature of intellectual and 
literary property. I contend that the practices of textual borrowing, citation, and republication that 
characterize Nerval’s writing (practices not previously theorized) participate in these debates by 
performing the fundamentally collective nature of literary production. In texts like Les Illuminés [The 
Illuminati] and Les Chimères [The Chimeras], it is through intertextuality, presented openly to readers 
and invoking a body of shared readerly experience, that Nerval generates a literary practice akin to 
acting, with both author and readers taking up the text like a role to be played, not to fool anyone, 
but to create a community of shared performance.
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
Empiricism Reimagined 
Les Nuits d’octobre 
 
 
Aux yeux de l’imagination, le monde réel languit 
auprès de ses fictions. On peut sentir que 
l’imagination devient la maîtresse à l’ennui des choses 
réelles et présentes. Les fantômes de l’imagination ont 
un vague, une indécision de formes qui émeut mille 
fois plus que la netteté et la distinction des 
perceptions actuelles.  
 
[In the eyes of the imagination, the real world wilts 
beside its own fictions. Boredom with real, present 
things signals that the imagination has taken hold. 
The ghosts of the imagination have a haziness, an 
indefiniteness of shape that is a thousand times more 
moving than the clarity and definiteness of actual 
perceptions.] 
 
Victor Cousin1 
 
 
The Ambivalent Realist 
In 1852, Nerval published a rambling feuilleton (serial) in which he explicitly addressed the question 
of what kind of writer he aspired to be. The wandering narration of the travel journal cum parody 
Les Nuits d’octobre [October Nights] took the readers of L’Illustration all over Paris and the Valois in five 
installments during October and November of that year, and took Nerval through an experiment 
with literary Realism.2 Having (twice) missed his train to Meaux (for what purpose, we know not), 
                                                
1 “Du beau et de l’art,” Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 September 1845. English citations from Les Nuits d’octobre will be quoted 
from Sieburth’s translation, October Nights, in Selected Writings, 204-44. All other translations are my own, except where 
otherwise noted. 
2 Whether the capitalization of this word to refer to the literary school is indeed appropriate for the period in question, 
when the contours of the category were still somewhat in flux and it was deployed far more as an insult than as a motto, 
is a question I will bracket. Maintaining the convention of capitalizing “Realism” in the literary context is intended here 
simply to mark my intent to speak only about this context and not about the broad philosophical tradition of realism. 
Just what the word “Realism” refers to will be discussed at great length below. 
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the narrator stops into a café for an absinthe with his flâneur friend and stumbles upon a Charles 
Dickens article in a review he happens to thumb through.3 In the text that follows, he claims to 
adopt the procedure of this article that belongs to the distinguished English tradition of 
“observation dénué[e] de tout alliage d’invention romanesque” [“first-hand observation 
unencumbered by the slightest contrivance of fiction”], pursuing not the dull sentimentality beloved 
by French readers, but rather a “vrai absolu” [“absolute truth”].4 The experiment is short-lived, 
however, and by the serial’s end, the narrator has proclaimed his renunciation of Realism. 
From its initial appeal to Realism’s procedures, to its final claim to have been cured of its 
Realist ambitions, Les Nuits d’octobre presents itself as Nerval’s confrontation with Realism. What is 
less evident, however, is how such a confrontation is to be interpreted and what relation this text 
might bear to Nerval’s other writing. Given the ways in which Realism’s referential ambitions are 
underpinned by a whole set of assumptions about the relationship between writing and the world, 
the Realist experiment of the feuilleton seems to represent the adoption and then rejection of those 
assumptions. But this literary-philosophical experiment is doubly perplexing with regard to the rest 
of Nerval’s writing, counter-intuitive both in its adoption of Realism and in its rejection. On the one 
hand, Nerval is traditionally understood as a writer entirely indifferent to Realism and objective 
referentiality, preferring instead the strictly personal worlds of imagination and dream. What, then, 
was he doing undertaking an entire Realist serial? On the other hand, Nerval in fact published a 
wealth of travel writing during his career, and had spent a great portion of the years leading up to Les 
Nuits d’octobre actively engaged in representing the material world in literature. Why, then, did he 
stage the local rejection of Realism in this serial? Before the oddities of the text even begin to pile 
up, its framing cannot help but make readers wonder both why Realism is a subject of explicit 
interest here and what significance ought to be given to its rejection in the end. 
For many scholars, the most sensible way of answering these questions has been to divide 
the contradictory aspects of Nerval’s writing into different phases of his career. Les Nuits d’octobre can 
then be understood as a turning point in his relationship to Realist writing practices, broadly 
construed. The serial did, as I’ve noted, come at the end of years of travel writing (a form of writing 
largely focused on the outside world and what the writer encounters in it), as well as a series of 
physiologies or character portraits.5 The careful social and material observations of the Voyage en 
Orient, Lorely, and countless articles, gave way, around 1852, to apparently much more personal, if 
not always autobiographical, forms of writing. Though Nerval’s narrators continued to travel, they 
tended to stay close to home and to sites already significant in their memories or imbued with 
imaginative significance.6 The encounter with the world as newness seems to have been replaced by 
                                                
3 The article in question, “The Key of the Street,” was not actually written by Dickens but by Charles Augustus Sala; 
because it was unsigned in its original publication in Household Words, the editors of the Revue brittanique wrongly 
attributed it to Dickens when they published it in translation. Since these circumstances were unknown at the time, I will 
follow the 1852 readers of the article, and of Les Nuits d’octobre, in taking Dickens as my point of reference in situating 
this text. See Virginia K. Lamb, “Nerval, Dickens et … Sala.” 
4 Les Nuits d’octobre in Œuvres complètes, 3:311-51, 314/Selected Writings, 205. 
5 Though the esoterism of Les Illuminés [The Illuminati] might obscure their relationship to Realism, we must remember 
that these character studies participate in a trend to which Champfleury’s Les Excentriques [The Eccentrics] also belong. 
Precisely in their selection of marginal figures (taken from life, rather than invented) depicted in great detail, these kinds 
of studies were understood as Realist in their ambitions. Nerval’s travel writing is much more obviously Realist in many 
of its tendencies, especially in its emphasis on contemporary society rather than history; see Jean-Marie Carré, Voyageurs 
et écrivains français en Egypte. Mizuno also provides an interesting perspective on Nerval’s travel writing as Realist in the 
vein of Flemish and Dutch painting; see “Nerval, écrivain de la vie moderne, et la peinture flamande et hollandaise.” 
6 We see the beginnings of this tendency in the narrator’s travels through the Valois in Les Faux Saulniers (see Chapter 
Three); it becomes ever more pronounced as the focus on the Valois, Vienna, and Naples is intensified in Les Filles du 
Feu, Pandora, and Promenades et Souvenirs in 1853 and 1854. See Chapter Two. 
 18 
repeated encounters with the self, as Nerval increasingly emphasized memory after 1852 and so 
made the autobiographical a more apparently significant dimension of his writing 7 The rigorous 
external referentiality of his great corpus of travel narratives seems to have come to self-
consciousness in Les Nuits d’octobre, only to be abandoned in subsequent works.8 Realism’s place in 
Les Nuits d’octobre has thus been of key hermeneutic significance for linking Nerval’s diverse writing 
practices in one coherent narrative, structured by an opposition between writing-the-world and 
writing-the-self.9  
This story that Les Nuits d’octobre helps to tell about the development of Nerval’s œuvre is 
not only a story of literary form, however. It is solidly grounded in the assumption that Nerval’s 
writing expresses his mental state and so it is also a story of his mental illness. For many scholars, 
the Realist orientation toward objective reality and the more personal or imaginative orientation are 
only the external forms of an internal experience of a healthy or unhealthy relationship of self to 
world. There is near unanimity among scholars in assuming that the necessity of the opposition 
between writing-the-world and writing-the-self emerges from the inexorable opposition between 
sanity and madness; there is agreement, too, that the trajectory of Nerval’s career expresses his 
movement toward perdition, and that the writing-the-self he does in the end is the symptom of the 
madness that took his life. 
Where that critical unanimity breaks down is in determining how those necessary 
oppositions map onto each other and what characterizes the fatal writing-of-self—determinations 
that depend on the understanding of Nerval’s madness that a scholar brings to the text. The two 
most common diagnoses directly oppose each other, the first identifying a dangerous narcissism that 
traps Nerval within his own self, where the second identifies a dangerous porousness that erodes the 
integrity of the self. 10 The significance of Realism (sometimes redemptive, sometimes perilous), and 
of its eventual rejection, depends entirely on whether scholars understand the force that destroys 
Nerval’s sanity as centripetal or centrifugal, contracting or exploding the self. According to Michel 
Jeanneret, for example, the Realism of Les Nuits d’octobre operates a dispossession of the self: by 
submitting itself to empirical disorder, the subject gives up attributing meaning to the world and also 
gives up its own identity.11 In Jeanneret’s reading, the Realist experiment is thus an aggravation of 
Nerval’s madness understood as a disintegration or a shattering of the self. Bruno Tritsmans offers 
the inverse interpretation of the feuilleton, arguing that it is the turn away from Realism that signals the 
demise of Nerval’s sanity: “la liquidation du projet initial par laquelle le récit s’achève est, en somme, 
                                                
7 Though this common account of Nerval’s trajectory as a writer is useful for pinpointing the significance of this 
particular moment in his career, I will ultimately argue that this increasing emphasis on the first person after 1852 does 
not, in fact, represent a turn toward the autobiographical and an increasing enclosure in the self; instead, I will want to 
read it as a process of experimentation in integrating the world into writing without opposing it to the self of a writing 
subjectivity. 
8 Mizuno’s study of réalisme in Les Nuits d’octobre proceeds along these lines; his preliminary parsing of some of the 
specificities and stakes of Realism in the early 1850s is very valuable and has contributed to my situating of Nerval’s text; 
however Mizuno ultimately delivers a highly personal reading that minimizes the importance of the broader cultural 
milieu in favor of reconciling Les Nuits d’octobre with a particular understanding of the writing Nerval was to do for the 
last few years of his life. See Mizuno, “Nerval face au réalisme. Les Nuits d’octobre et l’esthétique nervalienne.” 
9 See, for example, Cellier, Gérard de Nerval : l’homme et l’œuvre; and Chambers, Gérard de Nerval et la poétique du voyage. 
10 The self-evidence with which either of these problems (narcissism or loss of self) may be invoked as the central 
interpretive tool in Nerval studies sometimes creates a strange confusion; in Michiko Asahina’s study of Les Nuits 
d’octobre and Aurélia, for example, Nerval is first punished for the incoherent dispersion of his subjectivity (linked to 
Realism and his brand of flânerie), and then subject to madness characterized by confinement within a closed subjectivity. 
The dynamic of illness and punishment/cure is so confidently assumed as to function even if that requires radically 
shifting the definition of his illness from one reading to another. See Asahina, “Nerval: la ville et l’errance.” 
11 See “L’écriture et ses ruses” in La Lettre perdue. As I will show later in this chapter, Jeanneret’s conceptions of 
imagination and subjectivity closely mirror those of spiritualist philosophy and psychology during the mid-19th century. 
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le constat de l’impossibilité d’échapper au rétrécissement, à la cristallisation des préoccupations de 
Nerval autour de la problématique de moi” [“the liquidation of the initial project with which the 
story ends is, essentially, an admission of the impossibility of escaping the constriction, the 
crystallization of Nerval’s preoccupations around the problematic of the self”].12 If Nerval’s downfall 
is narcissism, then it is the turn away from the world, represented by the abandonment of Realism, 
that aggravates his madness. 
In these readings, the complex gesture of adopting and then rejecting Realism that Nerval 
makes in Les Nuits d’octobre is bent to the purposes of psychological arguments that remain external 
to the serial. Realism is treated as an abstraction (an outward turn, toward the world), opposed to 
some other abstraction of dream or imagination (an inward turn, toward the self). Understanding the 
story is thus merely a matter of glossing the shift from one abstraction to the other so that it maps 
onto whatever duality drives a preexisting narrative of Nerval’s career and life.13 In projecting 
psychological or existential stakes onto the Realist conceit, such readings fail to read it well, either in 
its textual complexity or in its historical specificity.14 The conjugation of writing the self and writing 
the world in Les Nuits d’octobre is not nearly as simple as the binary of adopting and rejecting the 
conceit would suggest: Nerval treats the form in which he writes with a great deal of nuance and 
irony here, as he will do in Sylvie and Les Faux Saulniers. Nerval himself described Les Nuits d’octobre, 
“[l]e seul article que j’aie écrite dans le genre réaliste” [“the only article I have ever written in the realist 
genre”], as “une sorte d’imitation satirique de Dickens” [“a sort of satirical imitation of Dickens”], 
claiming both to write in the Realist genre and to satirize it.15 Reading the Realism of Les Nuits 
d’octobre requires, then, both a careful attention to the satirical complexity of the writing, and a 
reflection on the stakes of such a satire—its significance as a critical engagement with an established 
genre and the writers associated with it. However, neither, the form of the writing nor its 
engagement with the literary field can be understood simply by taking the narrator at his word, and 
so we must pause over each in turn. 
 
Tensions and Digressions 
The encounter with Realism in Les Nuits d’octobre is an extremely complicated one that includes an 
adoption and rejection of Realist constraints—but not only that. On the one hand, the explicit 
engagement with Realism is invoked throughout the feuilleton and seems to be the text’s central 
concern. The text begins with two missed trains and an encounter with a Dickens article that frames 
the writing that will follow as an experiment in recreating the strict Realism of the English school. 
And indeed, the first three installments give an unflinching (or at least unrelenting) view of the lowly 
nightlife of Paris, from homeless men sleeping in sections of gas pipe, to public balls and seedy 
cafés. The narrator and his flâneur friend pass through the lower reaches of Parisian society and 
encounter the range of social types and milieus to be found there: flower sellers and rag-pickers, 
laborers and vagabonds, students and grisettes show up in cafés, bars, public balls, and singing clubs. 
                                                
12 “Impasses Narratives dans Les Nuits d’Octobre de Gérard de Nerval,” 163. 
13 Just one example of this, among many, is Chambers’s reading in Gérard de Nerval et la poétique du voyage, in which Les 
Nuits d’octobre is submitted to the singular duality of dream and reality that Chambers sees behind all Nerval’s writing; the 
terms of this duality are so abstracted in their generalization, however, that the role of literal dreams in Les Nuits d’octobre 
can be given only allegorical significance with regard to an overarching conception of dream as synonymous with 
madness (or, at least, interchangeable with anything that could be an antonym for reality). 
14 Richard’s study of Nerval in Poésie et profondeur is a prime example of this emphasis on the structure of Nerval’s 
consciousness rather than the literary field in which he was engaged; see “Géographie magique de Nerval.” However, 
this orientation is far from being limited to thematic approaches: it is, rather, a point of near unanimity among scholars. 
Recent readings by Chambers and Mizuno pursue much more historically grounded studies, but always retaining a 
certain level of abstraction in their historical terms, in order to refer them back to existing psychological frameworks. 
15 Letter to Ludovic Picard, January 30, 1853 in Œuvres complètes, 3:799. 
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The movement between these sites is not organized in the text by any overarching argument or 
predominating plot; there is a loose thematic of the search for a nocturnal meal, but this does not 
keep the narrator’s wanderings from being largely random, so that what is seen takes center stage.16 
Emphasizing the empirical over the distorting intervention of idealized literary types and plots, in 
addition to sharing Realism’s interest in studies of popular mores, Les Nuits d’octobre thus seems to 
represent a foray into Realism—the same kind of short-lived attempt at a conventional genre as 
Nerval’s unfinished historical novel, Le Marquis de Fayolle.17 Taking the narrator at his word (though 
we should know the dangers of this by now), we might see the encounter with Dickens as the 
culmination of Nerval’s own referential writing practices in an aborted attempt at Realism proper. 
On the other hand, however, the status of Realism in the feuilleton is complicated by more 
than its eventual abandonment. The text’s explicit Realist ambitions are problematized early and 
often, in part by the many installments that do not feature Parisian scenes depicted under a 
Dickensian banner, and in part by the elements of even those Parisian scenes that are not reducible 
to a study of manners. From the outset, the Realist aspirations of the text are only articulated in the 
suspension of an apparently more primary project, the journey to Meaux that is deferred by the 
missed trains. Though the travel writing of that intended journey seems to share the empirical focus 
of the Realism at stake in Les Nuits d’octobre, the motivation of travel writing by the logic of an 
itinerary contrasts with the aimless wandering of Nerval’s narrator.18 If the serial adopts a Realist 
project, then, it does so only within the space opened up by postponing a project of a different kind, 
and the discovery and imitation of the Dickens article are, strictly speaking, only filling time (and 
columns) until the travel (and travel writing) can commence. As we will see time and again, we must 
be suspicious of what Nerval’s narrators slip into the text in the guise of digression, and wonder 
whether digression will ever give way to the thing it supposedly defers. But in Les Nuits d’octobre, the 
narrator does eventually return to his initial itinerary, and so the significance of Realism here cannot 
be thought without reference to the travel (writing) from which it emerges and which it finally 
transforms. 
What’s more, the suspended journey to Meaux that might have structured the feuilleton is not, 
by any means, the only challenge to the serial’s Realist claims. The Dickensian conceit of the Parisian 
installments of Les Nuits d’octobre is doubled with a Dantean, distinctly non-Realist one. Just as the 
narrator is guided through the practice of Realist writing by Dickens, so, too, is he guided through 
his initiation into nocturnal Paris by the friend who makes him miss his train the second time. The 
establishments they visit are described as purgatory and hell, and when the narrator grows 
squeamish, his friend quotes Virgil’s encouragement to Dante: “« Sois fort et hardi : on ne descend 
ici que par de tels escaliers »” [“‘Be bold and think not of retreat/This way must serve us for the 
downward stair’”].19 These invocations of the idealized structure of Dante’s hell, with its orderly 
rings and clear moral classifications, are distinctly at odds with the text’s naked observation 
supposedly modeled on Dickens. The material world is invaded by the symbolic.20 This effect is only 
intensified by the other cultural allusions made throughout the Parisian installments (to Cicero, 
Diderot, Homer, and Mozart, among others), which constantly draw the narrator’s experiences back 
                                                
16 For more on food and Nerval’s interest in the real, see Henri Bonnet, “Le ventre de Paris dans Les Nuits d’octobre.” 
17 Unfinished, published in feuilleton in Le Temps from March to December, 1849. Michel Lévy published the novel, 
finished by Édouard Georges, in 1856. Œuvres complètes, 1:1133-1257. 
18 I will return below to the significance of aimlessness in defining the Realism at stake here; for the present, I will simply 
observe the disorderliness of the narrator’s path through Paris, and the lack of any planned itinerary. I will also return to 
the Meaux itinerary to see whether the expectation of order implied by a planned journey is borne out.  
19 Les Nuits d’octobre in Œuvres complètes, 3:328/Selected Writings, 220. 
20 See Chamarat-Malandain, “Dante et Diderot dans Les Nuits d’Octobre” in Nerval, réalisme et invention. 
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into his own intellectual life to give them meaning through association, rather than letting the 
empirical stand on its own.21 
This is not to say, however, that the Dantean is allowed to get more traction than the 
Dickensian, for Nerval keeps this conceit, too, messy and incomplete. Though the narrator’s early 
invocation of Francesca da Rimini in association with the couples he encounters (“souriants ou 
plaintifs” [“lightsome” or “winsome”]) places him precisely in the second circle of hell, he goes on 
to emphasize the ambiguity of that lustful space: “L’adultère, le crime et la faiblesse se coudoient, 
sans se reconnaître, à travers ces ombres trompeuses” [“adultery, crime and frailty all intermingle in 
this crowd of elusive shades”].22 The meticulous sorting of offenders into rings is challenged by the 
disorderly multiplicity of supposedly like sinners, suggesting that the descent into hell will not 
proceed along a direct path through clearly defined moral spaces. And indeed, this suggestion is 
quickly affirmed when the narrator’s guide advises him to buck up for the rest of his initiation: “« ce 
n’est pas là l’enfer : c’est tout au plus le purgatoire. Allons plus loin »” [“This is not Hell: this is at 
most Purgatory. Let’s forge onwards”].23 The narrator’s perception of his initiation into Hell is quite 
different from his guide’s, so that when he thinks he has passed the second ring, he has not yet even 
entered hell. It comes as little surprise, then, when his initiation does not end at the center of hell—
or, perhaps, in hell at all. The narrator assures his readers that the café Paul Niquet (his last stop), 
with its drunken rag-pickers and amateur philosopher, is not a place beyond redemption, wondering 
why no one intervenes to help these people escape “ce vestibule du purgatoire d’où il serait peut-être 
facile de sauver quelques âmes…” [“the antechambers of Purgatory from which it might yet be 
possible to save a few souls…”].24 The evident irony of this statement does not stop it from 
dampening the effect of the Dantean conceit, and so when the narrator goes on to say, “Le soleil 
commence à percer le vitrage supérieur de la salle, la porte s’éclaire. Je m’élance de cet enfer” [“The 
sun is beginning to slant through the windows near the ceiling; light is filtering through the door. I 
scurry out of this Hell”] his use of the word enfer has lost its Dantean specificity.25 No longer a 
structured moral and narrative space, the hell at stake here is only a place of banal disorder and 
suffering.26 
The first installments of the feuilleton are caught, then, between two tendencies: one toward a 
mode of empirical observation where no organizing principle disturbs the representation of what is 
encountered; and another toward an overarching structure that situates each moment of the real 
within an ideal, allegorical system. Each facet undoes the other, with the constant pull toward 
transcendence via cultural reference shattering the self-conscious immanence of the Realist 
representation, while the disorderliness of the empirical refuses the meaning that the ideal Dantean 
order would attribute to it. This interference is never resolved within the Parisian installments of Les 
Nuits d’octobre, so that the mutual destruction of these two literary conceits seems to leave the text 
scattered with shards of different ambitions that cannot be pieced together into anything coherent.27 
This strenuous resistance to closure surpasses even what we will observe in Les Faux Saulniers, where 
                                                
21 Tritsmans’s treatment of the ironic effect of cultural allusions in Les Nuits d’octobre offers many insights, though I do 
not share his understanding of this irony as masking the pain of a lack of established cultural values; see “La Descente 
aux enfers dans ‘Les Nuits d’Octobre’ de Gérard de Nerval.” 
22 Les Nuits d’ocbore in Œuvres complètes, 3:326/Selected Writings, 218. 
23 Ibid., 328/220 
24 Ibid., 335/227. 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Tritsmans, “La Descente aux enfers dans ‘Les Nuits d’Octobre’ de Gérard de Nerval,” 221. 
27 Coming to terms with the great irresolution of these competing conceits is an essential part of accounting for the 
experience of reading Les Nuits d’octobre. Despite their many insights, it is the decision to privilege the Realist and the 
Dantean, respectively, that makes the readings of Mizuno and Sieburth feel so incomplete; see Mizuno, “Nerval face au 
réalisme;” and Sieburth, “Introductory Note” to October Nights in Selected Writings. 
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deferral is placed front and center: the suspension of the journey to Meaux (Les Nuits d’octobre’s 
ostensible subject) is doubled by an irresolvable opposition between two contradictory literary 
tendencies. 
In its complexity, the text’s deployment of the three literary conceits of travel, Realism, and 
allegory does not immediately establish a clear parti pris in relation to Realism. In these first three 
installments, none of the generic claims dominates the text and so Nerval’s literary allegiances are 
anything but clear. We might think of this first, Parisian part of the feuilleton as putting forth a 
problematic, setting two discourses against each other in a confined textual space and letting their 
conflicts play out. It is not until the second part of the text (the two Valois installments in which the 
travel conceit is revived) that Nerval makes an intervention into the field he has sketched out. 
Understanding the significance and the nuance of that intervention requires understanding what is at 
stake in his depiction of the literary field as an opposition between the two poetics epitomized by 
the Dickensian and the Dantean. Les Nuits d’octobre, like so much of Nerval’s writing, is a text that 
responded explicitly to the literary field in which it was written, and its terms (including “Realism”) 
are drawn from that field with all of their concrete historical content—content we must recover. Just 
as Sylvie’s Idealism will have to be read in the context of its historical and institutional significance, 
so Nerval’s encounter with Realism in Les Nuits d’octobre cannot be read as abstractly philosophical or 
autonomously aesthetic. Nerval’s aesthetic choices in Les Nuits d’octobre, as elsewhere, are self-
consciously political and polemical, situating Nerval’s reflection on the relationships between self, 
world, and writing in relation to the way those elements were conjugated in the debates surrounding 
Realism during this period. 
 
Realism and Its Opponents 
Elucidating Nerval’s representation of the literary field via Dickens and Dante requires linking these 
figures to the historically specific literary discourses they are used to represent. First and foremost, 
this means breaking with the conceptions of Realism, both formal and historical, that have become 
commonplaces of modern literary studies. Realism is one of the most well established (if multi-
faceted) categories of literary scholarship, and though it is much critiqued, one can nonetheless 
invoke it with come confidence that it will be understood without being defined.28 The word 
commonly stands, on the one hand, for a mode of writing that emphasizes empirical observation of 
the everyday and so relies on certain mimetic procedures, and on the other hand, for a set of 19th-
century novels that epitomize those procedures. That set of works is generally agreed upon, though 
the works themselves are quite disparate: they include most of the novels in Balzac’s La Comédie 
Humaine [The Human Comedy], Stendhal’s Le Rouge et le noir [The Red and the Black], Flaubert’s Madame 
Bovary, and the novels of the Goncourts so famously mocked by Proust. They sometimes include, as 
well, the late-century Naturalist novels that are both Realism’s fullest realization and a move beyond 
it in their concerted positivism: Zola’s  Rougon-Macquart series, and some of Guy de Maupassant’s 
novels and stories. These works associated with Realism as a historical school are central to the 
canon of French literature, particularly as it is taught in the U.S., and the lines of a conflict between 
the referentiality of the novel and the self-reflexivity of poetry are so well drawn that it can be 
                                                
28 Indeed, a notion of the Realist novel with its third person omniscient narrator and emphasis on empirical social 
observation has been hardened by long use and by the various theoretical projects that have taken it as their starting 
point. Georg Lukács’s notorious Theory of the Novel of course comes immediately to mind, but the genealogy of studies 
predicated on a fixed conception of Realism is a long one. Whether we look at a thinker like Jean-Paul Sartre, who 
makes Realism a mode of nearly pure linguistic referentiality in Qu’est-ce que la littérature?, or one like Roland Barthes, who 
argues in “L’effet de réel” that there is an excess of reference in Realism that goes beyond the purely mimetic, what 
remains constant is a sense that there is a culturally agreed-upon object that can be invoked without much work of 
definition. 
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difficult to think the 19th century without them (even if they are invoked only to be critiqued). The 
mimetic procedures associated with Realism more broadly are also fixtures of literary studies, in 
which they are often invoked for the naivety of their referential claims. As the literary genre most 
emblematic of unproblematic reference, Realism is itself one of the least problematized referents in 
literary studies, banal in its obviousness, and so most often invoked to mark a work’s deviation from 
it. However, this putative conception of Realism can only be an obstacle to understanding the 
literary field in which Nerval intervened in Les Nuits d’octobre. A monolithic conception of the Realist 
paradigm, either as a referential discourse or as a historical school, belies precisely the 
transformations and ambiguities that shaped it and that are at stake in Nerval’s feuilleton.29 Above all, 
such a conception belies the fact that Realism existed first, and for nearly two decades, not as a 
banner to be carried but as an accusation to be hurled. As such, its significance lay not in the 
aesthetic values it affirmed (not in its pretentions to objective referentiality), but in those it was seen 
to transgress: before it was a literary school, it was what some critics saw as the antithesis of 
literature.30 
This negative sense of the word “Realism” was pioneered in the early 1830s by the critics of 
the Revue des Deux Mondes, a cultural institution whose crucial importance has been largely forgotten, 
since the aesthetic it promoted has not fared as well as those it rejected.31 The Revue served, from its 
inception in 1829, as the aesthetic mouthpiece of the liberal bourgeoisie, following more or less the 
same ideological trajectory during the July Monarchy as the Doctrinaire politicians Guizot and 
Cousin. In the early 1830s, the conservatism of these liberals and their aesthetic expression in the 
Revue were still moderate: in the face of Romanticism, the critics of the Revue did not advocate a 
reactionary classical aesthetic, but rather sought merely to distinguish between a good and a bad 
Romanticism. The Romanticism they promoted was the Idealist strain of Alfred de Vigny, Alfred de 
Musset, and George Sand, which corresponded to the constant and unanimous set of literary values 
that the Revue affirmed up to the Second Empire: an ideal of beauty whose spiritual dimension had 
to be protected from the distractions of the material.32 This beauty entailed coherence and a unity of 
purpose, to which the imagination contributed as the intervention of the intellect in the creative 
process, taking the chaos of material phenomena and arranging it to accomplish a unified purpose. 
The Revue’s conception of the imagination was as an ordering function: not a wild proliferation of 
unconstrained possibilities, but the deployment of the world’s disorder to express a single idea. 
George Sand’s early writing was emblematic of this aesthetic, as explained by critic Gustave Planche 
in an 1833 review of Lélia: “tous les caractères de Lélia sont des symboles philosophiques, et 
                                                
29 Les Nuits d’octobre was published in 1852, before the consolidation of the Realist movement we know and the 
retroactive inclusion of early 19th-century writers within it. At this moment (before the advent of either Flaubert’s 
modernist aestheticism or Zola’s positivism), the writers we now think of as Realists—writers like Balzac and Stendhal—
were not known as Realists but were rather still associated with Romanticism. The claims of Realism as a literary 
movement were being made in 1852 by Champfleury, a writer whose theorizations and implementations of Realism no 
longer figure in the literary canon. I will return below to a more detailed discussion of Champfleury’s Realism. 
30 In trying to think the history of Realism without primarily referencing the current conception of the Realist novel, the 
studies of Bernard Weinberg, Thaddeus Ernest Du Val Jr., and Wilbur H. Oda are invaluable, however outdated. More 
than any more recent work I have encountered, these three studies emphasize an exhaustive account of how the notion 
of Realism was formulated first and foremost in a critical context, rather than by the writers who would eventually claim 
it or be claimed by it. See Weinberg, French Realism: The Critical Reaction, 1830-1870; Du Val, The Subject of Realism in the 
Revue des Deux Mondes; and Oda, The Subject of Réalisme in the Revue de Paris (1829-1858). 
31 There is some disagreement about the first use of the term réaliste/réalisme, but it seems to have appeared in both the 
Revue des Deux Mondes—where it would continue to be an important enemy of critics like Hippolyte Fourtoul and 
Gustave Planche—and La Presse in 1833 or 1834. See Du Val, The Subject of Realism in the Revue des Deux Mondes, 
Gengembre, Le réalisme, and Bafaro, Le roman réaliste et naturaliste. For more on the idealist aesthetic of the Revue, see 
Chapter Two. 
32 Du Val, 27. 
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représentent, sous une forme idéale et complète, un sentiment particulier, développé isolément, à 
l’exclusion des sentimens [sic] qui pourraient le contrarier, le rétrécir, en diminuer l’éclat et la portée” 
[“all the characters in Lélia are philosophical symbols and represent, in an ideal and complete form, a 
particular feeling developed in isolation, freed of feelings that might contradict it, constrict it, 
diminish its brilliance and its reach”].33 In Planche’s account, the beauty and strength of Sand’s 
writing come from the way in which all details, all emotions resonate in harmony, to the exclusion of 
anything that might confuse the chord. This is the aesthetic that stands behind the Dantean allegory 
in Les Nuits d’octobre, one in which the idea to be expressed in the work transcends the material. 
Realism, then, was the name given in the early 1830s to the bad strain of Romanticism that 
transgressed this Idealism. It was applied to writers like Hugo, Dumas, and Balzac, and referred to 
the perceived excess of materialism in their novels and plays, the undue and unredeemed emphasis 
on accurate detail.34 Even the relatively Idealist Hugo of the 1820s had admired a form of writing 
entirely unlike Sand’s carefully unified narrative, a writing in which “l’action imaginaire se déroule en 
tableaux vrais et variés, comme se déroulent les événements réels de la vie” [“the imaginary action 
unfolds, like the real events of life, in real and varied tableaux”].35 Whereas the Hugo of Notre Dame 
de Paris, for example, used intricately textured descriptions to contribute to, rather than distract from 
“l’idée unique de l’ouvrage” [“the singular idea of the work”], the critics of the Revue remained 
convinced that the material and the ideal were at odds.36 They thus used “Realism” to denote the 
anarchy that lies outside the realm of art in which imagination makes its arrangements in the interest 
of beauty alone. This Realism was not yet the realism of Dickens, however; it was not the affirmative 
project of representing the real that Nerval takes up in Les Nuits d’octobre. To understand this flipside 
of the Idealist-Realist opposition in the serial, we must follow the history of the Revue into the early 
1850s, when an affirmative Realism finally emerged. 
The critics of the Revue des Deux Mondes continued throughout the July Monarchy to define 
their conservative Idealist aesthetic in opposition to an aesthetic that transgressed it. Cousin himself 
rearticulated the Revue’s aesthetic program in 1845 in an article “Du Beau et de l’art” [“On Beauty 
and Art”] where he insisted that the intervention of the harmonizing imagination was essential for 
the creation of a work of art: mere imitation of the world without sufficient transformation by the 
imagination was doomed to fall short of the aesthetic ideal.37 As the years passed, however, the 
language and the stakes of the charge of transgression of that ideal changed. As the danger posed by 
democratic elements grew, so did the Revue’s commitment to order as the fundamental characteristic 
of beauty. The outside of literature became associated not simply with the materialism of Realism, 
but with the materialist disorder of what the Revue came to call fantaisisme. Not to be confused with 
the fantastic but rather related to fantaisie or fancy, the accusation of fantaisisme contained the 
unredeemed materiality of Realism but with an emphasis on the lack of organization this exhibits. 
The epithet denoted, as explained in an 1852 article, form as the pure contingency of the material 
rather than the coherence of an idea: 
 
[Le fantaisisme] marche ou plutôt se précipite de faits en faits, d’observations en 
observations ; il dédaigne l’argument et nous laisse le soin de chercher en vertu de 
                                                
33 Gustave Planche, “Lélia, de George Sand,” Revue des Deux Mondes 2, (July-September 1833): 353-68, 353. Sand 
published exclusively in the Revue between 1832 and 1842, when she and its editor, François Buloz, had a falling out over 
the publication of Horace, her novel about the June 1832 insurrection. 
34 Du Val, 17 and 29. 
35 “Sur Walter Scott. A propos de Quentin Durward,” in Œuvres complètes. Philosophie I. 1819-1834. Littérature et philosophie 
mêlées, 245-57, 251. 
36 Ibid. See also the Preface to Cromwell in Œuvres Complètes. Drame I. Cromwell, 5-75. 
37 Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 September 1845. Cited in Du Val, 18. 
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quelle analogie telle pensée succède à telle autre, par quelle déduction l’écrivain a été 
amené à faire suivre ex abrupto d’un axiome burlesque une discussion sérieuse ; d’un 
trait d’ironie un chapitre sentimental. 
 
[Fantaisisme wanders or rather hurtles itself from fact to fact, from observation to 
observation; it disdains argument and leaves us with the trouble of searching for the 
analogy by virtue of which one thought succeeds another, the deduction that led the 
writer to follow up a burlesque axiom ex abrupto with a serious discussion, an ironic 
quip with a sentimental chapter.]38 
 
As the overthrow of the liberal social order became a palpable possibility, the conservatives of the 
Revue grew increasingly obsessed with order as an aesthetic value: the lack of structure and 
argumentation of fantaisiste writing, in which the mind wandered seemingly at random, partook of 
the same chaos that threatened the social and political body.39  
 Redefining their “materialist” opponents as fantaisistes allowed the critics of the Revue to 
condemn a much broader range of dangerous writers: instead of their earlier emphasis on Realist 
detail in novels and plays, the critics now took aim at a wide variety of young writers who were seen 
to favor material over spiritual concerns. The self-reflexivity of Gautier’s art for art’s sake and the 
referentiality of the school of sincerity led by the novelist Champfleury were brought together in a 
surprising juxtaposition under the catchall fantaisiste that signaled their indifference to morality as the 
driving force of literature, their “oubli des choses morales” [“disregard for moral issues”].40 An 
article on “Les Fantaisistes” published during the same autumn as Les Nuits d’octobre demonstrates 
the critical assimilation of different literary projects: “La poésie de M. Théophile Gautier et de son 
école est toute naturaliste, elle ne professe que le culte des choses de la création, elle ne remonte 
point du monde visible à Dieu” [“The poetry of M. Théophile Gautier and his school is entirely 
naturalist, professing only the worship of the stuff of creation, never ascending from the visible 
world to God”].41 Naturalism here is synonymous with fantaisisme and art for art’s sake, so that the 
whole literary generation is taken as one school; in the volatile days of the Second Republic and early 
Second Empire, the various ways that young writers threatened beauty did not matter nearly as 
much as the common threat they all posed to the moral and religious basis of the social order. 
It is in this climate that an affirmation of Realism and its materialist literary values emerged, 
championed by Champfleury. But this affirmation was crucially not symmetrical to the charge of 
anarchistic fantaisisme that the Revue had launched; it did not affirm precisely the same values that the 
Revue criticized. Champfleury’s Realism, which appears in Les Nuits d’octobre in the guise of Dickens, 
did not defend the broad range of condemned writing practices, including those of Gautier and 
Nerval. It was, instead, another rejection of them, coming this time from within the supposed 
“school” of fantaisisme. Champfleury had been part of that motley, fantaisiste generation of writers, 
                                                
38 Alfred Crampon, “Les Fantaisistes,” Revue des Deux Mondes 16, (October-December 1852): 584. 
39 This idea of the slack mind flitting from one idea to another is consistent with the common use of “fantaisiste” during 
the period, as noted in the Grand Larousse encyclopédique du XIXe siècle: ““Fantaisiste. adj. … Is said of an artist or a writer 
who refuses to submit to the rules and is guided only by his own fancy [fantaisie].” Pierre Larousse, Grand dictionnaire 
universel du XIXe siècle, 1872, 15 vols., reprint, Slatkine, Geneva, 1982, vol. 8, part 1, 92. It is worth noting that fantaisie is 
distinctly not what the Revue des Deux Mondes critics are getting at when they talk about imagination: while fantasy implies 
a passive, receptive orientation of the mind to the world, imagination as understood by the Revue is an active faculty by 
which the mind submits the world to its design. This distinction between passive and active faculties played a central part 
in Cousin’s eclectic spiritualist philosophy, a fact whose importance will become apparent with regard to the second part 
of Les Nuits d’octobre. 
40 Charles de Mazade, “Chronique de la quinzaine,” Revue des Deux Mondes 15, (July-September 1852): 612-26. 
41 Crampon, 593. 
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participating in the eclectic and eccentric bohemian writing of the July Monarchy. After 1848, 
however, he turned against that eccentricity to advocate, under the banner of Realism, a dryer 
novelistic practice emphasizing sincerity above all else.42 Champfleury’s conception of Realism 
refused the distorting intervention of the imagination in favor of an unadulterated observation, a 
truthful recording of sensation that he called sincerity.43 This sincerity was certainly opposed to the 
Idealism of the Revue des Deux Mondes, but it was also opposed to the imaginative writing of the other 
authors the Revue dismissed as fantaisistes. In Champfleury’s Realism, the writer’s role was limited to 
the act of observation, and his temperament to his way of seeing; the imagination did not intervene 
with any metaphysical distortions.44 The aggressively brute positivism of this Realist project had 
nothing in common with the writers who had previously been called Realist by the Revue (writers, 
like Hugo, for whom materialist detail had been in service of the metaphysical idea of the work). 
Neither did it share the same materialism as the other fantaisistes who, though they may not have 
valued mainstream morality, were far from indifferent to aesthetic ideals that transcended imitation. 
Champfleury created for the first time, and on behalf of his aesthetic alone, an opposition in which 
“Le réalisme [était] référé au matérialisme et au positivisme tandis que le romantisme [était] assimilé 
à l’idéalisme, à l’imagination” [“Realism was referred to materialism and positivism while 
Romanticism was assimilated to idealism and the imagination”].45 
 Champfleury’s articulation of Realism thus set up a dissymmetry in the literary field, which 
Les Nuits d’octobre represents in the encounter between Dante and Dickens: conservative Idealism 
opposed itself to the broad materialist disorder of fantaisisme, while Champfleury’s Realism opposed 
itself to all forms of aesthetic distortion. The imaginative disorder of fantaisisme (and of what had 
been called Realism in the 1830s) was thus opposed by both sides of that opposition. In the Idealist-
Realist opposition that was operative in the early 1850s and that drives the first part of Les Nuits 
d’octobre, fantaisisme appeared as a kind of no-man’s-land: a space of non-idealist imagination and non-
positivism materialism. This kind of fantaisisme is precisely the remainder that is left when Dickens 
and Dante cancel each other out. Neither a mind merely observing the world nor an imagination 
bent on transcending it, the notion of fantaisisme suggests an occluded third possibility of the 
disorderly, productive movement of an imagination engaged with the world. If neither of the literary 
forms explicitly claimed in Les Nuits d’octobre seems to describe Nerval’s writing, this third form that 
the other two conspire to exclude certainly does. The first installments of the serial open a space for 
this excluded form, with the simultaneous “imitation satirique Dickens” [“satirical imitation of 
Dickens”] and implied satirical imitation of Dante causing a collapse of the literary field structured 
by their opposition. Only once this opening is created can the text venture, as it does in the last 
three installments, onto its own terrain of the Valois and of travel writing. The travel conceit returns, 
not as another form of Realism, but as materialism unbound by rationality, imagination unbound by 
the ideal.  
 
 
 
                                                
42 See Champfleury, Le Réalisme. 
43 Pichois, Le romantisme II, 254. 
44 Weinberg, 146; Bourdenet, 24. 
45 Bourdenet, 20. This distinction was, of course, never as absolute as this, as Bourdenet himself notes. Not only was 
Realism a clear inheritor of the Romantic tradition, but even Champfleury did not succumb to the banality implied by his 
own adamantly Realist doctrine. He retained a preference for unknown and strange subjects and although he distanced 
himself from the école fantaisiste, he simultaneously tried to use the many features their writing shared with his to draw the 
writers of that school under the banner of Realism. In this sense, Champfleury’s innovation was almost as much one of 
classification as one of content—a reconfiguration of the literary field rather than a radical reimagining of literary form. 
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Irrational Materialism and Disorderly Imagination 
After a night spent wandering Paris waiting for the morning train, the narrator of Les Nuits d’octobre 
finally goes on his way at the end of the fourth installment: as the sun rises over Les Halles and the 
market begins to buzz with morning activity, he heads off for the train station and puts an end to his 
Parisian explorations. He seems in this moment to re-launch the suspended journey structure of the 
text, definitively taking up travel writing in place of the other two conceits. Rather than the 
randomness of material phenomena or the careful organization of an idea, this return to travel seems 
to promise an itinerary through the real as the guiding principle of the text. But Nerval’s use of 
travel writing here, as elsewhere, is idiosyncratic, and keeps the feuilleton from taking on an 
established generic form. This comes across most clearly in the bizarre itinerary of the narrator’s 
Valois travels. The Parisian installments begin, as I have discussed, with several false starts: an 
unfamiliar railroad timetable that puts the narrator at the station at the wrong time and an encounter 
with a friend that makes him miss his train a second time. He refuses to return home and begin 
again the next day (“Je serais obligé d’expliquer pourquoi j’ai manqué deux fois les omnibus” [“I 
would find myself having to explain why I twice missed the bus”]), and so has a night to kill in 
Paris.46 When seven o’clock finds him meeting his morning train, then, it looks as though he is back 
on track after some aberrant wandering—but in fact the path the narrator is on is nearly as chaotic 
as the one that had him crisscrossing Paris all night. 
We know the narrator is going to Meaux, but that is not his final destination. He is on his 
way to an otter hunt on the banks of the Oise River, straight to the north of Paris. Why, then, take 
the Strausbourg line northeast to Meaux rather than taking the Northern Railway directly to Creil? 
Quite simply, the narrator claims, because the new Northern Railway takes such an indirect route 
that he might as well follow an itinerary of his own devising. That itinerary turns out to be no direct 
than the slight bend in the rail line, however: 
 
 En prenant par Meaux, je rencontrerai l’omnibus de Dammartin ; je traverserai a  
  pied les bois d’Ermenonville, et, suivant les bords de la Nonette, je parviendrai,  
  après trois heures de marche, à Senlis où je rencontrerai l’omnibus de Creil. De là,  
  j’aurai le plaisir de revenir à Paris par le plus long, —c’est-à-dire par le chemin de  
  fer du Nord. 
 
 [[I]f I set out from Meaux, I’ll catch the coach to Dammartin; then I’ll cross the 
 forest of Ermenonville on foot and, following the banks of the Nonette, I’ll walk the 
 three hours it takes to get to Senlis, where I’ll hop on a coach to Creil. From Creil, I 
 shall have the pleasure of returning to Paris by rail via the longest detour—that is, via 
 the Northern Line.]47 
 
What’s more, the narrator does not manage to carry off his convoluted itinerary: he misses the 
Dammartin omnibus in Meaux and is forced to regroup. He takes a coach to Nanteuil-le-Haudoin, 
but then finds that the rainy weather makes walking through the forest impossible, and so he is 
forced to take a wild detour north to Crespy-en-Valois to meet up with a coach that will take him to 
the Oise (see map below). The coherence the travel itinerary seems to promise in these Valois 
installments is adamantly withheld through the constant adjustment of the narrator’s route, which 
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diverges further and further from the straight line from point A to point B, without, for all that, 
taking up any other logic—simply submitting itself to contingency.48 
 
 The eccentricity of this itinerary is the clearest indication that the travel writing of Les Nuits 
d’octobre operates on its own unique terms. We can also understand the feuilleton’s unconventionality 
with reference to Nerval’s travel writing more broadly, however. In written accounts of his voyages 
throughout Northern Europe, Germany, Italy, North Africa, and the Middle East, Nerval 
demonstrates an unusual combination of interests, drawing attention to the strangeness and 
irreducibility of the material phenomena of the real.49 His attention rests largely within the material 
world, delighting in descriptions of the sites and practices around which the people he observes 
build their lives. The things he sees are rarely taken as occasions for abstract or personal reflection: 
they are encountered on their own terms.50 Nerval is attracted in particular to the phenomena that 
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most challenge coherent global interpretation, moving between them in a wandering that delights in 
considering each practice, each site, in its particularity without striving toward the general.51 
 This attention to the material refuses not only an overarching ideal, but also the explanatory 
power of positivist empiricism. It is, for example, the statue of Erasmus rumored to turn the pages 
of its own book when the town clock strikes that piques his curiosity on a visit to Holland (much to 
the chagrin of the inhabitants of Dordrecht, who, he says, fear that the observation makes them 
look silly and superstitious).52 Human experience of the material phenomena of the real is fascinating 
because it challenges any unifying explanation, including even reason, and calls on the imagination 
for partial, mobile explanations.53 As we will see again in Les Faux Saulniers, the omnipresence of 
popular fictions and superstitions within people’s experience of the world means that the common 
sense rationality of empirical observation (think Champfleury’s sincérité) has no monopoly on the real 
in Nerval’s writing. He rejects a scientific reasoning that simply excludes what it cannot explain and 
uses skepticism to flatten the world to the thinness of its own method: “La science moderne, fondée 
sur l’incrédulité et sur la fausse logique des matérialistes, a toujours nié les créations anormales et les 
a reléguées dans le domaine de la fable” [“Modern science, founded in unbelief and the materialists’ 
false logic, has always denied abnormal creations and relegated them to the realm of tall tales”].54 
Nerval adamantly refuses to marginalize what seems to be mere fable, giving importance to dream, 
imagination, and the mystical. Yet none of these apparently metaphysical phenomena is allowed to 
overtake the others and the material to serve as a singular ideal. Nerval’s travel writing provides a 
model of fantaisisme in action: material and imaginative at once. His is not the hybridity of Hugo in 
which material detail intensified the representation of the ideal, but similarly finds itself excluded by 
an opposition between Realism as the genre of materialism and Idealist Romanticism as the genre of 
imagination. 
 So it is that the two primary phenomena of the travel installments in Les Nuits d’octobre are 
precisely those that most flagrantly refuse to be attributed exclusively to either the world or the 
imagination—those that make sense only within the loose interpretive dynamic of fantaisisme. On the 
one hand, the narrator encounters a marvel, i.e. a phenomenon within the real that calls on the 
imagination for its interpretation. On the other hand, he has dreams, i.e. experiences of the 
transformations that the imagination performs on the sense data of the world. Alongside the 
expected elements of travel writing in the Valois installments (descriptions of the train ride, the 
cafes, the local cats, the mayor’s house) come these profoundly strange scenes, in which the narrator 
turns his attention to phenomena that demonstrate a unique encounter between the imaginative and 
perceptive faculties. 
 The most important waking experience of the narrator’s travels in the Valois takes place in 
Meaux, where he encounters a freak show displaying a human attraction: the femme mérinos. This 
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being explained. 
52 Lorely in Œuvres complètes, 3:203 and 222-23. 
53 This conception of the imagination as mobile and indifferent to global coherence offers a new perspective on Nerval’s 
supposed spiritual syncretism (as manifest in the Voyage en Orient and Les Chimères). His interest in the various religions he 
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ultimately emancipatory way that Nerval moves between established positions, it often leads to a reduction of that 
movement to the attempt at creating a stable identity, a single spiritual touchstone that can then be uncovered through 
an act of critical interpretation. By thinking about the imagination in Nerval’s work as fundamentally disorderly and 
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difference. See Chapter Four. 
54 “L’Évêque de mer” in Œuvres complètes, 1: 1275. 
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woman, who is performing with a small troupe of musicians and dancers, becomes a source of 
fascination for the narrator. He encounters her first in writing, in an advertisement: 
 
Par permission de M. le Maire (de Meaux) 
MERVEILLE SURPRENANTE 
Tout ce que la nature offre de plus bizarre : 
UNE TRES JOLIE FEMME 
Ayant pour chevelure une belle 
TOISON DE MÉRINOS 
Couleur marron. 
 
[BY PERMISSION OF HIS HONOUR THE MAYOR (of Meaux) 
WONDER OF WONDERS 
One of the most bizarre occurrences in Nature: 
A WOMAN OF GREAT BEAUTY 
With a head of chestnut hair 
That is in fact 
THE FLEECE OF A MERINO]55 
 
This “merveille,” this “phénomène,” as the poster goes on to describe her, is presented as one of 
those phenomena that push the limits of rational explanation. This is, as I have discussed, a sort of 
phenomenon that never fails to attract Nerval’s narrators and so it is no surprise that the narrator of 
Les Nuits d’octobre attends the show that very night. The performance itself is not, however, 
immediately described. 
 Instead, in the first Valois installment the narrator merely recounts have seen the poster—
the one part of the show that is factually verifiable and poses no challenges to reason. In seeming 
anticipation of the skepticism his readers might feel faced with the femme mérinos, he insists only on 
the veracity of his claim to have seen the poster, appending the following note: “Tout dans ces récits 
étant véritable, l’auteur a déposé l’affiche aux bureaux de L’Illustration, où elle est visible” 
[“Everything in this narrative being true, the author has deposited this poster at the office of 
L’Illustration, where it is on view”].56 The note seems to be a concession to his earlier claims of 
Realism, an assurance that this story, too, lives up to the standard of truth set by Dickens. In 
invoking the Realist conceit of the first half of the feuilleton here, however, the narrator notably 
reduces its reach by attaching it to the simple question of the poster’s reality. At stake is not the 
unbelievable phenomenon of the wooly-haired woman, but merely the poster that claims to be an 
index of that phenomenon. The truth claims of material observation here are drastically reduced in 
an ironic capitulation to readers’ expectation of Realist sincerity: what can be definitively, empirically 
proven about the femme mérinos is that her performance was advertised. Beyond that, the discussion 
must continue in other terms. 
 Rather than an unproblematic situation in which seeing is believing, the performance of the 
femme mérinos will be treated as emblematic of an experience of contradiction between observation 
and reason, between what is seen and what common sense allows. It is an occasion on which the 
narrator can’t (or perhaps shouldn’t) believe his eyes (a woman cannot, after all, have the hair of a 
sheep), and so it allows Nerval to ponder what stock should be put in such a problematic sensory 
experience. On the one hand, readers are aware before the performance is even described that it has 
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a profound impact on the narrator: its effect on his psyche is alluded to in the account of a dream 
that intervenes between the narrator’s descriptions of the poster and his account of the show itself. 
(I will return to the dream shortly.) The femme mérinos and her fellow performers clearly get under the 
narrator’s skin. On the other hand, however, the narrator acutely observes in his account of the 
performance the faults that reason might find in it. He adopts a particularly skeptical attitude toward 
the claims the three principal performers make about their origins. They evoke an elaborate 
exoticism for their show by attributing to themselves three different homelands—a key element of 
the attraction even as presented on the poster, where the audience is promised “Des danses de caractère, 
espagnoles et italiennes” [“Colorful dances, notably Spanish and Italian “].57 M. Montaldo, the master of 
ceremonies, claims to be from Turin; his dancer is billed as Spanish; and the femme mérinos is 
identified as a native of Venice. The narrator does not take these mixed origins (what he is meant to 
believe about the performers) for granted, but rather evaluates them constantly against his 
observations. He questions M. Montaldo’s pronunciation of the Italian aria he sings, and remarks 
the Venetian’s idioms, deciding that while she might be from the region north of Venice, the other 
two are most likely from Savoy or even Auvergne.  
 The narrator’s attitude toward the freak show is clearly not one of blind belief: he does not 
demonstrate a propensity for delusion, but rather acknowledges with characteristic irony the factors 
that contradict the effect the performers are trying to create. And yet they do make an effect, as 
evidenced by the dream. Reason is not absent here, but it does not debunk the experience of the 
freak show. The narrator’s analysis of the illusion rather seems to leave his affective experience of it 
intact. If the question at issue here is the one answered by the poster (“Is this phenomenon real?”), 
his relationship to the freak show seems contradictory: he is at once aware that it is an illusion and 
somehow indifferent to that fact. But the question posed with regard to the femme mérinos is 
importantly not, “Is she real?” or “Is the claim of the merino hair true?” but “Do you believe in 
her?” Rather than the epistemological status of the phenomenon, the narrator is concerned here 
with an experience of belief. Reason may reject what the senses perceive (the strangeness of the 
material phenomenon), but that perception retains its significance. As in the popular fictions we will 
encounter in Les Faux Saulniers, belief here need not exclude the common sense that would 
contradict it; it is not a matter of belief in its strongest sense, precluding all other interpretations—a 
stance that would in this case seem to be delusional.58 It is rather a matter of maintaining the 
possibility of multiple, contradictory relationships to the phenomenon and so being able to engage 
with the irrational richness of the experience. Rather than a concern for the truth of his (and the 
performers’) representation, Nerval’s narrator here privileges a concern with how the imagination 
encounters the world and invests it with belief. 
 Thus his answer to the critic’s question, “« est-ce que l’on croit à cette femme aux cheveux 
de mérinos ? »” [“‘To begin with, do you think anybody would believe the part about the woman 
with the merino hair?’”] is affirmative: “« Je suis forcé d’y croire »” [“‘I have no choice but to believe 
it’”].59 The femme mérinos is no longer attested to only by the poster announcing her, which the 
narrator admits doesn’t really prove her reality. No, now he has his own experience of seeing her to 
justify his belief: 
 
Les doigts sont effilés, les pieds petits, les attaches fines ; elle a les yeux presque 
rouges et la douceur d’un mouton, — sa voix même semble un bêlement accentué. 
Les cheveux, si l’on peut appeler cela des cheveux, résisteraient à tous les efforts du 
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peigne. C’est un amas de cordelettes comme celles que se font les Nubiennes en les 
imprégnant de beurre. 
 
[Her fingers are finely tapered, her feet are petite, her wrists and ankles slender; her 
eyes are almost red and have that meek look of sheep – even her voice seems to have 
something bleating to it. Her hair, if you can call it that, would frustrate any comb. 
It’s a tangle of small cords, not unlike the butter-soaked braids worn by Nubian 
women.]60 
 
The promised phenomenon, the sheep’s hair, is borne out by his senses, which find so much of the 
sheep in this mysterious woman. There is, of course, the seed of a purely rational explanation here in 
the comparison to the dreadlocks of the Nubians. The narrator even goes on to develop this line of 
reasoning. She is too pale, he decides, and her hair too light for her to be Nubian herself, but racial 
mixing somewhere far down her bloodline could easily account for her wooly hair: “je pense qu’il y a 
eu croisement ;—un nègre,—Othello peut-être, se sera allié au type vénitien, et après plusieurs 
générations, ce produit local se sera révélé” [“I think there must have been some sort of cross-
breeding: a Negro—perhaps Othello himself—must have married some Venetian, thus creating this 
local variant several generations down the line.”].61 The narrator refuses, however, to let solid 
reasoning make the freak show banal: if heredity provides a logical explanation for the femme mérinos, 
the bloodline is traced all the way back to a pseudo-mythical past, in the union of Othello and the 
exemplar of Venetian beauty. The freak show produces an effect on the narrator that pushes against 
his ability to rationalize it, and so we see his imagination at work creating interpretations that honor 
his experience of belief. The irrational phenomenon of the femme mérinos thus demonstrates the 
incapacity of Realist conventions to account for the narrator’s experience when faced with her. The 
closed circuit that Realism tries to establish between observation and reason, permitting a pure 
sincerity in what is represented, is relentlessly invaded here by the imagination. The marvelous 
material phenomenon of the freak show troubles an opposition between world and imagination, 
showing how intertwined they are in experience. 
 As I have said, this experience of wonder that falls outside of a Realist paradigm shares the 
travel installments of Les Nuits d’octobre with another unexpected element: the representation of 
dreams.62 Just as the treatment of the femme mérinos opened the world of empirical observation onto 
the imagination and the irrational, the use of dreams provides a conception of the imagination that 
partakes of the disorder of the material. The narrator’s dreams here are not carefully ordered 
allegorical spaces, but function through a wild proliferation of associations that start from the 
contingent data of sensation. In recounting his first dream, for example, the narrator describes 
traversing an inescapable, Escher-esque labyrinth of stairways and corridors, as hammers beat on his 
brain—hammers that he notes are likely transformations of the mill hammers he observed on the 
way back to his hotel from the freak show. From this classic case of dreamwork, the narrator goes 
on to provide an example of the unconstrained associative energy of his dreams. Using citations 
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retained from plays he has seen or read, the narrator moves from the freak show performers to the 
popular entertainer Bilboquet from the vaudeville play Les Saltimbanques [The Acrobats], and the 
conman disguised as a popular entertainer in the melodrama Robert Macaire.63 His mental stores of 
experience, old and new alike, are strung together in this dream sequence through the hazards of 
association. The imaginative potential of dreams is not to reduce disorder through organization, but 
to generate it. Through the narrator’s dreams, Nerval introduces a conception of the imagination not 
as the unity of an idea, but as the productive disordering of experiences of the real. Writing the 
imaginative experience of the dream here cannot be separated from the messiness of material 
phenomena any more than writing the encounter with the phenomenon of the freak show could be 
separated from the irrationality of the imagination. 
 The travel installments of Les Nuits d’octobre use these two limit experiences of freak show 
and dream to elaborate a literary space that exists outside of an opposition between writing-the-
world and writing-the-imagination, outside of an opposition between Realism and an Idealist literary 
aesthetic. It is precisely in the name of this excluded space that the narrator renounces not only 
Realism, but also the Idealism that opposes it. Opening the installment where he describes the 
merino woman, Nerval writes, 
 
… Je m’arrête. — Le métier de réaliste est trop dur à faire. La lecture d’un 
article de Charles Dickens est pourtant la source de ces divagations !... Une voix 
grave me rappelle à moi-même. 
Je viens de tirer de dessous plusieurs journaux parisiens et marnois un certain 
feuilleton d’où l’anathème s’exhale avec raison sur les imaginations bizarres qui 
constituent aujourd’hui l’école du vrai. 
 
[… I’ll stop here. – It’s far too difficult to go on playing the part of a realist. 
And yet it was the chance reading of a piece of Dickens that set me off on these 
divagations! … A solemn voice is calling me back to my senses. 
I have just sifted through a pile of Parisian and Marnois newspapers, only to 
come across an article containing an entirely justified philippic against those bizarre 
imaginings that today go under the name of the école du vrai, or True-to-Life School.]64 
 
A sort of bookend to the conceit whereby a chance encounter with Dickens supposedly turns the 
narrator into a would-be Realist, we have another chance encounter, this time with an anti-Realist 
feuilleton (which must run along the lines of the Revue des Deux Mondes, if that is not actually the 
publication in question). Here we finally find the narrator explicitly inhabiting the opposition 
between Realism and its Idealist critics that was implied in the relationship between Dickens and 
Dante in the first installments. The position he takes via this parroted critique of Realism is a 
complicated one: the point of anti-Realist anathema that the narrator borrows from the critic here is 
precisely a reference to the kind of writing that neither of those literary aesthetics allows for—
“bizarre imaginings.” If the rest of the Valois installments argue for a critique of Realism, it is 
precisely a critique of Realism’s inability to deal with the truly strange, with what really calls on the 
imagination—something that the beautiful unity of writing preferred by the Idealist critic does no 
better. Nerval cites an Idealist critique of Realism, but uses it to highlight the fact that Realism has 
no more place for the strange or disorderly imagination than Idealism does; the two-pronged irony 
of the narrator’s reference to the critical feuilleton here thus operates in a single rhetorical gesture the 
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reciprocal destruction that took place in the Parisian installments. By letting Idealism and Realism 
cancel each other out, he effectively clears the Valois installments of all but a fantaisisme that neither 
one of those aesthetics allows for, a fantaisisme that inextricably binds writing-the-world and writing-
the-imagination.  
 
Digressive Subjectivity 
Les Nuits d’octobre stages a battle between Realist and Idealist literary aesthetics. Instead of coming 
down on one side or the other, however, the feuilleton offers an alternative that exists in precisely the 
space they conspire to exclude. When the narrator takes his final leave of Realism at the end of the 
text, it is not in favor of what might be seen as Realism’s opposite. His ironic summary—“Voilà 
l’histoire fidèle de trois nuits d’octobre, qui m’ont corrigé des excès d’un réalisme trop absolu ; j’ai 
du moins tout lieu de l’espérer” [“This is the faithful history of the three October nights that cured 
me of my exaggerated notions of absolute realism – at least I have every reason to believe I have 
recovered”]—makes a joke at Realism’s expense (“I sure hope I’m done with it!”) while also mocking 
the moralizing discourse of the critics who characterize it as a personal failing.65 In response to our 
initial question of what sense might be made of Nerval’s engagement with Realism in Les Nuits 
d’octobre, we seem to have a clear (if ironic) answer. The encounter with Realism enables a subtle and 
hilarious critique of its limitations, as well as those of its foremost aesthetic competitor, and allows 
Nerval to position himself against them both. 
 Our initial question about the status of Realism in Les Nuits d’octobre was, however, 
surrounded by a whole set of other questions about the place this gesture toward Realism occupied 
in Nerval’s literary career. In the context of his œuvre, Realism seems to be opposed to the personal 
writing of his late work, which is often described as a kind of proto-autofiction, and so Les Nuits 
d’octobre seems to have something to say about the turn toward writing-the-self. As I have discussed, 
scholarly approaches to this question have tended to correlate this turn with a psychological one: the 
final, irrevocable turn toward madness. This is to say that scholars have tended to bring to the 
question of writing-the-self their own, preexisting conceptions of the self to be written (usually 
psychoanalytic, be they Freudian or Lacanian). But just as we have been able to give historically 
specific content to the Realism (writing-the-world) at stake in Les Nuits d’octobre, so, too, can we look 
to Nerval’s text to provide historical terms for thinking about both the writing and the self of this 
question of writing-the-self. 
 Indeed, each established literary aesthetic at stake in the feuilleton implies its own conception 
of the self. Nerval’s positioning himself against these two forms of writing can thus also be 
understood as positioning himself against these two forms of subjectivity. Underlying the opposition 
between Realism and Idealist Romanticism in the mid-nineteenth century was an opposition 
between materialist and spiritualist philosophies and their understandings of the self.66 A 
physiological current of psychological thinking, descended from the materialism and sensationalism 
of the idéologistes did battle, throughout the century, with a spiritualist current that exclusively bore 
the name of psychology.67 As Goldstein argues in The Post-Revolutionary Self, the stakes of this conflict 
were nothing less than the moral and political stability of the French nation and its citizens. On the 
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one hand, physiology presented a composite self, made up of numerous faculties that work together 
without being governed by any unified entity that might properly be called The Self.68 It was this lack 
of a unified self, opponents of physiology claimed, that had been responsible for the upheavals and 
moral failings following the 1789 Revolution: with no responsible core, there is no possibility of 
moral action or accountability.69 Particularly following the demise of the corporatist structures that 
ordered society and selves in the ancien régime, what was needed to ensure social order was precisely a 
strong sense of self.70 Spiritualist philosophy with its grounding in psychology (associated most 
famously with Cousin) emerged in response to precisely this need.71 Cousin’s “eclectic spiritualism” 
started from a self-constituted, a priori self and derived everything else from there.72 In opposition to 
sensationalism’s anarchic multiple self, subject to the same materialism as the world, Cousin put 
forward a self from which all of philosophy emerged—a self whose accountability could underpin 
social order. 
 Though in Cousin’s philosophy everything, including ontology, was to be discovered by the 
self through introspection, the results of that introspection were not as various as the selves 
producing them.73 Goldstein argues, in fact, that this psychological approach served as a guarantor 
of moral and social order: “the Cousinian combination of ‘personal will’ and ‘impersonal reason’ 
flattered the possessor of the moi that he enjoyed a thrilling degree of individuality and efficacy yet 
at the same time guaranteed that he would not rock the boat.”74 By way of the regulation of 
common sense, the self appears here as an agent of an order that exceeds it—a configuration that 
should sound familiar to us, for it meets up with the principles of literary aesthetics put forward by 
the Revue des Deux Mondes. We must not forget that it was Cousin himself who wrote what can be 
seen as the aesthetic manifesto of that journal, “Du Beau et de l’art,” where he argued that 
imagination should act as a unifying force, bringing the work of art into harmony with its idea. 
Beneath an Idealist literary aesthetic meant to protect against chaos and ugliness, then, lay a 
spiritualist philosophy meant to protect against upheaval and immorality. The epithet réaliste rhymed 
with that of idéologue: in both an aesthetic and a psychological sphere, Cousin and his fellows sought 
to combat the insidious effects of materialism and its contingence. Their spiritualism and Idealism 
were the philosophical and the aesthetic correlates of their Doctrinaire politics, which maintained 
the July Monarchy by advocating the achievement of social order through a juste milieu between 
popular democracy and absolutism, and continued to guide the conservatism of the Party of Order 
after the 1848 revolution.75 
 The question of the composition of the subject is thus everywhere implied in Les Nuits 
d’octobre in the struggle between Champfleury’s sincere, undistorted faculties of observation and the 
Revue des Deux Mondes’s overarching, organizing imagination, between the conception of the writing 
subject as a recorder of perception and the conception of the writing subject as a creator of 
harmony. This question also makes two explicit appearances in the dreams the narrator recounts 
during the Valois installments. In those dreams, Nerval draws these two discourses of the self onto 
                                                
68 The Post-Revolutionary Self, Chapter Three: Is There a Self in this Mental Apparatus? 
69 Ibid., 134. 
70 The Post-Revolutionary Self, 157. 
71 Ibid., 139. 
72 Ibid., 158-61. 
73 Ibid, 180. 
74 Ibid. 
75 We see, then, that the opposition between Realism and the Revue des Deux Mondes in the first part of the serial is an 
asymmetrical one in another sense, with the Revue representing the ruling bourgeois order that associated ‘materialist’ 
writing with the constant risk of revolution. 
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his own terrain and ironizes their ways of relating both to the self and to its writing.76 I have already 
mentioned the first of these dreams, in which the mill hammers become hammers striking the 
narrator’s brain. The associative logic that governs that first dream is the object of reproach, within 
the dream itself. The hammers and labyrinth seem from the first to be a punishment for crimes we 
cannot yet identify: “Serait-ce la peine à laquelle je serais condamné pour mes fautes ?” [“Is this the 
punishment for all my sins?”].77 It is in response to this initial sense of punishment that the narrator 
initiates his string of associations with the freak show. The dramatic characters Bilboquet and Robert 
Macaire are cited to speak on behalf of the narrator himself, so that he himself enters the chain of 
entertainers his associative mind is following. This work of association and substitution (his failure 
to keep things straight) becomes the first apparent crime in the dream, and the narrator responds to 
the criticism he anticipates: “Bon ! Je confonds à présent Bilboquet avec Macaire. Mais ce n’est pas 
une raison pour qu’on me casse la tête avec des foulons ” [“Oh, here I go confusing Bilboquet with 
Macaire. But that still doesn’t justify pounding my head to smithereens with a millstone”].78 The 
independent identities of these two characters are not the only things at stake in the confusion the 
narrator is guilty of here: arriving at them in the first place required passing through a confusion of 
his own identity with that of the performers he saw at the freak show. Thus in this first dream 
sequence, the narrator finds himself under attack for the porosity of his self, represented by the 
citations. This crime, his third and final citation insists, is greatly out of proportion with the gravity 
of the judgment being brought against him: “Voilà bien du tapage pour … Bien peu de chose” 
[“Much ado … About nothing”].79 
 This first part of the dream suggests a self under attack for its lack of integrity, for the 
confusion if suffers. In the dream’s second sequence, the hammers pass into the hands of little 
gnomes, tiny workmen intent on putting the narrator’s consciousness to rights. The gnomes proffer 
a strange discourse in order to justify their project, blending elements of physiology and psychology, 
concretizing transcendental abstractions and setting them side by side with precise anatomical 
vocabulary. They observe just the sort of problem that the narrator seemed to anticipate in the first 
part, identifying in his mind a conflict between self and non-self: “Le moi et le non moi de Fichte se 
livrent un terrible combat dans cet esprit plein d’objectivité” [“Fichte’s I and Not-I are locked in a 
deadly struggle within this ever-so-objective mind.”]80 The non-self ought, through its difference, to 
simply mark the limit of the self while in fact originating from the very same subject, of which it is 
just another expression.81 But here, rather than being subordinate to the self, the non-self is going 
head to head with it. Indeed, the purported “objectivity” of the narrator’s mind seems not to refer to 
a capacity for unbiased observation, but to a propensity toward giving free reign to what ought to be 
dominated.82 More specifically, the gnomes worry about the presence in his mind of ideas regarding 
the femme mérinos, who they fear has invaded some secret compartment of his brain. He did not 
adequately protect himself from her and from the claims made about her by her fellow performer: 
                                                
76 The tendency to read these dreams as “authentic” expressions of Nerval’s psyche (as real dreams), rather than as 
authorial inventions, has led to a near absolute lack of acknowledgment, let alone interpretation, of the abundance of 
references to Cousin in these dreams. 
77 Les Nuits d’octobre in Œuvres complètes, 3:337-338/Selected Writings, 229. 
78 Ibid., 338/229. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 339/230. 
81 Alexander M. Schlutz discusses the role Fichte gives to imagination in reconciling the self and non-self, the subjective 
and the objective. We heard an echo of this unifying function of the imagination, which allows the irrationality of nature 
to be assimilated into the rational self, in the Idealism of the Revue des Deux Mondes critics. See “The Highest Point of 
Philosophy: Fichte’s Reimagining of the Kantian System” in Mind’s World, 140-61. 
82 Nerval draws on the full ambiguity of the word objectivité here, using it in a sense that must allude as well to the charge 
of matérialisme made against so-called Realist writers. 
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“notre Parisien est encore jeune… Il ne s’est pas assez méfié du boniment” [“our Parisian is still a little 
green… He took the patter too literally”].83 His willingness to take this irrational phenomenon 
seriously, rather than to neutralize its power by seeing it as mere patter, has invited disorder into his 
mind and threatened the integrity of his subjectivity. 
 The cure for this disorder is to be brought about by the tiny workmen, toiling to tidy up the 
narrator’s mind: “Travaillons, frères, travaillons ;—la boîte osseuse se nettoie.— Le compartiment 
de la mémoire embrasse déjà une certaine série de faits.—La causalité, oui, la causalité,—le ramènera 
au sentiment de sa subjectivité” [“Let’s get down to work, brothers. The cranial cavity is looking a 
bit cleaner. The chamber of memory is already stocked with a certain series of events. Causality,—
yes, causality,—will bring him back to an awareness of his subjectivity”].84 The container of his skull 
is reorganized, beginning with the memory in which events must be put in order by causality. 
Following on the explicit reference to Fichte (“le moi et le non moi”), we find here what must be 
understood as a reference to Cousin, for whom causality, alongside substance, was one of the two 
laws of thought, allowing for the passage from psychology to ontology.85 For the self to do its job in 
grounding philosophy, it had to hold to the inexorable laws of causality—not the arbitrary logic of 
association. The need to reestablish causality in the narrator’s brain can be understood as a need to 
reorder the relationship between self and world in order to return to the self its primacy: “La 
causalité, oui la causalité,—le ramènera au sentiment de sa subjectivité,” his all-important 
subjectivity. The gnomes have thus cracked open the narrator’s skull in the name of the dominant 
Cousinian ideology, remaking his subjectivity as he sleeps according to a particular institutional 
conception of the self and the proper relation between the internal and the external. 
 As I’ve said, Cousin is not the only target of Nerval’s irony here, and the dream does not end 
before he takes another jab at the physiological alternative. The highly concrete and detailed 
anatomical descriptions attributed to the gnomes cannot help but make the discourse of physiology 
sound as silly as that of spiritualism: “Nettoyons d’abord le sinciput et l’occiput ;—que le sang 
circule plus clair à travers les centres nerveux qui s’épanouissent au-dessus des vertèbres” [“Let’s 
first clean out the sinciput and the occiput—so that the blood will flow more freely between the 
nerve centers that spread above the spine”].86 Whether it be the flow of causality or the flow of 
blood that is at fault in the gnome’s diagnosis, the discourses they use to diagnose the narrator’s 
supposed illness are the butt of the joke here. Both physiology and psychology become the 
specialties of talking gnomes. The dream demonstrates these doctrines’ capacity for ruthless 
repression (brainwashing at its most literal), while using the dream’s absurdity to refuse them the 
power they claim. The narrator vindicates himself, on waking, through the humor of a two-part 
citation: 
 
  Pascal a dit : 
« Les hommes sont fous, si nécessairement fous, que ce serait être fou par 
une autre sorte que de n’être pas fou. » 
La Rochefoucauld a ajouté : 
  « C’est une grande folie de vouloir être sage tout seul. » 
  Ces maximes sont consolantes. 
 
 
                                                
83 Les Nuits d’octobre in Œuvres complètes, 3:339/Selected Writings, 230. 
84 Ibid., 339/231. 
85 Causality is obviously also an important principle for empiricism.  
86 Ibid., 339/230. 
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[Pascal once said: 
‘Men are mad, so ineluctably mad that not to be mad would merely be 
another form of madness.’ 
To which La Rochefoucauld added: 
 ‘To consider oneself the only wise man is the greatest folly of all.’]87 
 
In response to the philosophical discourses that define selfhood, Nerval puts forward literature’s 
long-standing refusal to obey or even to value those definitions. Writing about the self, even Pascal 
and La Rochefoucauld embraced its improper functioning. 
 This first dream thus establishes a motif of crime and punishment around the narrator’s 
selfhood. The self is subject to material and spiritual dysfunction for which he must be disciplined 
and rehabilitated. The two dominant psychiatric discourses appear as regulators of the self, asserting 
their conceptions of its proper constitution in relation to the world. The abstraction of this risk of 
censure in the narrator’s first dream finds a concrete reflection in a run-in he has with the authorities 
in the day between his two dreams. The morning after the performance in Meaux, he intends to set 
out for Dammartin, but misses the omnibus (of course). He manages to catch another headed in 
more or less the same direction, only to find on his arrival that rainy weather makes it impossible to 
cut through the forest of Ermenonville as planned. His already meandering course is thus further 
disrupted by a jaunt in the opposite direction of his destination in pursuit of a connection in Crespy-
en-Valois, to the northeast. It is there that his irrational itinerary comes under the scrutiny of a 
gendarme, who is already concerned by the narrator’s lack of papers (which he forgot in Meaux). 
With no proof of identity, the narrator also cannot make a clear account of himself and what he is 
doing there (in Crespy on the way from Meaux to Creil) and so finds himself under arrest. The 
absence of a proper self, denoted by the absence of his papers, is confirmed by his disorderly way of 
moving through the world. Government bureaucracy confirms the diagnosis already made by the 
gnomes, and the narrator spends the night in prison. 
 It is there that he has the second and final dream of Les Nuits d’octobre, in which discourses of 
the self and literary aesthetics converge. The associations of dreamwork are in evidence again here, 
as the juridical consequences the narrator faces for failing to identify himself properly are 
transformed into the institutional consequences of his erratic writing practice, and the juridical 
apparatus he faces is transformed from a legal to an academic one. The narrator finds himself faced 
with a tribunal that reminds him of the Sorbonne jury for his baccalaureate, made up of avatars of 
Guizot, Cousin, and the literary critic Désiré Nisard. The significance of these authority figures can 
be linked to Nerval’s scholastic biography, but far exceeds this personal reference; more important 
than Cousin’s and Guizot’s affiliation with the university in the final years of the Restoration, when 
Nerval himself was a student there, is their meteoric rise under the July Monarchy and the 
astonishing cultural authority they together represent, particularly in the field of education where 
spiritualist philosophy was aggressively propagated.88 Though he had been made Inspector General 
of Higher Education in the spring of 1852, Nisard bore this authority primarily in the literary field, 
where he was an outspoken critic of Romantics like Hugo and Dumas. The jury that confronts the 
narrator in this dream thus represents the whole compound of philosophical and aesthetic values I 
have sketched out around Cousin and the Revue des Deux Mondes.89 The stakes of their judgment of 
                                                
87 Ibid., 340/232. 
88 See John I. Brooks, The Eclectic Legacy. 
89 The state power at stake in the dream is still that of the July Monarchy, under which both Guizot and Cousin held 
great authority, though it could be argued that the philosophical and aesthetic values of order at stake here were 
complicit in the Second Empire, as well; we might attribute this untimeliness of the authorities represented here to their 
formative influence on Nerval’s own development, since they ruled France culturally as well as politically during most of 
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the narrator are anything but academic, however: “J’allais subir une condamnation capital” [“I was to 
face conviction for a capital offence”].90 Though the charges pertain to the narrator’s writing, the 
consequences will be of the utmost gravity, as if to show the intractability of the opposition between 
our narrator and the conservative cultural representatives he faces. 
 The charges put forth are in no way surprising in the context of the feuilleton, but the 
astonishing nature of the proceedings makes them worth looking at in detail: 
 
Sur une table étaient étendus plusieurs numéros de magazines anglais et 
américains, une foule de livraisons illustrées à four et à six pences, où apparaissaient 
vaguement les noms d’Edgar Poë, de Dickens, d’Ainsworth, etc., et trois figures 
pâles et maigres se dressaient à droite du tribunal, drapés de thèses en latin 
imprimées sur satin, où je crus distinguer ces noms : Sapientia, Ethica, Grammatica.— 
Les trois spectres accusateurs me jetaient ces mots méprisants : 
« Fantaisiste ! réaliste ! essayiste !! » 
 
[Several issues of British and American magazines lay exhibited upon a table, 
in addition to a pile of four- and sixpenny illustrated supplements that here and there 
featured the names of Edgar Poe, Dickens, Ainsworth, etc. Three pale and emaciated 
figures sat to the right of the tribunal, draped in theses composed in Latin on satin 
bands on which I thought I made out the words: Sapientia, Ethica, Grammatica. These 
three avenging spectres were hurling imprecations at me: 
« Fantaisiste ! réaliste ! essayiste !! »]91 
 
The tribunal is called to order with the evidence splayed out in front of it: those issues of English 
and American journals full of quintessentially fantaisiste writing, derived from the British tradition of 
essayisme.92 The narrator is charged in part with the crime he claimed to be committing in the first 
part of Les Nuits d’octobre, that of réalisme—but as we have seen, the réalisme of which one might be 
accused is not the same one that might be affirmatively claimed in 1852. Réalisme is accompanied 
here by fantaisisme and essayisme, which, as we have seen, serve to indicate a terrain not exhausted by 
the empiricist conception of Realism championed by Champfleury. The réalisme at stake here is one 
that takes in Poe as well as Dickens, to retain the possibility of imaginative disorder and strange 
phenomena (perhaps attributable essayisme and fantaisisme, respectively). These three charges are 
related, but each develops a different aspect of the personal and social stakes of non-Idealist literary 
production, as a juror likened to the Revue des Deux Mondes critic Henri Patin illustrates: “« Du réalisme 
au crime il n’y a qu’un pas ; car le crime est essentiellement réaliste. Le fantaisisme conduit tout droit à 
l’adoration des monstres. L’essayisme amène ce faux esprit à pourrir sur la paille humide des cachots. 
                                                                                                                                                       
his adult life; we might also attribute it to the relative newness of the repressive Second Empire—or, most likely, to the 
very repressive policies of that regime, which would have made it impossible to attack the current government directly. 
On the politics of L’Illustration and their potentially restrictive influence on Nerval’s writing, see Mizuno, “Nerval face au 
réalisme.” 
90 Les Nuits d’octobre in Œuvres complètes, 3:348/Selected Writings, 241 (translation modified). 
91 Ibid. The three Latin figures here represent science (or philosophy), ethics, and philology. 
92 Larousse explains the essayiste thus: “Nom donné aux auteurs d'essais, et particulièrement aux écrivains anglais qui 
rédigent dans les revues et les journaux des chroniques scientifiques, religieuses ou artistiques.” The essayiste is not to be 
confused with the journalist(ic), however “l'objet que poursuit l'essayiste est la critique, tandis que le journaliste se propose 
surtout de renseigner.” Most important for my purposes here, however, is how similar essayisme seems to be to the 
fantaisisme I have already discussed: “Un essayiste, au fond, est un homme qui ne prend pas une thèse convenue, mais qui 
aime à laisser flotter sa penseée sur tous les sujets qui l'intéressent,” (think Montaigne, Chateaubriand, or Jean-Paul 
Richter). (Larousse, vol. 7, part 2, 947.) 
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[»]” [“‘It’s but a very small step from realism to crime; for crime is, by its very nature, realistic. 
Fantaisisme inevitably leads to the worship of monsters. Essayisme has landed this wayward mind on a 
rotting pallet in a dungeon.[’]”].93 These various dangers (immorality, ugliness, waywardness) are 
ones to which Nerval’s narrator seems already to have succumbed in the various stages of the 
feuilleton: exploring the Parisian underworld, admiring the femme mérinos, and now getting arrested for 
being off course. 
 The accusation here is a literary one—a list of genres in which the narrator is accused of 
writing. But it is more than that. As we have seen, and as the Patin criticism demonstrates, these 
genres are closely linked to the composition of the self who writes them. Orderly writing requires 
orderly writers, and texts organized by a moral idea require writers organized by an a priori self. In 
this sense, the charges pursued by the dream tribunal have everything to do with those pursued by 
the police: failure to properly identify oneself, to have the kind of self that can be properly identified 
in its coherence. When the narrator pleads guilty in his dream, it might seem then that he pleads, 
too, to this fundamental failing of the self. But this dream, like the first, is permeated with irony, and 
the narrator’s confession is no exception: 
 
  Je jure de renoncer à ces œuvres maudites par la Sorbonne et par l’Institut [de  
  France] ; je n’écrirai plus que de l’histoire, de la philosophie, de la philologie et  
  de la statistique… On semble en douter… eh bien ! je ferai des romans vertueux  
  et champêtres, je viserai aux prix de poésie, de morale, je ferai des livres contre  
  l’esclavage et pour les enfants, des poèmes didactiques… Des tragédies !—des  
  tragédies ! 
 
  [I hereby promise to forswear all books outlawed by the Sorbonne and the Institute.  
  Henceforth I shall only write works of history, philosophy, philology and statistics  
  … You seem to doubt my word … Well, I’ll do even better: I shall write pastoral or  
  morally uplifting novels, I shall compete for the official prizes awarded to poetry and 
  edifying literature. I shall write books against slavery, books for children, didactic  
  verse … And tragedies—yes, especially tragedies!]94 
 
Social, psychological, and literary order demand particular forms of writing, and the narrator vows to 
convert to them, in all their diverse banality. He begins with academic genres like history and 
philology where strictly linear arguments might be made, but facing the tribunal’s skepticism, he 
offers alternatives: books asserting irrefutable moral positions (books against slavery and for children, 
he puns). Within this realm of authorized writing, even the more properly literary genres exist only 
within the sphere of the moral, as in the apposition of “prizes awarded to poetry and edifying 
literature.” Virtuous novels and didactic poems are the only fictional forms available, if not for that 
most conservative of genres, tragedy. This list of genres that might be approved of by the Idealist 
aesthetics of the jury is a catalogue of sterile forms, and the prospect of the narrator’s tragedies 
sends even those ghostly academicians themselves floating off into oblivion with mournful cries. 
 The options for acceptable non-Realist (non-fantaisiste) literary production are laid out in this 
dream in all of their dullness. The powers-that-be refuse forms of writing that do not demonstrate 
order and unity of idea and of self, but not even they seem to want to read the literature they 
authorize. They are forced to surrender in the face of tragedy, and the narrator’s dream ends without 
any sentence being handed down. Nerval’s irony in the face of his narrator’s accusers continues into 
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94 Ibid., 349/241. 
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the next day’s events, when the narrator sarcastically notes that academic knowledge is good, at least, 
for entertaining gendarmes. This ironic admission of the usefulness of approved genres in 
interacting with the forces of social order belies the way in which the forces of order are in this 
instance unwitting conspirators in the narrator’s guilty vagabondage: in transporting him to appear 
before a judge in Senlis, the gendarmes in fact continue the narrator’s wandering itinerary and deliver 
him, through yet another illogical turn, right where he wants to go. The police do much more to aid 
the narrator’s disorder (the crime for which they picked him up in the first place) than he does to 
accommodate them with orderly thinking. 
 In his waking encounter with the police and the dreamed encounters with cultural 
authorities, the narrator of Les Nuits d’octobre is not nearly as submissive as he might appear to be. 
The fundamental conflict between his own practices of writing and living and those literary and 
philosophical discourses is made evident by the repeated motif of crime and judgment, but the 
feuilleton consistently rejects the judging authorities even while staging their claims to power over 
both writing and writing subjects. The narrator’s self and his writing of it are adamantly not what 
either Champfleury or Cousin would like them to be, and he only ironically apologizes for that fact. 
The self at work here is too porous, as the gnomes attest, but also too imaginative, and so stands in 
opposition to both the control of organization and the transparency of sincerity. It offers itself 
instead as a kind of wild curiosity—a receptive ground onto which association draws a great variety 
of materials out of which any number of unpredictable things can be made. This self is not the 
unified one that might express itself or the purely observant one that might depict what it sees, but is 
rather a creative one that takes in the world without reserve and transforms it: a fantaisiste self. 
Behind the necessary co-articulation of writing-the-world and writing-the-imagination in fantaisisme is 
a self that does not lie only in its relationship to one of those things but that is the site of their 
encounter. 
 Les Nuits d’octobre thus suggests that Nerval’s transition from travel writing to the more 
apparently autobiographical texts of the 1850s cannot be understood as a transition from writing-
the-world to writing-the-self: the two were never separate. There is, as I have already discussed, 
nothing like a simply empirical project in his travel writing, which is marked by an idiosyncratic 
interest in strange phenomena and the way they engage the imagination and provoke associations. 
Likewise, there is nothing in his late work as simple as “personal” writing. After all, the writing self 
as it is explored in Les Nuits d’octobre is not the moi of autobiography but a mechanism of receiving 
and transforming the non moi—not an entity, we might say, but the mobility of its own wandering. 
This writing subject sheds new light on the ones we encounter in texts like Sylvie, ou Souvenirs du 
Valois that have been read autobiographically. The writing-the-self that a story like Sylvie seems to 
undertake has to be reconsidered to account for this porousness of the self to the non-self, and the 
appearance of subjective integrity that such a story presents has to be reexamined in light of the  
repressive dimension of that integrity. What kind of subject and what kind of writing we encounter 
in a text are, as we have seen in Les Nuits d’octobre, not abstract aesthetic questions, but historical and 
even polemical ones. In turning to Sylvie in Chapter Two, then, I will read the story in terms of both 
the epochal shifts and the local critical maneuverings that provide the context for its publication, 
restoring the profound imbrication of writing-the-self and writing-the-world in Nerval’s work, and 
drawing out the fictional mechanisms through which he imagined the porousness of moi and non-moi 
to function.
 42 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
History Play 
Sylvie 
 
 
Ces vieux airs, d’un français si pur, raniment les 
puissances d’illusion que nous transmirent nos pères. 
 
[These old tunes, in such pristine French, revive the 
powers of illusion passed down to us by our fathers.] 
 
Maurice Barrès1 
 
 
The Mists of Idealism 
In 1853, Nerval published what would become his most beloved work, Sylvie, ou Souvenirs du Valois 
[Sylvie, or Memories of the Valois]. The story appeared that summer in the Revue des Deux Mondes, where 
readers were already familiar with Nerval’s travel writing and his historical portraits.2 With its wistful, 
lyrical prose, however, Sylvie introduced readers to a different Nerval, the poet of bittersweet 
nostalgia. Here, in a hazy story of dream and memory, the narrator recalls three women he loved as 
a young man, and elaborates a dense landscape of childhood memories on which those loves play 
out. We meet the young man-protagonist in the Parisian theater where he nightly performs his 
unrequited love for an actress, only to catch him quickly slipping off to the countryside where he 
spent his childhood, to reunite with the peasant girl he loved in his youth. Into the protagonist’s 
nighttime carriage ride through the Valois in search of his lost love, the narrator weaves a series of 
memories that recall that love and introduce another—for the daughter of local aristocrats, whom 
he saw only a handful of times before she entered a convent. Sylvie unfolds as the dense intertwining 
of these three unhappy love stories—for the actress Aurélie, the peasant Sylvie, and the nun 
Adrienne—with the landscapes and traditions of the Valois region that cradled not only Nerval’s 
infancy but also that of the French nation. 
 After the episodic travel writer and the eccentric historian, then, the readers of the Revue des 
Deux Mondes encountered in Sylvie Nerval the melancholic poet. And in the sweet longing that 
                                                
1 “Discours de réception.” English citations from Sylvie will be quoted from Sieburth’s translation in Selected Writings, 
modified as needed. All other translations are my own, except where otherwise noted. 
2 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:537-79. The Pléiade edition includes the version of “Sylvie” published in 
Les Filles du feu in 1854; that is the version that will be cited here, modified according to the Pléiade’s notes regarding the 
variations in the Revue des Deux Mondes. 
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pervades the story and its enchanting descriptions of the Valois, Sylvie made that melancholy 
charming. Rural episodes that Nerval had treated the year before in the autobiographical fragments 
of La Bohême galante reappear here, transformed by their integration into a story deeply rooted in the 
18th-century pastoral tradition.3 Traces of that tradition traverse the story, not only in its delicate 
portrayal of country life, but also in direct references to Jean-Antoine Watteau and his fêtes galantes, 
and, above all, to Rousseau. The sequence of the narrator’s memories centers on a series of 
traditional festivals that allude (both implicitly and explicitly) to Watteau’s paintings, but it is 
folksongs, so prized by Rousseau for their naïve sincerity, that resound throughout the text, serving 
as an ephemeral point of reference in one memory after another.4 In this way, the entire Valois is 
imbued with the promise of a transparent relation to the world, and the story becomes an idyll of 
forests, girls, and songs.5  
 The Valois of Sylvie is imbued, too, with a melancholy brought on by the disappointment of 
that promise of transparency and the disappearance of that idyll. After recalling so many sweet 
memories of his childhood in the countryside and of the folk songs and festivals that punctuated it, 
the protagonist finds that he cannot regain the ideal all those memories have expressed. If Adrienne, 
the young nun fleetingly glimpsed, awakened his desire all those years ago, it is a desire that cannot 
be satisfied by the peasant or the actress. The nun is gone, and cannot be recaptured in either of the 
other young women, making Sylvie an elegy as much as an idyll. And indeed, in the last chapter, the 
narrator comments on the bittersweet lessons of his fruitless search for the impossible. “Telles sont 
les chimères,” he writes, “qui charment et égarent au matin de la vie. […] Les illusions tombent l’une 
après l’autre, comme les écorces d’un fruit, et le fruit, c’est l’expérience. Sa saveur est amère ; elle a 
pourtant quelque chose d’âcre qui fortifie” [“Such are the chimeras that beguile and misguide us in 
the morning of life. […] Illusions fall away one after another like the husks of a fruit, and that fruit is 
experience. It is bitter to the taste, but there is fortitude to be found in gall”].6 For all its beauty and 
fascination, the story of the Valois that Sylvie recounts is finally one of disillusionment, sealed with 
the final revelation of Adrienne’s early death. 
 The idyllic Nerval of Sylvie was appreciated by contemporary readers, as he has been by so 
many readers since, for the pale beauty of his writing. Gautier praised his style as “pur” [“pure”] and 
“limpide” [“limpid”], describing the story as “un marbre grec légèrement teinté de pastel” [“a statue 
lightly tinted with pastels”].7 This is the same style that Maurice Barrès eulogized half a century later, 
when he insisted that Nerval had captured in Sylvie the “mélancolie tendre et chantante” [“tender, 
melodious melancholy”] that resonated through the Valois mist, the songs that were the voice of 
France itself.8 The “purity” and “limpidity” of Sylvie contribute not only to its idyllic quality, 
however, but also to its elegiac quality, a mournfulness that (however beautiful) has been for readers 
a source of concern as much as of admiration. They have seemed (particularly to 20th-century 
scholars) to signal a troublesome Idealism, one that goes too far and so is doomed to 
disappointment, a Rousseausitic vision of the Valois as a dreamed-of space of transparency and 
                                                
3 In his essay on Nerval, Marcel Proust criticizes 19th-century critic Sainte-Beuve for reading Nerval this way, as a 
holdover from an 18th-century aesthetic. See Contre Sainte-Beuve. 
4 When Sylvie was republished in the 1854 collection Les Filles du feu, Nerval appended to it an article on the “Chansons et 
légendes du Valois” [“Songs and Legends of the Valois”] (Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:569-79).  
5 When I speak of Rousseau, I do not pretend to make claims about the philosopher’s actual views, but rather about the 
way that they had been assimilated by the mid-19th century into a Rousseauism that was already a cliché. I will refer to 
“Rousseauism” when appropriate, but even the name Rousseau will be meant to refer not to the man but to the idea. 
6 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:567/Selected Writings, 176. 
7 Quoted in Jean-Luc Steinmetz, Reconnaissances, 78. 
8 “Discours de réception.” 
 44 
immediacy.9 In returning to the Valois, the melancholic poet chases after an impossible unification 
of real and ideal. Whether his inevitable failure signals his inability to come to terms with the real 
(his madness), or the impasses of Romanticism itself, the idealization of the Valois has seemed to 
many to be pathological—a dream, in the worst sense of the word. 
 For these readers, one of the primary manifestations of this Idealist pathology is its effect on 
time. The plot of Sylvie is, without doubt, complex and even confusing, folding time back on itself 
again and again, as it passes through familiar landscapes. Readers can never be sure whether they’ve 
been here before, or whether that “before” hasn’t yet ended.10 More important for many scholars, 
however, are the temporal implications of the story’s impetus more broadly. In wanting to return to 
the Valois and to (a) lost love(s), the protagonist is accused of wanting to negate time, to achieve a 
simultaneity and identity represented by the unchanging repetition of the traditional song or festival 
that links the modern present to the feudal past.11 What’s more, the loves themselves are subject to 
this same logic of identity. The apparently complex romantic plot, with lovers in all directions, is 
instead understood as a series of repetitions in which the protagonist’s three loves manifest a single 
(always unsatisfied) desire. The slippage from the actress to the peasant girl, and the suspicion that 
the protagonist’s interest in both is underpinned by an obsession with the nun, suggest that these are 
variations on a theme, imperfect approximations of something that remains out of reach because 
Adrienne was lost to the convent and then to death, or because she was never the desired origin but 
just another avatar.12 Sylvie is thus cast as a story about the impossible desire to abolish difference 
and to do away with time—to transcend history (personal or otherwise) in attaining the ideal. This 
impossibility is commonly understood in recent readings as the source of the story’s melancholy.13 
Nerval’s protagonist (or Nerval himself, for those prone to autobiographical readings) is at odds 
with reality and with history, because he is at odds with the very dynamism of time. In its Idealism, it 
seems, Sylvie is at the heart of Nerval’s reputation as a mere dreamer: his imaginings may be charming, 
but they are hopeless, and so the story is one of ineffectuality and failure. 
 In thinking about Nerval’s Idealism in Sylvie, however, we must return to where we started: 
to August 1853 and the Revue des Deux Mondes, which first published the story. The journal was, as 
we saw in Chapter One, far from hospitable to the writing of Nerval and his fellow ex-bohemians, 
whom Revue critics lumped together under the rubric of fantaisisme: writers not sufficiently concerned 
with beauty and the ideal. Given the great prestige of the Revue, it is easy to imagine the benefits that 
publishing there might offer to a writer like Nerval, even if he was not likeminded. It is harder to 
imagine, however, why the journal might open its pages to a writer so foreign to its aesthetic project. 
True, this was not Nerval’s first appearance in the journal, but his earlier pieces for the Revue 
(serialized installments of the Voyage en Orient in 1846-47, and a portrait of Rétif de la Bretonne in 
1850) corresponded easily to forms of travel and historical writing commonly published there. Much 
of the writing Nerval had been doing since 1850, on the other hand, was much less easily classified, 
prone to hybridity and digression that would find no sympathy with the editors of the Revue. 
                                                
9 See, for instance, Poulet, “Sylvie ou la pensée de Nerval” in Trois essais de mythologie romantique; Sarah Kofman, Nerval ou 
le charme de la répétition, lecture de « Sylvie »; and Bénichou, “Nerval” in L’école du désenchantement. 
10 On the complexity of temporality in Sylvie, see Umberto Eco, “The Woods of Loisy” in Six Walks in the Fictional Woods. 
11 See, for example, Destruel, “Obsessions: L’écriture de soi” in L’écriture nervalienne du temps; Jean-Nicolas Illouz, “Sylvie” 
in Nerval. Le rêveur en prose; and Bray, “Lost in the Fold.” 
12 This way of reading the female characters in Sylvie is incredibly common among Nerval scholars, if not entirely taken 
for granted, and so the examples are far too numerous to list here. For some scholars the unattainable origin is an 
essential or ideal woman (even the goddess Isis); see, for example, Brix, Les déesses absentes. For others, particularly those 
psychoanalytically inclined, the absence that lies at the origin of the series is the mother Nerval hardly knew; see for 
instance Felman, La Folie et la chose littéraire; Bettina Knapp, Gérard de Nerval; and Kristeva, Soleil Noir; but also Kofman, 
who resists strictly psychoanalytic readings. 
13 See, for example, Chambers, “Suicide without Pistols” in The Writing of Melancholy. 
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Serialized texts like Les Faux Saulniers and Les Nuits d’octobre could never have appeared in the Revue’s 
pages, and yet Sylvie seems to resonate in so many ways with the kind of Idealism the Revue 
propagated. It seems to have been cherry-picked for the journal.  
 The orthodox account in Nerval studies of why Sylvie differs so greatly from Nerval’s earlier 
writing is that the story represents a more advanced point in his progress toward the heart of his 
true, autobiographical problematic.14 Mizuno, however, proposes a very different way of 
understanding this stylistic divergence. Rather than seeing it as a more advanced stage in a 
teleological process toward the expression of Nerval’s personal truth, Mizuno reads the Idealism of 
Sylvie as an occasional feature, an adaptation engineered to win editorial approval for the story at a 
time when Nerval had turned away from the theater and was looking to brand himself as a prose 
writer.15 In Mizuno’s reading, the story’s apparent naivety and Rousseauism must be regarded with a 
certain degree of suspicion as to whether they represent Nerval’s own views. Nerval was, after all, a 
serious reader of Rousseau, with more sophisticated ideas about the philosopher than the kind of 
simplistic Idealism he invokes in Sylvie.16 What’s more, Nerval takes a certain ironic distance from 
Rousseauism—an irony I will return to in discussing the story’s “Dernier Feuillet.” For Gabrielle 
Chamarat-Malandain and Jacques Bony, Nerval’s irony signals the narrator’s self-ironization, a kind 
of bitter acknowledgment of the foolishness of his younger self.17 But it must also be read as the 
author’s irony with regard to the tactic he has adopted, his refusal to completely identify with the 
Idealism he employs to get Sylvie past the censors, as it were. That Idealism was, after all, quite 
different from the significance Rousseau had had earlier in the century. While early Romantic 
sensibility was associated with a new, post-Revolutionary social order and implied possibility and 
freedom, by midcentury its ideological significance had changed. As I discussed in the introduction, 
by 1853, that sensibility was associated with a strict Idealism (of which the Revue des Deux Mondes was 
a major proponent) and the maintenance of a status quo of authoritarian state and cultural power. 
Sylvie’s irony with regard to Rousseau thus appears as an acknowledgment of the great disjuncture 
between Rousseau’s philosophy of freedom and its repressive appropriation, between the Rousseau 
who might have interested Nerval and the Rousseau he was obliged to invoke in the Revue.18 
 This line of Mizuno’s thinking can be productively followed a step beyond his own 
arguments. Rather than simply allowing Nerval a certain distance from the official moral of his story, 
I will read the text in search of the ways in which it insinuates unsanctioned forms and ideas into 
this apparently custom-tailored text. I will look not only for disavowal of the story’s explicit aims, 
but also for ideas and values that are surreptitiously affirmed. This is not to dismiss the pastoral 
beauty of Sylvie: a reader can think nothing else about the story without first reflecting on its 
mournful poetry, now idyll, now elegy. Nor is it to suggest that the story’s beauty and any enjoyment 
of it are inauthentic ideological alibis that we must cast off to find its true meaning. The virtuosity 
with which Nerval works in an Idealist idiom that is not his own and pushes it to its pathological 
                                                
14 Jacques Bony, for instance, interprets Nerval’s career as a progression toward first person, confessional writing; see Le 
Récit nervalien. 
15 “Sylvie de Gérard de Nerval et la Revue des Deux Mondes,” 216-19. 
16 Monique Streiff-Moretti, Le Rousseau de Gérard de Nerval, 116-17. While Streiff-Moretti insists that Nerval likely did not 
think the idealist myth he propagated (a myth originated by Bernardin de Saint-Pierre) was an accurate assessment of 
Rousseau, she nonetheless understands that idealism as being authentically Nerval’s own, whereas I will argue that 
Nerval’s simplistic invocation of Rousseau is a way of disavowing an idealism that is not his own. 
17 Chamarat-Malandain, Nerval, réalisme et invention, 83; and Bony, L’Esthétique de Nerval, 144. 
18 We might also hear in it the echo of other ways that he takes distance from the apparent sincerity (almost to the point 
of autobiography) of the story, including his use of the actress/nun conceit of George Sand and Jules Sandeau’s 1831 
novel Rose et Blanche. By essentially rewriting this previous pastoral novel, a tale of young men engaged in impossible 
romances with young women who circulate between stage and convent, Sylvie is no longer simply pastoral but perhaps 
pastoral to the second degree, which immediately troubles its ostensible transparency and naivety. 
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limits is not simply a diversion, but the story’s most significant gesture. What I am arguing is rather 
that Sylvie enables multiple readings (some that would have been appreciated by the editors of the 
Revue and others that had to pass under the radar), and that understanding the story means 
theorizing the relationship between those multiple readings. We must read both the apparent 
Idealism and the underlying currents of irony and artifice that push against it, in order to see how 
Sylvie gets beyond an opposition between what is apparent and what is essential, how it plays the role 
of sincerity in order to call sincerity itself into question. By making the invocation of authenticity 
itself a performance, the story stages a mode of fiction that transcends authenticity and 
inauthenticity, both.  
 
Mystifying Idealism 
Sylvie manages to perform Idealism without being identifiable with it because of the other stories it 
simultaneously tells. The text creates multiple, simultaneous readings through its use of precisely the 
element its pastoralism seems to reject: time. Time is, we must recall, the enemy of Sylvie’s Idealism: 
it creates difference where the protagonist seeks identity, distance where he seeks immediacy. It is 
the medium of the real that the protagonist tries to transcend in search of the ideal, and that the 
narrator disrupts by organizing memories based on resemblances rather than chronology. And yet as 
a literary device, the disorientation of time in Sylvie functions much more to draw attention to time 
and to reflect upon it than it does to erase or eclipse it. Though the story might seem to offer 
resemblance as an alternative narrative logic to chronology, in practice the effect of the complexity 
of the plot is to enlist readers in the arduous task of restoring its order, restoring time. As Proust 
observed, the reader of Sylvie “est obligé à tout moment de tourner les pages qui précèdent pour voir 
où on se trouve, si c’est présent ou rappel du passé” [“is constantly obliged to turn the preceding 
pages to see where he is, whether it is the present or a recollection of the past”].19 The story cannot 
do without chronology, and readers feel it, feel “obliged” to piece together the temporal logic that 
seems to be missing. Umberto Eco picks up on Proust’s reading to note that, though readers 
struggle and often fail in their attempts to situate themselves in the chronology of the story, that 
chronology nonetheless demands to be sorted out. It does not, Eco argues, want us to “fall ill, like 
Labrunie [Nerval’s family name]—incapable of distinguishing dreams, memories, and reality,” but 
rather “to feel that the periods of time [are] blurred and to understand how he managed to blend 
them.”20 To parse that blurring, readers must attend as much to the differences that reveal how each 
memory is situated in time as to the similarities through which the series is associated.21 The 
invisibility that time might enjoy in a story that moves steadily forward, where it might be taken for 
granted, is revoked by Sylvie’s insistence on time as a formal problem. As a formal feature, the 
temporal disorientation of the story thus serves far more to thematize the passage of time than to 
transcend it. 
 In this way, time allows itself to be read through the disorienting, Idealist series of memories 
in Sylvie—or rather, it demands to be read against the Idealism of that series. This temporality that 
the story harbors goes beyond narrative time, however, beyond the protagonist’s travels and 
romances: reordered and reconsidered, the chronology of the story introduces a reflection on history 
itself. Against its apparent Idealism, Sylvie offers a kind of allegory of history, unfolding the 
implications of contemporary social and economic transformation. What’s more, it creates this 
account of dynamism out of precisely the figures that might seem to embody repetition and 
                                                
19 Contre Sainte-Beuve. 
20 “The Woods of Loisy,” Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, 37 and 38. 
21 I will return in Chapter Four to the functioning of repetition and seriality in Nerval’s poetics; Sylvie is unique, however, 
in the centrality of historical situation as an axis of difference. 
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stagnation in the story: the female characters. It is certainly true that there is continuity in the 
protagonist’s desire for the three women, a single desire motivating his engagement with each of 
them. However, the fact of a coherent logic to the series does not imply that the women have no 
specific content, that, as Michel Brix argues, they simply “se superpose et renvoient, par un jeu 
complexe de miroirs et d’analogies” [“are superimposed on one another and refer to one another, in 
a complex game of mirrors and analogies”], or that “La femme n’est pas aimée pour elle-même, mais 
parce qu’elle évoque une autre figure féminine” [“A woman is not loved for herself, but because she 
evokes another feminine face”].22 To read the women this way, to see the story treating them as 
mere mediations of each other, requires abstracting each of them to a face, a voice; it requires 
removing from them all of their personal and historical specificity. This is, of course, what Brix 
would argue that the story does, but this unsituating belongs to the reading rather than to Sylvie. 
 In the context of the story, each woman is attributed distinct values and correlates: the 
actress Aurélie is associated with Parisian modernity and the artifice of the theater; the nun Adrienne 
is associated with the long history of feudal tradition; and the peasant girl Sylvie is associated with 
the naïve continuation of that tradition. The story gives historical specificity to each of the women, 
as well as to the circumstances of the protagonist’s encounters with them, and so does not allow for 
them to be flattened into a repetitive series. If there is an iterative dimension to the romantic plot 
(the protagonist trying and failing with one woman after another), it is not because it is a repetition 
of a desire impossible to satisfy, a desire to overcome difference itself by gaining access to one 
woman through another. What thwarts the protagonist and fuels his engagement with the series of 
women is rather the obstacle presented by a specific historical moment. This historical moment is 
one we know well, a period of modernization, during which modern, capitalist values replaced older 
social forms, and the anonymity of modern life eclipsed rural communities. When we look beneath 
the tangled links of resemblance between the women of Sylvie, what we find is a story of their 
transformation, so that when the protagonist loses each woman, his loss is driven not by the 
impossibility of his desire but by the divergence of his values from hers.  
 The protagonist begins in Paris, in thrall to Aurélie, but does not approach her because of 
what he presumes to be her venality. He does not want a love that can be bought, but something 
purer, and so he follows his memories to the villages and girls of his youth, epitomized by Adrienne 
and Sylvie. The opposition between the venality of Paris and the virtue of the countryside that 
Nerval establishes in the story’s opening is certainly not a new one, and there is nothing in the 
opposition itself that necessarily refers to this historical moment rather than any other. And yet, the 
specific terms in which he sets up the opposition do seem to insist on its historical specificity. What 
allows the protagonist to even consider engaging Aurélie’s affections with money is his good luck on 
the financial markets, the recognition and rising value of the foreign stocks he inherited: “Dans les 
débris de mon opulence se trouvait une somme assez forte en titres étrangers. Le bruit avait couru 
que, négligés longtemps, ils allaient être reconnus. C’est ce qui venait d’avoir lieu à la suite d’un 
changement de ministère. Les fonds se trouvaient déjà cotés très haut ; je redevenais riche” 
[“Among the various assets that had not yet slipped through my fingers, there was a fairly substantial 
batch of foreign securities. There had been a rumour that these securities, which had long been 
deemed worthless, were about to be formally recognized—and indeed, after a government reshuffle, 
this is precisely what had just taken place. Their market value had already risen considerably; I was a 
rich man again!”].23 In the suddenness of this change of bourgeois fortune and the impersonal 
mechanisms to which it is owed (not to the familial act of bequeathal, but to the anonymous 
functioning of the market), this opening Parisian scene distinctly belongs to the mid-19th century. 
                                                
22 Les Déesses absentes, 238. 
23 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:539-40/Selected Writings, 147. 
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The Parisian culture the protagonist abandons to return to the Valois is not an idealized but a 
historical one. 
 The Valois to which he returns initially appears as the ideal of naivety that might be opposed 
to Parisian corruption. As we’ve seen, in its close association with its feudal history, the Valois seems 
an idealized space outside of time. This is what Adrienne seems to embody in Sylvie: an unchanging 
order, impervious to history. She is inaccessible in the story, once she enters the convent, and so the 
protagonist shifts his attention to Sylvie, apparently as a kind of substitute, another representative of 
the same feudal ideal. The loss of Sylvie, however, is very unlike the loss of Adrienne, which 
happens off-stage, so to speak, and is never fully explained. Sylvie, on the contrary, is lost in a very 
specific and profoundly historical way, one that evokes the new economic and social reality of the 
July Monarchy. When the protagonist finally arrives in the village to reunite with his youthful love, 
he finds her much changed. The Sylvie of his youth was the daughter of peasants who carried on 
Valois traditions in her pleasures as well as in her work. This “fée éternelle des légendes” [“the fairy 
of legend blessed with eternal youth”] was not only an enthusiastic participant in village festivals but 
also a skilled lacemaker, trained in an age-old craft in the Valois region (which includes Chantilly).24 
 The Sylvie he finds on his return, however, is very different. She is a “fée industrieuse” 
[“industrious fairy”] who has given up lace to make gloves for a manufacturer in the town.25 If Sylvie 
is a disappointment, then, it is not simply because she has been marked by the passage of time in 
some abstract way; it is because she has succumbed to a very particular historical transformation and 
lost her connection to traditional society. “[G]râce à ses talents d’ouvrière,” the narrator notes, “je 
comprenais assez que Sylvie n’était plus une paysanne” [“I realized well enough that thanks to her 
skills as a worker, Sylvie was no longer a peasant”].26 In her transformation from artisan to 
pieceworker, Sylvie has adopted a practicality appropriate to the new economic and social order. 
Indeed, she goes on to marry not the wistful protagonist but an ambitious peasant who plans to 
become a baker, and ends up the wife of a petit commerçant (shopkeeper). Her progress may not 
represent the most spectacular trajectory of modernization, but her (inevitable) passage from peasant 
to bourgeoise is at the heart of the disappointment Sylvie recounts.27 
 When the protagonist returns to Paris and to Aurélie, this passage is reiterated in relation to 
a different woman who represents a different culture destroyed by bourgeois values. At the 
beginning of the story, the actress is already suspected of the stereotypical venality the protagonist’s 
uncle warns him about. This venality is not distinctly modern or bourgeois, however; that the actress 
might be mercenary in her relations with men, reveling in the spectacular wealth she might extract 
from them, is nothing new. But this kind of venality is importantly not what destroys their 
relationship when the protagonist finally gets close to Aurélie; the death knell for their romance 
rather sounds because Aurélie reveals her desire for the kind of practical support offered by a 
bourgeois husband who would be not a patron but a business partner. While her decadence might 
have been compatible with the culture of the theater she represents, her pragmatism is not: she is 
just another bourgeoise trying to manage her career. I will return later to this image of the actress as 
entrepreneur, but for now we need only observe that the decisive break in both of the protagonist’s 
relationships in Sylvie comes at the moment when the woman demonstrates her commitment to that 
most modern of values: utility. It is not an ideal identity that eludes the narrator here, but real ways 
of living that have been eradicated by the new economic and social order. 
                                                
24 Ibid., 550/159. 
25 Ibid., 560/168. 
26 Ibid. 
27 It is for this reason that Monique Streiff-Moretti describes Sylvie’s ideological significance in the story as that of “La 
femme et le quotidien, la femme et l’argent, le “bon sens” contre l’ideal”; see Le Rousseau de Gérard de Nerval, 379. 
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 The story of loss and disappointment that the narrator traces in Sylvie is thus not simply 
personal and spiritual, but also historical. What he mourns is not an impossibility, but rather forms 
of life that used to exist (that he himself experienced) and that are being blotted out. With this 
reflection on the ravages of history, Sylvie pushes against its apparent Idealism, grounding its 
melancholy in a recognition of real historical transformation. But we must be careful not to 
oversimplify this allegory, pitting the modernity of the women against the nostalgia of the 
protagonist. If the story were centered only on the disappointments of the changing Valois and 
Sylvie’s willingness to go along with them, it might easily be read as an elegy for rural culture—but 
the actress is no less a source of hope, and then of disappointment, for the protagonist. He is not 
disillusioned by her from the start, because she is a Parisian actress and not a girl from the 
countryside, but becomes disillusioned only later when he comes to understand that she relates in 
the same way as Sylvie does to the new economic and social order. Sylvie is thus an allegory of 
modernization in which country and city, tradition and art, authenticity and inauthenticity, are not 
the poles of before and after. The transformation that thwarts the protagonist affects both Sylvie 
and Aurélie, both tradition and theater. This is because the loss that is dramatized in Sylvie is not a 
fall from naivety to artifice, but the abandonment of collective practices, be they traditional or 
dramatic, that are simultaneously naïve and artificial. What is mourned here is a conjugation of 
authenticity and inauthenticity, reality and illusion, that is far more complex than the naivety the 
story seems to espouse in its idealism. 
 
Tradition and Fiction 
What is mourned in Sylvie is a loss of cultural practices, but not in the way the story’s apparent 
pastoralism would have us expect. The women that the protagonist loses in the story are all strongly 
identified with the performances they shared with him: Adrienne with folksongs, Sylvie with 
festivals, and Aurélie with the theater. If the protagonist turns away from both peasant girl and 
actress at the moment each affirms her own bourgeois identity, it is because, in affirming the 
primary importance of utility (Sylvie’s practicality), she turns away from the cultural forms she 
shared with him. Those are forms, as I’ve said, that bring together their participants in an 
imaginative practice that bridges reality and illusion. Apparently authentic traditional practices and 
apparently inauthentic theatrical practices converge in Sylvie in a complex but unified conception of 
collective fictional practice that is far-removed from the Rousseaian naivety of the folksong. This 
mode of practice is elaborated first and foremost through the narrator’s memories of Valois 
festivals, but the terms in which he celebrates those festivals and mourns their loss are the same 
terms in which he praises certain forms of dramatic practice and critiques others. 
 The festival is the first folk practice to appear in the story, in the first of the two memories 
that send the protagonist back to the Valois and to Sylvie. After a night at the theater, he sees an 
item in the newspaper about the yearly Fête du Bouquet provincial, and though the account of the 
festival is sparse (“Demain, les archers de Senlis doivent rendre le bouquet à ceux de Loisy” 
[“Tomorrow the archers of Senlis will present the bouquet to the archers of Loisy”]), the mere 
mention of its unchanging procedures suffices to awaken in the protagonist a very vivid memory of 
the festival: 
 
Le cor et le tambour résonnaient au loin dans les hameaux et dans les bois ; les 
jeunes filles tressaient des guirlandes et assortissaient, en chantant, des bouquets 
ornés de rubans.—Un lourd chariot, traîné par des bœufs, recevait ces présents sur 
son passage, et nous, enfants de ces contrées, nous formions le cortège avec nos arcs 
et nos flèches, nous décorant du titre de chevaliers,—sans savoir alors que nous ne 
faisions que répéter d’âge en âge une fête druidique survivant aux monarchies et aux 
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religions nouvelles. 
 
[The far-off sounds of drum and horn was drifting through the hamlets and woods; 
the young girls were weaving garlands and tying ribbons around bouquets, singing all 
the while. A heavy wagon, drawn by oxen, was receiving these offerings as it passed; 
and we, the children of these parts, were escorting it with our bows and arrows, 
imagining ourselves knights of old—unaware that we were merely repeating from 
age to age a Druidic festival that had survived all subsequent monarchies and forms 
of religion.]28  
 
From the mention of the fête in the present emerges the fullness of the protagonist’s memory—not 
of one festival, one year, but of the festival’s repetition, described in the imperfect. The festival is 
repeated (rehearsed) year after year, and has meaning for the protagonist only insofar as it is 
repeated. The significance of this repetition is importantly not predicated on its young participants’ 
consciousness of the druidic rite that serves as its origin. The festival is repetitive and conservative 
(“survivant aux monarchies et aux religions nouvelles”), as well as “naïve ” (“sans savoir alors”), 
creating its effect on its participants through a naturalized, unthinking repetition of a traditional 
form. 
 The festival here comes very near the folksong as Rousseau understood it, working its magic 
through the unconscious effects of repetition. In his Dictionnaire de musique, Rousseau discusses Swiss 
folksongs, explaining the source of their affective force that was so great and so aroused the 
homesickness of the Swiss guards that the French king made it a capital offense to play them. 
According to Rousseau, there is no feature of the songs’ form, no musical element, that can account 
for their tremendous effects. They gain their power instead from the unconscious force of habit and 
repetition: “Ces effets, qui n’ont aucun lieu sur les étrangers, ne viennent que de l’habitude, des 
souvenirs, de mille circonstances qui, […] leur rappelant [aux gardes] leur pays, leurs anciens plaisirs, 
leur jeunesse, et toutes leurs façons de vivre, excitent en eux une douleur amère d’avoir perdu tout 
cela” [“These effects, which do not befall foreigners, come only from habit, from memory, from a 
thousand circumstances, which, reminding the guards of their country, their old pleasures, their 
youth, and their entire way of life, arouse in them a bitter sorrow at having lost all that”].29 The 
nostalgia of the Swiss guards serves here to draw out the mechanisms by which folksongs bind 
people to the society to which they belong and to its way of life, creating a sense of coherence and 
belonging, simply be being constantly repeated. A mere tune is enough to invoke this sense of 
belonging (or of exile, as the case may be), just as the mere notice of the festival is enough to revive 
for the protagonist a dense, iterative experience. 
 What this comparison to the folksong obscures in the narrator’s account of the fête du bouquet 
provincial, however, is the element of self-conscious performance and staging involved in the 
repetition of the festival. The “répétition” here is not simply repetitive in the way of Rousseau’s 
nostalgic song, but also invokes another, quite different iterative concept, that of rehearsal. Part of 
what the protagonist recalls of the fête is the role he would play in it, along with the other boys: 
“nous, enfants de ces contrées, nous formions le cortège avec nos arcs et nos flèches, nous décorant 
du titre de chevaliers” [“we, the children of these parts, were escorting it with our bows and arrows, 
imagining ourselves knights of old”]. The festival’s yearly repetition is naïve insofar as it is made 
without awareness of the druidic rite on which it is based. It is also, however, creative and actively 
imaginative in its relation to the past, insofar as its participants reinterpret the components of the 
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festival (the bows and arrows) and invent historical personas for themselves based on them. Not 
only does this initial description of the festival in Sylvie invoke the continuity between festival and 
theater, it also demonstrates the kind of theatrical imagination the festival participants employ to 
give content to the ritual. Though it is only a brief memory, sparked by an even briefer newspaper 
notice, this first appearance of the festival in Sylvie already suggests the complex combination of 
naivety and self-conscious fictionality that tradition implies for Nerval. 
 The two memories of the Valois that the narrator recounts as the protagonist makes his 
carriage ride through the night only exacerbate this complexity. The examples of festivals he recalls 
are less and less grounded in the naturalized, unconscious performance of tradition, and more and 
more mediated by outside influences—and yet, the interest and intensity of these festivals do not 
decrease or even change significantly. Both memories come from the same adolescent trip to the 
Valois to see Sylvie. In the first, the protagonist returns to the “fête patronale” to be a knight once 
more. After describing the traditional archery competition and procession through the countryside, 
the narrator gives a detailed account of the celebratory feast in which the young people set out to 
improve upon tradition: 
 
[L]es vainqueurs avaient été conviés à un repas qui se donnait dans une île ombragée 
de peupliers et de tilleuls, au milieu d’un des étangs alimentés par la Nonette et la 
Thève. Des barques pavoisées nous conduisirent à l’île,—dont le choix avait été 
déterminé par l’existence d’un temple ovale à colonnes qui devait servir de salle pour 
le festin. […] Trois colonnes avaient succombé emportant dans leur chute une partie 
de l’architrave ; mais on avait déblayé l’intérieur de la salle, suspendu des guirlandes 
entre les colonnes, on avait rajeuni cette ruine moderne,—qui appartenait au 
paganisme de Boufflers ou de Chaulieu plutôt qu’à celui d’Horace. 
 La traversée du lac avait été imaginée peut-être pour rappeler le Voyage à 
Cythère de Watteau. Nos costumes modernes dérangeaient seuls l’illusion. 
 
[[T]he victors had been invited to a banquet which was to take place on an isle 
shaded by limes and poplars in the middle of one of the lakes fed by the rivers 
Nonette and Thève. Small boats, all decked out with flags, ferried us over to the 
island—the site had been chosen because it featured an oval temple with columns 
which was going to serve as the banquet hall. […] Three of its columns had 
collapsed, carrying along with them a portion of the architrave; but the interior had 
been cleared of debris and garlands had been strung between the columns, thus 
rejuvenating this modern ruin—a remnant of the paganism of Boufflers or Chaulieu 
rather than that of Horace. 
 The crossing of the lake had perhaps been devised to recall Watteau’s Voyage 
to Cythera. Our modern dress alone spoiled the illusion.]30 
 
In this memory, the young people reengineer the festival to improve upon the received form, 
augmenting the celebration with the picturesque setting of the island and its temple to Urania. 
Inspired by the tradition they have long known, they innovate in ways that suggest the influence of 
Watteau’s fête galante. If we hold the festival to a standard of authenticity predicated on its loyalty to 
the traditional script (if we expect that it be an unthinking repetition), the banquet walks a strange 
line between the legitimately ancient and the merely staged. But as in the first festival memory, the 
element of staging does not appear as an obstacle to the festival’s effect. The “illusion” created 
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through the mediation of “Voyage to Cythera” is an addition to, rather than a perversion of, the 
effect of the traditional festival. There is no ideal here of the preservation of original forms, no 
opposition between the authentic and the artificial. Rather than the preservation of a naturalized, 
wholly traditional imaginary, the young people here participate in a mode of festival performance 
that reengineers the naively traditional to reflect a historical imaginary influenced by painting and 
literature—a mode echoed in the temple itself, which, though authentically dilapidated, is an 18th-
century replica of a Greek temple.31 
 The conjunction of authenticity and artifice, of naïve repetition and self-conscious 
innovation, that we see in the archery festival is repeated and intensified in the second memory of 
that visit to Sylvie. In this second memory, they young lovers spend a day together just the two of 
them, outside the context of any particular traditional practice, but capable nonetheless of 
engineering a similar effect. The day after the archery festival, Sylvie and the protagonist pay a visit 
to Sylvie’s elderly aunt, and, while she prepares lunch for them, they stage what has become the 
most iconic scene of the story. Digging around in the cupboards in search of models for her 
lacemaking, Sylvie finds the old woman’s wedding portraits and decides that she and the protagonist 
should become, with the help of the old couple’s wedding clothes, the reincarnation of that portrait. 
She jumps into action, directing an impromptu mini-festival in which she and the protagonist 
perform an invented relation to the traditional heart of the region by embodying these figures of the 
past. There is no tradition here at all, no received form for the practice Sylvie creates; the form of 
tradition has been entirely usurped by the image of the portrait that the young couple self-
consciously stage for Sylvie’s dumbstruck aunt, their scrambling around in preparation evoking the 
chaos backstage at the theater. 
 When they appear before the aunt, hand in hand, however, they are the young couple “de 
l’autre siècle” [“of another century”], both for themselves and for her: “C’était l’image de sa 
jeunesse,—cruelle et charmante apparition !”32 The fiction that the couple performs by taking on the 
roles of bride and groom seems to pass into delusion here: in the absence of any traditional form, 
illusion seems to replace naivety as the source of the practice’s effect. But this moment of 
“apparition” quickly gives way to another in which the aunt begins to share memories of her 
wedding. The costumes of the young couple are put back in proper relation to the past they repeat, 
as she teaches Sylvie and the protagonist the old wedding traditions: 
 
Elle retrouva même dans sa mémoire les chants alternés, d’usage alors, et le naïf 
épithalame qui accompagnait les mariés rentrant après la danse. Nous répétions ces 
strophes si simplement rythmées, avec les hiatus et les assonances du temps ; 
amoureuses et fleuries comme le cantique de l’Ecclésiaste ;—nous étions l’époux et 
l’épouse pour tout un beau matin d’été. 
 
[She even managed to recall some of the songs which it was the custom in those days 
to sing back and forth across the banquet table, just as she remembered the quaint 
epithalamium which had accompanied the newly-weds as they returned home from 
the dancing. We again sang with these stanzas, with their simple rhymes and their 
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bygone assonances and hiatuses—as flowery and as impassioned as the Song of 
Songs. We were bride and bridegroom one whole, fine summer morn.]33 
 
By teaching them the songs, the aunt projects forward the tradition that was missing from Sylvie’s 
initial impulse to embody the portraits. Sylvie seemed to know this would work, and it seems to have 
worked even before the wedding songs close the circle.34 For her and the protagonist, wearing the 
wedding clothes creates the combination of lucid theatricality and naïve pleasure that they felt the 
night before at the archery festival. Now, however, there is no opposition between traditional form 
and the creativity that can be the basis of innovation, because Sylvie’s sense of tradition is an 
essential element of her innovative impulse, just as much as the portraits she takes as her inspiration. 
 Through these two memories of the archery festival and the dress-up scene, Sylvie thus puts 
forward a conception of traditional practice that emphasizes its creative dimension over its repetitive 
dimension, and emphasizes self-conscious, mediated performance over naïve, unthinking ritual. The 
fictions that the young people engineer in these memories do not negate the effect of traditional 
practice that weaves itself into the fabric of lived experience, but allow for a simultaneity of life and 
illusion. The appeal of the Valois, and of Sylvie, must be understood in relation to the appeal of this 
kind of practice. The adolescent Sylvie appears through these two memories as a kind of imaginative 
collaborator for the protagonist: she is a lover of festivals, always the last to stop dancing, but more 
importantly she is an inventor of festivals, as she demonstrates with the wedding clothes. She both 
produces and enjoys with the protagonist the kind of effect that draws him to traditional practices. 
 The question arises, then, why she eventually fails the protagonist, why this youthful 
partnership does not work in the long run. We have seen that the problem is not, as some scholars 
argue, that the protagonist wants something impossible from Valois culture, and from Sylvie as part 
of it. The problem is rather that Sylvie loses interest in the kind of practice she and the protagonist 
used to enjoy together, as she adopts the logic of modern popular culture. When the protagonist 
returns to see her, she prefers not to sing the old songs because they have gone out of fashion, along 
with the social rituals of which they were a part: “Sylvie ne voulut pas chanter, malgré nos prières, 
disant qu’on ne chantait plus à table” [“Sylvie refused to sing despite our entreaties, claiming that 
singing at the dinner able just wasn’t done any more”].35 She has cut ties with her traditional 
imagination, and so views the songs through the eyes of fashion: they are not iterative, but rather 
passé. So it is that when she does agree to sing, it is in a distinctly modern style, much to the 
protagonist’s horror: “Sylvie modulait quelques sons d’un grand air d’opéra modern… Elle phrasait !” 
[“Sylvie intoned a few bars of a grand aria from a modern opera… She was phrasing”].36 Even the 
wedding dress that played such a central role in her engineering of her own mini-festival has been 
assimilated to a new, urbanized culture: Sylvie has worn it as a mere costume to a public dance in the 
nearby town. For the protagonist who expected to find the Sylvie he had known in his youth, her 
scorn for the practices they shared is shocking and painful. He has lost his partner, not only (and 
perhaps not even primarily) in love, but also in imagination. But Sylvie no longer has any interest in 
                                                
33 Ibid., 551-52/160. 
34 My reading of Sylvie here departs radically from the one Richard gives, which understands disguise and dress-up as 
failures to achieve the ideal: “prostituant l’essence dans la honte d’une fausse incarnation, il est le signe d’une légèreté, 
d’un manque de fidélité à l’être.” Rather than opposing performance and being to approach performance as a spiritual or 
existential problem, I am arguing instead that, for Nerval, the conjunction of the fictional and the real allows for the 
creation of a desired form of imaginative practice. See “Géographie Magique de Nerval,” 67-68. 
35 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:563/Selected Writings, 172. 
36 Ibid., 560/169. 
 54 
mixing life and illusion. She no longer wants to play; she is a good bourgeoise for whom “il faut 
songer au solide” [“let’s think of practical matters”].37 
 The protagonist does not fight for Sylvie when he finds out about her baker-suitor, because 
she is not the woman he thought she would be. She has not simply grown up, but been transformed 
by her initiation into a modernized, industrialized culture. When he returns to Paris, he is thus still in 
search of what he had hoped to find in a return to festival practice and Sylvie: a revival of collective 
imaginative practice. He reimagines this search in light of the theater, a form with a different 
relationship to modernization. In the quick passage from Sylvie to Aurélie (which, we must 
remember, only reverses the original slide from Aurélie to Sylvie), we see a profound continuity 
between tradition and theater that goes against the Idealist association of tradition with authenticity 
and naivety. Just as Nerval’s treatment of the festival in Sylvie complicates the operation of tradition, 
his treatment of theater suggests a relation to illusion and artifice that is much more complex than 
the association of theater with mere falseness. Here, too, collective practice creates the possibility of 
bridging reality and imagination, turning fiction into a lived practice. 
 
Theater and Sincerity 
If, according to the pastoral logic the story seems to put forth, tradition and authenticity are positive 
terms opposed to the negative terms of theater and artifice, what will surprise us in Sylvie’s treatment 
of Aurélie is the way in which it is precisely her sincerity that disappoints the protagonist. As we 
have already seen, he turns away from the actress at the moment when she makes it clear that she is 
looking for a good bourgeois marriage (a business partnership) rather than the kind of creative 
partnership he is looking for. But it is not only in her utilitarianism that she disappoints him. It is 
also in her understanding of what it is to be an actress. The disjuncture between the protagonist’s 
desires and the reality of the woman here is not a gap between ideal and real any more than it was 
with Sylvie. But the historical transformation at stake with Aurélie plays out differently than the one 
at stake with Sylvie. Rather than through a break with traditional culture, Aurélie fails the protagonist 
through her position on the wrong side of a change in the aesthetics of acting that has removed all 
art and artifice in the name of sincerity and spontaneity. 
 Sylvie thinks historically about the actress as much as it does about the fate of tradition in 
modern France. This is evident from the story’s first pages, in which the narrator justifies his 
younger self’s reticence to approach Aurélie, though he has gone to see her perform every night for 
a year. He delights in her voice, in the way her beauty is transformed by different kinds of lighting 
on stage. And yet, we find out, he has never made any attempt to approach her; what is more, he has 
not learned anything about who she is off stage: “Depuis un an, je n’avais pas encore songé à 
m’informer de ce qu’elle pouvait être d’ailleurs ; je craignais de troubler le miroir magique qui me 
renvoyait son image” [“For an entire year it had not even occurred to me to find out who or what 
she might really be; I was afraid to cloud the magic mirror that cast her image back at me”].38 He has 
allowed the actress to be only what she is on stage, fearing, he says, that knowing about her in life 
might disturb his attraction to her. 
 The narrator goes on to give an explanation for this impulse to keep his distance from the 
actress, citing a piece of advice he received in his youth: “un de mes oncles qui avait vécu dans les 
avant-dernières années du XVIIIe siècle, comme il fallait y vivre pour le bien connaître, m’ayant 
prévenu de bonne heure que les actrices n’étaient pas des femmes, et que la nature avait oublié de 
leur faire un cœur” [“one of my uncles who had lived through the penultimate years of the 
eighteenth century (and who knew the period as only those who had truly experienced it could) had 
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warned me quite early on that actresses were not women, nature having forgotten to endow them 
with hearts”].39 The uncle’s counsel emphasizes the falseness of the actress in her real-life 
relationships; she may be able to feign emotion on stage, but that does not imply that she is capable 
of any more than feigning. Showing the young protagonist the many trinkets and portraits he 
collected as remembrances of his romantic disappointments, the uncle creates an image of the 
actress who cannot be real, who can only act in real life the way she acts on stage and who is, thus, 
destined to break the heart of any man who endeavors to share a real romance with her. His nephew 
takes this advice to heart, and so prefers not to approach Aurélie, however enchanting she may be 
on stage: “je m’était habitué à penser mal de toutes sans tenir compte de l’ordre des temps” [“I 
became accustomed to think ill of all actresses regardless of their place in time”].40  
Following this first rationale for staying away from the actress because she is incapable of 
real feeling, “sans cœur,” the narrator promptly provides a second explanation. Unlike the first, 
which was inherited advice gleaned from his uncle’s experience in the late 18th century, the second is 
particular to the protagonist’s (and Nerval’s) own generation. He and his fellows find themselves 
living in a strange period in which elegant or cynical dissipation is out of fashion, and in which a 
more utopic, philosophical, even religious sentiment dominates, but is stymied in hesitation, unable 
to pass into action. He goes on to contrast the materiality of the young men of his generation with 
the spirituality of their aspirations: “L’homme matériel aspirait au bouquet de roses qui devait le 
régénérer par les mains de la belle Isis ; la déesse éternellement jeune et pure nous apparaissait dans 
les nuits, et nous faisait honte de nos heures de jour perdue” [“Material man longed for the bouquet 
of roses which would regenerate him at the hands of the lovely Isis; forever young, forever pure, the 
goddess would appear to us at night, filling us with shame for having so wasted the hours of the 
day”].41 And yet not even this longing for spiritual affirmation can set the youth of his generation to 
work and stop them wasting their daylight hours: “L’ambition n’était cependant pas de notre âge” 
[“Worldly ambitions, however, meant little to our generation”].42 Children of Musset’s mal de siècle, 
this generation is unable to bridge its ideals and the need for action, and so it turns away from the 
material world: 
 
Il ne nous restait pour asile que cette tour d’ivoire des poètes, où nous montions 
toujours plus haut pour nous isoler de la foule. À ces points élevés où nous guidaient 
nos maîtres, nous respirions enfin l’air pur des solitudes, nous buvions l’oubli dans la 
coupe d’or des légendes, nous étions ivres de poésie et d’amour. Amour, hélas ! des 
formes vagues, des teintes roses et bleues, des fantômes métaphysiques ! Vues de 
près, la femme réelle révoltait notre ingénuité ; il fallait qu’elle nous apparût reine ou 
déesse, et surtout n’en pas approcher. 
 
[The sole refuge left to us was the poets’ ivory tower—which we climbed, higher and 
higher, in order to isolate ourselves from the crowd. Having been guided to these 
heights by our masters, we at last breathed the pure air of solitude, drinking ourselves 
into oblivion from the golden cup of fable, drunk with poetry and love—love, alas, 
of vague shapes, of blue and rosy hues, of metaphysical phantoms. Seen close, any 
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real woman seemed too gross to our starry-eyed sensibilities. She had to appear a 
queen or a goddess: above all, she had to lie beyond reach.]43 
 
Here the narrator attributes as clearly as possible the reticence to approach the beloved woman to a 
kind of neo-Platonism that finds itself revolted by the real—the kind of Idealism with which Sylvie is 
so often associated. Love belongs to the spiritual aspirations of the young men of his generation, 
and getting too close to a woman (even an actress, we must assume) means coming face to face with 
her vulgar reality and so losing the ideal image one has created. 
 We cannot but be struck here by the divergence in the logic of these two reasons not to 
pursue Aurélie. For the uncle, the issues at stake are falseness and artifice: in pursuing a romance 
with the actress, one wants to be engaged with her as a real woman, one wants her to feel real 
feelings, but she can only act. One can only be hurt by such a woman, since the reality of one’s own 
emotions cannot be reciprocated. For the men of the protagonist’s own generation, however, there 
is quite another danger in approaching the woman (who, we should note, is not specified here as an 
actress, but who must be Aurélie as much as any other woman). One does not want a real romance 
with her, does not want the real emotions of a real woman, but rather the ideal figure she represents, 
be it on stage or in the imagination. One’s own feelings for her are predicated on a kind of 
abstraction that her reality can only destroy, and so those feelings can only be protected by keeping 
one’s distance. In the generational gap, then, desire seems to shift from the real to the ideal, and a 
kind of worldly attraction to women of the late 18th century is replaced by a neo-Platonism, confined 
to its “tour d’ivoire.”44 
 This account of the Platonism of the young men of 1830 plays into Sylvie’s apparent (and 
apparently doomed) Idealism. And yet, not only does the Platonist explanation appear in proximity 
to the uncle’s quite different one, but it is also followed by what looks like a complete disavowal. 
After describing the aversion to real women that marked his generation (“et surtout n’en pas 
approcher” [“above all, she had to lie beyond reach”]), the narrator immediately changes course: 
“Quelques-uns d’entre nous néanmoins prisaient peu ces paradoxes platoniques, et à travers nos 
rêves renouvelés d’Alexandrie agitaient parfois la torche des dieux souterrains, qui éclaire l’ombre un 
instant de ses traînées d’étincelles” [“Some of us, however, were not too keen on these Platonic 
paradoxes, and amid our renewed fantasies of Alexandria, we would occasionally brandish the torch 
of the gods of the underworld, momentarily illuminating the darkness with a trail of sparks”].45 A 
counter-impulse emerges here: rather than the striving toward an ideal woman that rejects the 
vulgarity of the real, a more fleeting light than that eternal fire of Isis tempts “quelques-uns d’entre 
nous” with its sparks and flashes. The protagonist thus moves immediately from the Idealist space 
of the theater into the company of a group of bons vivants, whose motto is “« Buvons, aimons, c’est la 
sagesse ! »” [“You can’t go wrong with wine, women and song!”].46 
 Among this company is the young man who is actually Aurélie’s lover. Thus, despite the 
protagonist’s refusal to pursue her, the shift in this passage demonstrates that he is not entirely 
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foreign to the kind of man who would pursue her, nor to the kind of pleasure seeking that would 
make him want to. Indeed, when the protagonist glances at the newspaper to find that a shift in the 
stock market has just made him rich (the news item he notices right before the fête du bouquet), the 
money’s first significance is that it might allow him to pursue Aurélie: “la femme aimée si longtemps 
était à moi si je voulais.—Je touchais du doigt mon idéal” [“the woman I had so long adored was 
now mine for the asking. My ideal was henceforth within reach”].47  This “idéal” must be read with 
care, since, as we have seen, the narrator takes a critical distance from the idealism of his generation. 
What is clear is that his newfound wealth offers the protagonist an opportunity to cross the distance 
between him and the actress, but in a way he is ultimately not interested in crossing it. He does not 
want to be a corrupter, the narrator tells us, which might mean that he has moral qualms about 
tempting her virtue with money, or that he does not want to buy that false affection his uncle 
warned him about, or even yet that he does not want the version of her who would love him for 
money, at the expense of his ideal. All of these possibilities are kept in play here (both the ones that 
fit the Revue’s spiritualism and the ones that don’t) as the narrator turns away from Aurélie and turns 
his eyes to the next news item, the announcement of the Fête du Bouquet provincial that, as we have 
seen, sends him back to the Valois. The opening of Sylvie is ambiguous as to the significance the 
story will give to acting, and the way it intends us to read the actress. It is not until after the 
elaboration of festival performance that the story returns to Aurélie to clarify its rejection, not only 
of the Idealism of the narrator’s generation but also of the actress herself. 
 The difference between the view the narrator’s uncle took of the actress in the late 18th 
century and the view his friends take in the early-mid 19th century is, as the story makes clear, not 
merely personal but deeply historical, inscribed in “l’ordre des temps” [in “their place in time”].48 It 
has to do not only with changes in the views of actress-loving men, but also and more importantly 
with changes in the actress herself, as both an artist as a citizen. The actress of 1830 is not at all the 
actress of 1780: both her civil status and her aesthetics have changed significantly. Once the narrator 
of Sylvie has worked through the historical transformations that eroded traditional Valois practice, he 
returns to Paris to work through the historical transformation of the actress alluded to in the story’s 
opening pages. He finally gets close to Aurélie, and in so doing he reveals both what he wants from 
her (the kind of actress he thought she might be) and how she disappoints him (the kind of actress 
she really is), a disjuncture that must be explained by a historical reflection on the actress in the first 
half of the 19th century. 
 Approaching the causes of Aurélie’s allure for the protagonist and the reasons she fails to 
satisfy him as historical questions means reading against the grain, both of the story and of the 
scholarship, treating historically what is presented symbolically, both in Sylvie’s apparent Idealism 
and in scholarly readings.49 There is no debate as to the centrality of the actress to Nerval’s writing, 
both in the texts collected in Les Filles du feu and more broadly: from Un roman à faire, through 
“Octavie” and “Corilla” to Pandora, by way of the more autobiographical Petits châteaux de bohême and 
La Bohême galante and the theatrical La Polygamie est un cas pendable, actresses traverse his work. This 
omnipresence is most often explained as a feature of Nerval’s Idealism, by a view of the actress as a 
kind of blankness that makes her particularly suited to the serial substitutions in which Nerval is 
seen to be engaged—an ahistorical phenomenon. The most thorough exploration along these lines 
is Chambers’s L’Ange et l’automate, which looks at the way the actress operates in the imaginary of 
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Romantic writers including Nerval. Chambers identifies the essential feature of the actress, the 
feature that makes her so useful as a kind of mythical figure, namely her status as a sign with no 
referent: “Elle apparaît alors, moins comme signe de... que comme une actualisation des signes eux-
mêmes dans ce qu’ils ont de plus troublant” [“She thus appears less as a sign of… than as an 
actualization of the signs themselves in their most troubling form”].50 
 According to Chambers, the epitome in Nerval’s work of this emptiness of the actress and 
her absolute superficiality is the Aspasie of the 1851 play L’Imagier de Harlem [The Image-Maker of 
Harlem].51 In this drame-légende, Aspasie is Alilah, the female companion of Satan, provided by him 
with one identity after another and appearing under six guises throughout the play’s ten tableaux. 
Each of her roles is selected by Satan to pique the interest of Laurent Coster, the play’s hero and the 
inventor of print; at any given moment, she appears as the woman who most answers his desires. As 
Chambers points out, even though Satan also appears under multiple guises, his multiplicity is of a 
significantly different sort than that of Aspasie.52 While the devil is always himself, superficially 
masked to accomplish his ends, Aspasie is nothing but her roles. She has no autonomous being; 
there is no reality behind the artifice. She is precisely the actress that Sylvie’s protagonist’s uncle 
warns against: she has no heart but is only “versatilité et fausseté de surface se déployant sur un fond 
vide” [“superficial versatility and falseness covering an empty core”].53 The actress here is both 
dangerously empty and apt to be filled by the imaginations of the men-poets whom she fascinates. 
 This reading of the actress is predicated, however, on a kind of double de-historicizing of the 
actress, failing to consider both Nerval’s real relationship to the theater and its performers, and the 
real, shifting terms in which acting was being understood during this period. In the first place, 
Chambers’s reading is rendered problematic by the distance required for the actress to maintain the 
great degree of abstraction she enjoys in L’Imagier de Harlem. In formulating the relationship of the 
poet to the actress, Chambers writes, “Les poètes ne voient pas la comédienne de près, de la coulisse 
; ils la rêvent à partir de la salle, et leur amour est un amor de lonh” [“Poets do not see the actress up 
close, from the wings; they dream her from the audience, and their love is a love from afar”].54 While 
this might be true of some of the poets Chambers discusses, it certainly does not apply to Nerval. 
Far from an uninitiated spectator of the theater, Nerval lived in close proximity to the business of 
the stage. He wrote more than twenty plays over the course of his career, alone or in collaboration, 
and worked almost constantly as a Parisian theater critic. These two professional pursuits sent him 
to the theater almost nightly, and there is every indication that he would have been there nearly as 
often even if it were not his business; when abroad, he consistently sought out the theater district of 
the towns he visited and made it a point not only to see many shows, but also to meet many 
performers. Even the major business venture of his life was a magazine pittoresque devoted to the 
theater, Le Monde dramatique. Revue de spectacles anciens et modernes [The World of Drama. Review of Ancient 
and Modern Spectacles]. Given all this, we can easily agree with Bony, who suggests that Nerval might 
be better understood as a man of the theater first, and a poet and storywriter second.55 His 
passionate interest in the theater was anything but abstract, as the historicist, sociological tendencies 
of Le Monde dramatique demonstrate: the world of the theater and the people (including women) who 
populate it were very real to him. 
 In the second place, it is not only Nerval’s own relationship to the theater that is at stake, but 
also the state of the world of acting more broadly. Chambers’s argument, emphasizing the pure 
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artifice of the actress, is underpinned by a Diderotian conception of acting. This conception, 
famously laid out in the Paradoxe sur le comédien, valorizes a stark distinction between art and life and 
identifies artifice as the essence of the actor’s craft. Great actors, Diderot argues, are great because 
of their careful observation of human emotion, and their thoughtful development of a way of 
playing the part that conveys emotion to the spectator.56 Their job is not to really feel the emotion 
they convey, but to create the optimal artifice to elicit the emotion in their audience.57 Acted and 
lived sensibility are two entirely different things (the traits required to be a good actor and to be a 
good spectator are not the same here), and the best actors are those without a strong character of 
their own.58 For Chambers, the cultural dominance of this way of understanding acting through a 
complete break between the real and art is what explains the emptiness of the actress figure. 
However, Diderot’s conception of acting dates from the 18th century, and corresponds to a much 
more Classical aesthetic than the one that came to prominence during Nerval’s lifetime. When we 
think about the Romantic renovation of the theater, we tend to emphasize the generic innovation of 
the melodrama and especially of the drama, with their rejection of Classical formal constraints in 
favor of representations more true to life. This transformation of theater during the 19th century in 
fact went well beyond the plays themselves: the visual elements of décor and costumes became more 
realistic and historically accurate, and the staging and acting became more natural.59 In the realm of 
décor, the realism introduced by Romanticism entailed an intensification of artifice, with the 
construction of elaborate sets and the invention of special effects, particularly of light. In the realm 
of acting, however, Romantic realism marked a turn away from artifice toward a sincere, 
spontaneous style of performance. 
Until the early 19th century, actors in the major Parisian theaters had been trained almost 
exclusively at the Conservatory, where they studied a histrionic and affected style of acting. Like 
Diderot’s great actors, these men and women cultivated artificial gestures and ways of speaking to 
create forceful, grandiose performances. Much closer to declamation than to contemporary acting, 
this style of performance began evolving toward a more expressive style during the Restoration, with 
the celebrated tragedian François-Joseph Talma.60 But it was the visit of a Shakespearean company 
from London in 1827, the year after Talma’s death, that blew the doors off the old theater. Instead 
of standing around the prompter’s box declaiming their lines, the English actors moved around the 
stage as though it were real space; rather than making restrained, cultivated gestures and facial 
expressions, they were natural and expressive.61 Paired with the violence of Shakespeare’s plays, their 
acting came as a shock and a revelation to Parisian theater audiences. The English immediately 
influenced the acting of the promising young actors and actresses of the period, including Frédérick 
Lemaître, Bocage, and Marie Dorval, causing Delacroix to observe, “Our own actors have gone back 
to school.”62 
Not all actors entirely embraced the new aesthetic, of course, and many of the great rivalries 
of the century, including that between Marie Dorval and Mlle Mars, continued to play out around 
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competing styles of acting.63 Overall, however, the Conservatory’s Diderotian aesthetic was largely 
displaced by the realist and sentimental tendencies of Romanticism, in a “gradual replacement of an 
art of acting recognizably governed by precedent and artifice to one that was more freely expressive, 
more ‘true to life’ in its representation of human behavior.”64 The actress of the mid-nineteenth 
century, then, was not necessarily the wholly artificial creature of Diderot’s ideal, and Nerval’s 
actress was not necessarily Chambers’s Aspasie. The heartless woman the protagonist is warned 
about in “Sylvie” is, after all, the actress of an earlier generation (the uncle’s late eighteenth-century 
youth) rather than the new, spontaneously expressive actress of 1830. 
The transformation that replaced the artifice of the ancien régime actress with the naivety of 
the Romantic actress was a historical phenomenon of great interest to Nerval and his colleagues 
during the first year of their periodical venture, Le Monde dramatique.65 In the issues that Nerval edited 
in 1835, the actress is a major subject of reflection (much more than she was after Nerval and his co-
editor resigned), yet she is never treated as a timeless or universal figure, as a mere trope. The journal 
as a whole takes a highly historicist view of the theater, and the actress is no exception. Two series 
of articles in particular, both published during Nerval’s tenure as editor, are of particular interest 
here: “Mœurs dramatiques” [“Dramatic Mores”] and “Des Filles d’opéra. 1770” [“Opera Girls. 
1770”]. These two series provided venues in which to explore and weigh in on the changing social 
status of actresses and the changing aesthetics of acting that were transforming the way the actress 
operated in the social imaginary. Here we begin to see more clearly what was at stake for Nerval in 
this transformation, and so to appreciate what he valued in the creative practice of the actress (and 
what his protagonist hopes to find, but does not, in Aurélie): a commitment to joining art and life, 
fiction and reality. 
What strikes one most about these articles, published by a group of writers at the heart of a 
bourgeoning dramatic Romanticism, is how often they lament the changes to “la race des actrices.”66 
We might expect the expressiveness of the Romantic actress and her newfound naturalness to be an 
unquestioned improvement for these young critics and playwrights (strongly associated with literary 
Romanticism), but the issue proves to be more complex than this. Two schools of actresses are seen 
to exist in Paris at the same time: one, “le vrai type, heureusement conserve en elle, des filles de 
l’opéra en 1770” [“the real type, happily conserves within herself the opera girls in 1770”], while the 
other is “plus naïve et plus vraie” [“more naïve and more true”].67 Each is attractive in its own way, 
in accordance with the charms of the woman herself, the particularity of her talent. Mlle Mars, 
representing the old guard at the Comédie-Française, is compared in her striking “esprit” [“wit”] 
with Marie Dorval, who “n’a pas précisément ce qu’on est convenu d’appeler de l’esprit de mots ou 
de conduite. Elle a toute la naïveté, le laisser-aller de l’artiste.[…] [E]lle ne cherche pas le mot, elle dit 
la passion, la peint, l’inspire ou l’éprouve.[…] [E]lle pleure des douleurs imaginaires qu’elle retrace, 
comme de ses propres douleurs : son cœur est brisé” [“does not quite have what is conventionally 
called witty speech or conduct. She has all the naivety and impulsivity of the artist.[…] She does not 
search for words, she speaks passion, paints it, inspires it or feels it.[…] She cries for the imaginary 
suffering she rehearses, as if for her own suffering: her heart is broken”].68 We see here an 
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appreciation for the affective intensity of Dorval’s acting, which she feels as though she were really 
living it, but this does not preclude an appreciation for Mlle Mars, nor does it forgive the mediocrity 
to which naïveté without genius is doomed. The potential for a powerful (or disappointing) 
performance exists on one side and the other, there being actresses with varying degrees of each 
kind of brilliance.69 
If no strong allegiances are declared with regard to the aesthetics of the performances given 
by these actresses, the same cannot be said for their lives off-stage. It is not simply in their 
understanding of their art that these actresses differ, according to the writers of Le Monde dramatique, 
but also in their understanding of the relationship between art and life. Here, the actress of times 
gone by (the opera girl of 1770) is the clear favorite. When the actress’s art is considered beyond the 
stage, the naturalness of the new generation is seen to come at a great cost. This question of the 
actress in her “real” life is treated in the journal from a sociological as well as an aesthetic 
perspective, and is closely linked to the actress’s integration into post-Revolutionary society. Along 
with her male counterpart, the Parisian actress had been excommunicated from the Catholic Church 
during the ancien régime, unable to marry or receive the last rites without renouncing her dramatic 
vocation. She was, then, excluded from society except in her role as actress: given the centrality of 
the church, she was effectively excluded from civil society, unable to play the social role of wife or 
mother and so allowed no identity aside from that of artist. By comparison, the actress of the 1830s 
belonged to the world in a different way: the simple expressiveness of her acting maps onto the 
straightforward bourgeois existence she was able to lead. Her vocation as an actress was now legally 
compatible with a social identity as wife and mother, making the question of marriage for actresses a 
crucial and controversial one.70 According to the writers of Le Monde dramatique, by marrying, the 
actress removes herself from her public role (no less important than that of the clergy) and gives 
herself to one person. But what is really at stake here is less her romantic availability than her 
ideological allegiances. Through marriage, the actress allies herself with the interests of a family and 
allows money to overtake art as her motive for acting. “Parlez à ces dames de leur art, elles vous 
répondront : « J’ai deux mois de congé avec mon mari, tant par représentation, et nous comptons 
rompre notre engagement, si monsieur notre directeur de Paris ne veut pas augmenter mes 
appointemens [sic] et ceux de mon mari »” [“Speak to these women of their art, they’ll reply: ‘I have 
two months of vacation with my husband, so many francs per performance, and we intend to break 
our contract if our director in Paris refuses to increase my salary as well as my husband’s”].71 The 
“artiste” must at some level be a solitary creature, beyond the reach of the banal concerns that 
accompany her integration into society. 
The marginal status of the 18th-century actress appears in Le Monde dramatique to have 
liberated her from such things. It is not that her position is simply romanticized here, for the 
journal’s writers were acutely aware of the emotional havoc such extreme vulnerability wreaked on 
these women.72 And yet, the full existence of actresses as such seems to depend upon it. It is being 
denied any life outside their profession that makes actresses synonymous with their art: “C’est qu’en 
effet, Laguerre [, actrice du 18e siècle], la belle Laguerre n’était elle-même que son masque” [“Indeed, 
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Laguerre [, an 18th-century actress], the beautiful Laguerre was no one apart from her mask”].73 The 
artificiality of the 18th-century actress that, in the opening pages of Sylvie, seemed to indicate only a 
lack of real feeling, appears here in a more complicated light, as a total devotion to her art. It is not 
her stock portfolio or her children that concern her, but rather her beauty and the effect she can 
produce, onstage and off.74 While so many contemporary actresses aspire to be bas-bleus 
(bluestockings), to produce something in their own name independent of any role, the 18th-century 
actress is her roles, her beauty, the constancy of her artifice.75 She is not, as the narrator’s uncle 
suggests, a heartless creature who exists only in a mode of deception; she is rather an artist who is 
never not an artist, who has no “real” life separate from her art. She is not inauthentic, but her 
authenticity comes from the way she lives her life as a performer, without reference to any prior 
personal truth. It is this version of the actress as a consummate artist that the young writers of Le 
Monde dramatique mourn when they complain that “la race des actrices se perd” [“the race of actresses 
is in decline”].76 
At stake for them, and for Nerval with them, are the differences in the relationship between 
art and life, between imagination and reality, implied by the transformation of the actress. These 
differences are ones that have been theorized by Rousset in his analysis of modes of acting from the 
Baroque through Romanticism.77 Rousset’s opposition between neo-Classicism and Romanticism 
corresponds to the distinction we have already observed in the history of the aesthetics of acting, 
with Romantic acting requiring an alignment between art and life. This mode of acting is epitomized 
by the literary play-within-a-play (or play-within-a-novel) tropes in which characters take on roles 
that correspond to what they already feel: “Telle est l’identité de la scène et de la vie qu’on ne peut 
représenter ce qu’on n’éprouve pas” [“Such is the coincidence between stage and life that one can 
play nothing one does not feel”].78 We find again here the acting of a Marie Dorval, who feels what 
she acts but must also act what she feels. In such an aesthetic, the actor or actress is no longer 
someone who can embody any emotion and transition from one to another from night to night, or 
even over the course of a single, multi-play performance (as required by repertory theater). The actor 
is instead marked by his or her own sensibility and associated with the roles that sensibility serves 
best. Hence the rise of long runs and plays written for particular actors, allowing the actor to make a 
name by playing always more or less the same character.79 Romantic actors are, in some ways, not 
actors at all. As Rousset observes, the realism of their performances is exacerbated to the point that 
“À pousser bien loin le dogme de la sincérité en art, l’art s’abolit dans la vie” [“When the dogma of 
sincerity in art is taken to extremes, art collapses into life”].80 
On the other end of the spectrum in Rousset’s account is the neo-Classical actor, who 
corresponds to something like Diderot’s vision, in which actors suspend their own identities in order 
to create the illusion of the characters. In the theater, neo-Classical actors are all art. Their real lives 
do not come into play, neither impact nor are impacted by the illusion they creates. This account 
applies an absolute separation of life and art where the people who actors are outside the theater 
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make no contact with the roles they play. As we have seen, however, this account of neo-Classical 
acting implies an opposition between the actor’s real life and the actor’s performance that is missing 
from the account of the 18th-century actress in Le Monde dramatique. In her case, there is not a life 
outside the theater that can be opposed to the art of her performance. Even offstage, she lives as an 
actress. There is for her no mode of life that is not simultaneously a mode of art, no reality that is 
not also a fiction. She corresponds much more to what Rousset writes of the Baroque actor, who 
has no self apart from the roles he takes on one after another. The Baroque actor’s roles are fictions, 
but what truth he has is through them: “La vérité du jeu fait la vérité de l’homme qui le joue[…]” 
[“The truth of the performance creates the truth of the man who performs it”].81 For Rousset, this 
feature of the Baroque has primarily to do with the capacity of the role to act back on the actor, 
which is not precisely what is at stake in the artistic life of the opera girl. This model is useful, 
nevertheless, as a third position between the neo-Classical and the Romantic that conceives of art 
and life as intimately related.82 In the opera girl’s life as a constant creative practice, imbricating 
sincerity and artifice, we finally find clear resonances of Sylvie’s treatment of tradition. The 18th-
century actress’s very life appears as a kind of imaginative practice in which the writers of Le Monde 
dramatique feel they participate as part of her public. In her very way of living as an artist, onstage and 
off, she shares with others (and perhaps lovers, above all) a kind of performance of life that does not 
fool them (they do not need the uncle’s warning), but rather initiates a kind of collective fiction. In 
this practice of pretending but not faking, the opera girl creates something like what Sylvie creates 
with the dress up clothes, something like what the protagonist of Sylvie finds in the festival. If we 
give the 18th-century actress her rightful place in Sylvie, it seems that when the protagonist gives up 
on the Valois and returns to Paris (when he shifts his hopes from Sylvie to Aurélie), it is precisely 
such an actress he seeks. 
 
Performing Naivety 
After Sylvie refuses to share in traditional practice with him, the protagonist of Sylvie returns to Paris 
in pursuit of Aurélie, hoping to collaborate with her in creating a mode of lived performance that 
conjoins sincerity and artifice. The series of memories through which the narrator leads readers 
while his younger self travels through the Valois reveals the continuity between traditional and 
theatrical practice, and sets the stage for the protagonist’s turn to the actress as another practitioner 
of collective fictional forms. However, this pursuit is no less disappointing than the last, as Aurélie 
turns out have the sensibility of a Romantic actress far more than that of an opera girl. What she 
wants from the protagonist is authenticity, sincerity.  
 On the protagonist’s return from the Valois, he sets his sights once again on Aurélie and 
decides finally to approach her. But establishing a relationship with her on the terms he wants, at the 
juncture of fiction and reality, requires a great deal of engineering on his part to create a desirable 
illusion and to position it in direct relation to their lived romance—not unlike Sylvie’s engineering of 
the dress-up scene. So it is that he doesn’t approach Aurélie immediately (which his newly-recovered 
inheritance would allow him to do), but rather takes his time in setting up the conditions for their 
meeting. He does not simply present himself to her as the desirous man he is; instead, he approaches 
her in the role of suitor. This is, we must recall from the story’s opening sentence, a role he had 
already played, unbeknownst to Aurélie, during the entire year leading up to his departure for the 
Valois in search of Sylvie: “Je sortais d’un théâtre où tous les soirs je paraissais aux avant-scènes en 
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grande tenue de soupirant” [“I was coming out of a theater where, night after night, I would make 
my appearance in one of the stage boxes, dressed in the elegant garb of an ardent suitor”].83 All 
those nights at the theater, Aurélie was not the only actor; the young protagonist, too, dutifully 
played his part as her admirer. It is in the guise of this admirer that he finally introduces himself to 
Aurélie, making his first advances in the form of anonymous letters, signed only “Un inconnu” [“A 
Stranger”].84 The protagonist does not start to woo the actress as himself. By writing her letters, he 
appears before her as nothing more than the character of “Suitor” (a role he hopes to play someday 
in the flesh) while he, the writer-actor of those letters, sets off to travel around Germany. 
 Aurélie gets to meet the real man behind the fiction of the inconnu only after the protagonist 
has written a fiction that the two of them can perform together. Indeed, while he is traveling, he 
composes a play with her in mind as the leading lady, a play that he uses to get close to her on his 
return to Paris: 
 
Je n’oublierai jamais le jour où elle me permit de lui lire la pièce. Les scènes d’amour 
étaient préparées à son intention. Je crois bien que je les dis avec âme, mais surtout 
avec enthousiasme. Dans la conversation qui suivit, je me révélai comme l’inconnu des 
deux lettres. Elle me dit : « Vous êtes bien fou : mais revenez me voir… Je n’ai jamais 
pu trouver quelqu’un qui sût m’aimer ». 
 
[I shall never forget the day she allowed me to read her the play. The love scenes had 
been written with her in mind. I believe I recited them with spirit, and above all with 
rapture. In the conversation that ensued, I revealed I was the Stranger of the two 
letters. She said to me: ‘You’re mad, but come and see me again… I have yet to find 
a man who knows how to love me.”]85 
 
This scene of the reading of the play is a promising one: the protagonist performs for Aurélie and 
reveals himself to be the one who has in fact been performing as her secret admirer for quite some 
time, and the actress responds positively to his performances. She is baffled, perhaps, but also 
intrigued by his actorly approach to love, and seems to see promise in it, all other attempts at love 
having failed her. She agrees to the play as well as to an increasingly intimate relationship with the 
protagonist, agreeing to link her art and her life in collaboration with him. The romantic fiction he 
has carefully orchestrated thus seems to be bound for success. 
 There is still an element missing, however, in order to establish the desired conjunction 
between art and life, between on stage and off stage. It is the revelation of this element that will 
destroy the protagonist’s relationship with Aurélie. The play he has written for her, the one that 
allows their real relationship to be doubled by the romance she performs on stage, does not tell just 
any love story, but takes up the protagonist’s own memories of Adrienne, mediated through the 
story of the love of Francesco Colonna for Lucretia Polia de Trevisse: “j’avais entrepris de fixer dans 
une action poétique les amours du peintre Colonna pour la belle Laura, que ses parents firent 
religieuse, et qu’il aima jusqu’à la mort,” writes the narrator [“I had undertaken to portray in a poetic 
action the loves of the painter Colonna for the fair Laura, whom her parents had forced into a 
nunnery and whom he loved unto his dying day”].86 In engaging Aurélie to stage this particular 
romance, the protagonist deploys the same kind of traditional imagination that Sylvie used to create 
                                                
83 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:537/Selected Writings, 145. 
84 Ibid., 564/173. 
85 Ibid., 565/174. 
86 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:565/Selected Writings, 174. 
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a mini-festival around the wedding clothes. He begins with a memory of Adrienne that, via the song 
she sang, holds within it the kind of collective practice for which he longs. Then he finds an image 
that can mediate a repetition of that memory the way the Watteau painting mediated the archery 
festival, only here he turns to an imaginary drawn from Renaissance literature. The selection of 
Colonna’s Hypnerotomachia Poliphili as the source for the protagonist’s play allows not only for the 
repetition of Adrienne in the person of Lucretia (the young beauty lost to a convent), but also, and 
just as importantly, for the repetition of the festival culture of the Valois in the romance’s voyage to 
Cythera.87 The play, consciously performed, would thus intertwine even more intricately reality and 
fiction, repetition of received forms (traditional practices, memories, and theatrical roles) and 
creative innovation. It would allow for a lucid fictionalization of a past that the participants might 
still take naïve pleasure in reviving. It can only do all this, however, with Aurélie as a conscious 
participant, sharing not only in the staging of the fiction but also in the sense of repetition that 
accompanies it. 
 This is precisely what Aurélie refuses to be for the protagonist: a willing participant in the 
full functioning of his fictional practice. He does not broach the question right away, but there is 
nonetheless a sense that the relationship will only satisfy him once she is fully on board, and so he 
must eventually test her willingness to play with him in life as well as in art. On a tour with the acting 
troupe, he takes her to the castle where he first saw Adrienne—to one of the Valois sites that 
invokes the entirety of the old community and its practices. He hopes that it will affect her, that she 
will feel here the resonance of what she has been acting out all this time. She is unmoved, however, 
so he takes a more direct approach to elicit her complicity: 
 
Alors je lui racontai tout ; je lui dis la source de cet amour entrevu dans les nuits, rêvé 
plus tard, réalisé en elle. Elle m’écoutait sérieusement et me dit : « Vous ne m’aimez 
pas ! Vous attendez que je vous dise : “La comédienne est la même que la 
religieuse” ; vous cherchez un drame, voilà tout, et le dénouement vous échappe. 
Allez, je ne vous crois plus ! » 
 
[Then I told her everything; I told her the source of this love first glimpsed in the 
night, then in dreams, and realized in her. She listened attentively, then said: ‘You do 
not love me! You’re expecting me to say: “The actress and the nun are one and the 
same.” You’re chasing after some drama, and you can’t come up with the 
dénouement. What nonsense! I no longer believe you at all!’]88 
 
The protagonist faces the same incomprehension from Aurélie as Sylvie has faced from so many 
readers, who have assumed that the repetition of Adrienne in Aurélie is to be taken literally, that the 
illusion the protagonist seeks in his performance with Aurélie is in fact a delusion. The convergence 
between the two women is ridiculous to the actress, and makes clear that the protagonist does not 
love her “for herself.” But this is not true in the way that she understands it. She is not asked by the 
protagonist’s fiction to be the nun, nor is she asked to hide herself by pretending to be the nun. She is 
rather asked to play the nun, to inhabit simultaneously the lucid awareness of her own acting and the 
pleasure of allowing that acting into the reality of her life. What the protagonist asks of her (asks to 
share with her) is a mode of performance that has much more in common with participation in a 
                                                
87 The mediation of the narrator’s memories of the Valois here by Colonna is, as we see, further mediated by Watteau’s 
Voyage to Cythera, which was such an effective mediating element for the young innovators of the archery festival. 
88 Ibid., 566/176. 
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festival or with the play of children (like the young archer-knights) than it does with the theater as 
either pure artifice or pure sincerity.  
 This is not a kind of performance that interests Aurélie, however. She does not want to play 
in her real life; she wants to be sincere, to be loved for herself.89 She is, in many ways, just like Sylvie, 
looking for a sensible, realistic love rather than a wild, imaginative one. Indeed, once Aurélie has 
refused a full part in his fiction, the protagonist starts to suspect that he has a rival for her affections: 
“Je crus apercevoir qu’elle avait un faible pour le régisseur […]. Cet homme était d’un caractère 
excellent et lui avait rendu des services” [“I seemed to notice that she had a weak spot for the 
director […]. He was a man of excellent character who had done a great deal for her”].90 The 
director is an actor, too, but there is no comparison between him and our actorly protagonist, for 
the director’s appeal lies entirely in his off-stage practicality, in who he is as a man. What Aurélie 
wants in a lover is not an imaginative collaborator, or someone trying to work out a drama in real 
life, but the business partner needed by the actress-entrepreneur. The protagonist’s invitation to play 
with him in a shared fiction is not what she understands by love; she is looking rather for the real life 
support the director might offer her: “Aurélie m’a dit un jour « Celui qui m’aime, le voilà ! »” [“One 
day Aurélie said to me: ‘You know who truly loves me? That man there”].91 She, like Sylvie, has no 
interest in mixing love and illusion, and so the protagonist is left without a partner to create with 
him the kind of collective imaginative practice he longs for. 
 As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the double failure of the protagonist’s pursuit of 
Sylvie and Aurélie, piled on top of his inability to recover Adrienne, makes Sylvie read as a 
melancholic tale. A young man chases his desires up and down the French countryside, only to be 
disappointed by the impossibility of what he seeks. In the Idealist reading that Sylvie seems to 
encourage with its pastoralism, it is naïve authenticity he seeks, both in the countryside where he 
might have been successful if he were less radical in his rejection of time, and in the city where he is 
doomed to come up against a fundamentally inauthentic culture. As we have seen, however, Sylvie 
puts forward a conception of the protagonist’s desire that disrupts this picture. First, it is a desire for 
a practice of tradition, rather than for a transcendence of time or a return to origins. Second, that 
traditional practice is not simply associated with naivety and authenticity, but rather with a 
conjunction of naivety and fiction, beyond an opposition between authenticity and inauthenticity. 
And third, the desired practice can exist as easily in Paris as in the Valois. If the protagonist struggles 
to find the conjugation of art and life he is looking for, then, it is not because he desires an 
impossible degree of naivety, but because he desires an unfashionable degree of artifice. In the cases 
both of Sylvie and folk traditions, and of Aurélie and acting, Sylvie shows mid-19th-century culture 
turning away from a vital relationship to illusion and artifice, in favor of an aesthetic of sincerity 
more compatible with bourgeois values. The obsession with naivety that Sylvie seems to espouse is 
pointed up through the story as rather an obsession of the culture at large—and of the Revue des 
Deux Mondes, as much as anyone else. 
 The story stages a pastoralism and Idealism that it simultaneously critiques—but this critique 
does not simply negate the pastoralism as an inauthentic alibi. Sylvie does not oppose its apparent 
meaning to its real meaning, but rather performs a role appropriate to its venue while also 
acknowledging the status of that role as a role. The narrator of Sylvie performs Idealism the way the 
                                                
89 She is like the actress in Nerval’s one-act play “Corilla,” who presents herself to each of her two suitors under a 
different guise—to one as a cruel queen, to the other as a poor flower-seller—and so seems to be “comédienne en 
amour comme au théâtre” [“actress in love as at the theater”], but turns out to be simply scheming in service of her 
desire to be loved for her true self. The play’s entire drama is in determining which man deserves to see her authentic 
face. See “Corilla,” Les Filles du feu and Petits châteaux de Bohême in Œuvres complètes, 3:420-37. 
90 “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:567/Selected Writings, 175-76. 
91 Ibid., 567/176. 
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young archers perform chivalry. But is certainly not a role he chose, as the irony of the “Dernier 
Feuillet” makes clear. If the narrator closes the story by giving the authorized interpretation (“Telles 
sont les chimères qui charment et égarent au matin de la vie” [“Such are the chimeras that beguile 
and mislead us in the morning of life”]), he also insists that this interpretation is but a rehearsal: 
“qu’on me pardonne ce style vieilli” [“forgive me my old-fashioned turns of phrase”].92 It is not a 
role he chose, because it is a role that does not know it is one but rather understands itself to be 
natural even when it is clearly “vieilli.” In place of the unselfconscious sincerity of its apparent 
Idealism, Sylvie offers a view of sincerity itself as always mixed with artifice, as valuable only insofar 
as it is allowed to coexist with illusion. 
 We see this in the festivals that the narrator recalls and in the romantic fiction the 
protagonist invents for Aurélie, but we also see it in the Valois itself. According to the pastoral logic 
Sylvie puts forward, the Valois is a place of immediacy and authenticity. It is natural, free of any 
artifice—and that is why the protagonist cannot get back there. This is the Valois of Rousseau, the 
subject of the narrator’s bittersweet nostalgia: “Rousseau dit que le spectacle de la nature console de 
tout. Je cherche parfois à retrouver mes bosquets de Clarens perdus au nord de Paris, dans les 
brumes. Tout cela est bien changé !” [“Rousseau said the spectacle of nature provides consolation 
for everything. Sometimes I go looking for my groves of Clarens again, lost somewhere to the north 
of Paris in the mists. Everything has so changed!”]93 The mist figures again the elusive origin 
concealed in the Valois, never to be recovered because time has done its work. And yet, the 
authentic Valois the narrator seems to mourn is not quite (or not only) what it seems. The narrator 
is indeed nostalgic, but the object of his nostalgia is not merely authenticity, it is authenticity 
understood as a form of artifice: 
 
Quelquefois j’ai besoin de revoir ces lieux de solitude et de rêverie. J’y relève 
tristement en moi-même les traces fugitives d’une époque où le naturel était affecté ; 
je souris parfois en lisant sur le flanc des granits certains vers de Roucher, qui 
m’avaient paru sublimes,—ou des maximes de bienfaisance au-dessus d’une fontaine 
ou d’une grotte consacré à Pan. Les étangs, creusés à si grands frais, étalent en vain 
leur eu morte que le cygne dédaigne. 
 
[Every now and then I feel the urge to revisit these scenes of solitude and reverie. 
There I sadly rediscover within myself the fleeting traces of an era when naturalness 
was affected; I occasionally smile when I read certain lines of Roucher that had once 
seemed so sublime to me chiseled into the granite rocks—or else philanthropic 
maxims inscribed above a fountain or a grotto dedicated to Pan. The ponds, dug at 
such expense, are now stagnant expanses, shunned by swans.]94 
 
The Valois that the narrator reminisces about here is not an original, natural landscape, but a 
constructed one. What is to be mourned is the artful mediation of the real that does one better than 
the real itself, the affectation that makes naturalness. This is the Valois hidden in the mists of Sylvie: 
not an unattainable authenticity but a conjunction of reality and illusion that lies beyond an 
opposition between authenticity and inauthenticity. We might also say, Sylvie is this Valois landscape, 
concealing within its mists a pastoralism enriched by the artifice through which it is created. The 
Valois of Sylvie is thus, like the Valois of Les Nuits d’octobre, a space beyond oppositions (between 
                                                
92 Ibid. 
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sincerity and falseness, as between perception and imagination) in which the individual imagination 
can open itself to something that exceeds it. As we have seen, however, this Valois is not a space 
beyond the reach of authority, be it cultural or legal: proper forms of subjectivity are still enforced 
there, as are proper forms of writing. It is this legislation that I will consider in Chapter Three, where 
authoritarianism will assert itself on the scale of the state, and where Nerval’s writing will be above 
all a work of evasion. In Les Faux Saulniers, fiction will be not only a victim but also a weapon of 
cultural authority, a weapon the writing subject will dodge by making himself a fiction.
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Chapter Three 
Fictional Crimes 
Les Faux Saulniers 
 
 
[Ils] sont devenus réels à force d’avoir été inventés. 
 
[They have become real by dint of having been 
invented.] 
 
Nerval, “Histoire véridique du canard”1 
 
 
The Occasional and the Oppositional 
In the first installment of the feuilleton Les Faux Saulniers [The Salt Smugglers], published October 24, 
1850, Nerval explains to the director of Le National the strange authorial predicament he faces.2 He 
has promised Le National a serialized historical portrait of an esoteric 18th-century thinker, the 
continuation of a series of portraits he has been publishing in various newspapers and journals.3 He 
discovered the subject for this latest study (a fascinating story of a radical priest’s escape from the 
prisons of Fort l’Evêque and the Bastille) in a biography in a Frankfurt book market, but found the 
asking price for the book rather steep and chose not to buy it, counting instead on acquiring it back 
in Paris. Though further research has confirmed the book’s existence and led Nerval to other 
sources documenting the abbé’s life, the biography itself has not turned up by the deadline for the 
first installment. There can be no question of changing subjects: the publication of the study has 
already been announced in Le National, complete with its projected title: “Études historiques: Les 
Faux Saulniers (Extrait de la Vie et aventures de l’abbé Bucquoi)” [“Historical Studies: The Salt 
                                                
1 In Œuvres complètes, 1:860. Nerval is writing here of Kaspar Hauser and the brigand Schubry, two famous 19th-century 
canards. Literally a “duck,” a canard is a bit of sensational news that may or may not be true. In his Monographie de la presse 
parisienne, Balzac describes the canard as being made up of “[l]a relation du fait anormal, monstrueux, impossible et vrai, 
possible et faux” [“the account of a strange, monstrous fact, impossible and true, possible and false”] (39). 
2 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:1-169. The serial originally ran in the daily opposition paper Le National between 
October 24 and December 22, 1850. All English citations from Les Faux Saulniers will be quoted from Richard Sieburth’s 
excellent translation The Salt Smugglers, which places a high value on the text’s journalistic context, going so far as to 
approximate the formatting of its serial publication. All other translations are my own, except where indicated. 
3 These studies, treating a mix of pre-revolutionary writers, mystics and socialists, were later collected in the 1852 volume 
Les Illuminés. 
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Smugglers (Extract from the Life and Adventures of the Abbé Bucquoi)”]. Nerval thus announces that he 
has no choice but to carry on with Les Faux Saulniers without the biography for reference.4 
This situation is problematic (and interesting to Nerval) because of a new constraint that has 
been causing problems for French journalism since the summer. The Riancey amendment to the 
July 1850 Press Law placed a hefty stamp tax on the publication of romans-feuilletons (serialized 
novels) in political newspapers like Le National—a tax steep enough to ruin papers who dare publish 
any but the most profitable romans-feuilletons, or even anything that might be mistaken for a roman-
feuilleton.5 Nerval, of course, is not a novelist; his extensive publishing in the press has rather 
consisted primarily of standard journalistic forms like theater columns, as well as travel writing and 
historical studies like the one he is trying to publish in Le National.6 The Riancey amendment should 
not, then, have any impact on Nerval’s writing, and yet, in Les Faux Saulniers, he presents this 
troublesome new law as a threat: without the biography of the abbé de Bucquoy in hand to serve as 
incontestable proof of the historicity of his subject, he asks, what is to keep the tax authorities from 
accusing him of writing a serial novel? “Moi-même, qui ne suis pas un romancier, je tremblais en 
songeant à cette interprétation vague, qu’il serait possible de donner à ces deux mots bizarrement 
accouplés: feuilleton-roman.[…] je commence à m’effrayer aujourd’hui des condamnations suspendues 
sur les journaux pour la moindre infraction au texte de la loi nouvelle” [“I myself, who am no 
novelist at all, was alarmed at the vagueness of interpretation invited by these two oddly coupled 
words: serial novel.[…] I’m beginning to get somewhat frightened about the penalties that threaten to 
befall any newspaper in violation of the slightest letter of the new law”].7 
Nerval thus finds himself in a bind in the first installment of Les Faux Saulniers. The solution 
he proposes is to continue his search for historical documentation of the abbé, writing about that 
search until he can safely write his portrait of the abbé “d’une façon historique et non 
romanesque,—car il faut bien s’entendre sur les mots” [“in an historical rather than in a novelistic 
fashion,—for let’s at least get our terms clear”].8 “[J]e vous tiendrai au courant,” he assures the 
director of Le National, to whom the feuilleton is directly addressed, “du voyage que j’entreprends à la 
recherche de l’abbé de Bucquoy.—Ce personnage excentrique et éternellement fugitif ne peut 
échapper toujours à une investigation rigoureuse” [“I shall keep you abreast of my travels in search of 
the abbé de Bucquoy.—This eccentric and ever-so-slippery figure cannot hope to elude my 
painstaking investigation for very long”].9 Nerval’s quest for unimpeachable evidence begins in the 
first installment at the National Library and continues for weeks, through archives in Paris and 
beyond, and through the various kinds of documentation Nerval comes across in his research and 
his travels. As Malandain has observed, there is something of the detective story about Les Faux 
Saulniers: Nerval follows the abbé’s traces through police records, family genealogies, and memoirs, 
                                                
4 “Note sur le texte” [Les Faux Saulniers] in Œuvres complètes, 2:1327. 
5 It is worth noting that while in English the historical phenomenon of the serial novel is identified in name with the 
feature of seriality (the fact of its being broken down into installments that were published one at a time), in French it is 
identified with the area of the newspaper in which it was published. The feuilleton, which long predated the roman-feuilleton, 
refers to a distinct space usually on the bottom of the first two to four pages of a newspaper; because of this position it 
is also known as the rez-de-chaussée (ground floor), in opposition to the main news stories above it on the haut-de-page 
(upper page). Before the advent of the roman-feuilleton in 1836, and a few days a week after that time, the feuilleton was 
filled with theater columns and reviews, accounts of meetings of the Académie Française, and sometimes travel writing 
or historical studies. See Queffélec, Le roman-feuilleton français aux XIXe siècle. 
6 For a detailed documentary study of Nerval’s career as a journalist, see Brix, Nerval Journaliste; for reflection on the 
relationship between his journalistic writing and his fictional practice, see Dina Blanc, Nerval in the Newspaper. 
7 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:5-6/The Salt Smugglers 8-9. 
8 Ibid., 5/8. 
9 Ibid., 10/11. 
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trying to track down something that can guarantee the truth of his account of the man and so avoid 
contravention of the law.10 
The ongoing absence of the source that would anchor the portrait Nerval was hired to write 
keeps him in constant and explicit relationship to the law. Throughout the installments, Nerval 
reiterates his supposed anxiety about the Riancey amendment and the consequences he could bring 
down on Le National if his text looks like a novel. He reassures the director of Le National again and 
again, “Ce n’est pas un roman,” “Ne craignez rien,—ce n’est pas un roman” [“This is not a novel,” 
“Have no fear,—this is not a novel”].11 The reiteration of his anxieties and reassurances is not, 
however, as straightforwardly submissive as it might initially appear. The feuilleton’s reaction to the 
constraint of the law is not a constant genuflection but rather a kind of dance: rather than stifling the 
text, the constraint provides its narrative energy, spurring it onward. Nerval insists that he must keep 
writing in ever more inventive ways, until the conditions of the law can be met. More importantly, 
the content of the installments that so volubly proclaim their legality seems cherry-picked to 
provoke the law, to put pressure in every conceivable way on its logic. The investigative structure 
has none of the clear-cut orderliness of a good-faith inquiry, but rather indulges in every possible 
digression—as long as there is documentation for it, of course. The mention of a “prétendu comte de 
Bucquoy” [“alleged count de Bucquoy”] in the police records at the Bibliothèque nationale, for 
example, is duly noted and analyzed, but then gives way to the transcription from those same 
records of a deathbed dispute over the contents of a will.12 The potentially problematic transcription 
is included here despite the risk it poses, even though it has nothing to do with the missing abbé. 
From this brief early digression to the weeks-long detour through the racy memoirs of the abbé’s 
great-aunt Angélique de Longueval, the elements of Nerval’s text that seem most likely to displease 
the tax office and so to need defending are not unavoidable risks but seem to be included precisely 
to provoke the law. 
The obsessive references to the feuilleton’s respect for the constraints of the law, its constant 
insistence that it is not a novel, thus create an exhilarating effect, wherein what Chambers calls its 
“overt, and indeed ostentatious submissiveness to the law” shades into blatant provocation.13 When 
Nerval summarizes Angélique’s memoirs, he seems to delight in both arousing and dismissing the 
director’s supposed anxiety, in what seems less like a plea of innocence than a taunt: “P.S. Est-ce que 
vous craindriez d’insérer demain la suite de l’histoire de la grand-tante de l’abbé de Bucquoy? On 
m’a assuré que dans les circonstances actuelles cela pouvait présenter des dangers.—Cependant, c’est de 
l’histoire” [“P.S. Would you be afraid to insert the continuation of the tale of the great aunt of the 
abbé de Bucquoy in tomorrow’s installment? I have been informed that given the present state of 
affairs this might be a dangerous course of action.—And yet, it’s straight history”].14 As Daniel Sangsue 
observes, “[Nerval] ne fait pas qu’esquiver habilement l’amendement Riancey, sa pratique anti-
romanesque s’accompagne d’une réflexion pénétrante sur la pertinence des distinctions génériques et 
leur fondement, de même que sur les conditions et la possibilité d’une inscription du réel dans le 
texte” [“Nerval not only skillfully evades the Riancey amendment, his anti-novelistic practice is 
accompanied by a penetrating reflection on the pertinence of generic distinctions and their basis, as 
                                                
10 Nerval, ou l’incedie du théâtre, 78. 
11 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:22 and 14/The Salt Smugglers, 20 and 14. 
12 Ibid., 12/13. 
13 Room for Maneuver, 116. While Chambers’s reading emphasizes the melancholic dimension of Nerval’s opposition to 
the law through self-erasure, rather than the more active forms of critique I will explore here, his insistence on the 
layered nature of oppositional texts is essential, and missing from the overly-literal readings of Nerval’s account of his 
submission to the law, cf. Daniel Desormeaux, “Sans foi ni loi: (Nerval et Marx) pour ou contre le roman feuilleton.” 
14 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:55/The Salt Smugglers, 43. My emphasis. 
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well as on the conditions and possibility of an inscription of the real in the text”].15 Indeed, more 
than protecting himself from a law that threatens the writing he intended to do, Nerval seems to 
conceive of the project of Les Faux Saulniers precisely in order to provoke the law, selecting sources 
that walk the line between fact and fiction, from Angélique’s titillating memoirs to Valois peasants’ 
rewriting of French history as legend. Despite the impression Nerval gives in the first installment, 
then, we must read Les Faux Saulniers not as what we might think of as a passively occasional text, 
unavoidably shaped by the intervention of the law, but rather as actively occasional, itself intended to 
intervene with regard to the logic of the law. 
To understand the text this way, as an intentional engagement with the terms set forward by 
the new Press Law, we must part company with existing readings of Les Faux Saulniers.16 These 
readings begin without fail from the account of his subjection to circumstance that Nerval puts 
forward in the text’s early installments, and in so doing they miss the irony of Nerval’s voluntary and 
provocative engagement with the Press Law. Even the few readings that do not see Nerval as a 
victim here, but laud the force and wit of his political critique, do not break with the assumption that 
the terms of the confrontation are those Nerval makes explicit.17 By subordinating the text to the 
historical contingency of the July 1850 Press Law, scholars use history with regard to Les Faux 
Saulniers the way that psychology is so often used with regard to Nerval’s other works: as an external 
force to which Nerval’s writing can be attributed as a symptom or reaction. A reading of this feuilleton 
that does not take for granted its inevitability under the circumstances, then, will restore not only the 
full effect of Nerval’s irony, but also his status as an intentional, insightful writer. By asking why 
Nerval engages with Riancey, we can appreciate not only Nerval’s remarkable ability to make 
lemonade (both bitterly ironic and sweetly hilarious) out of political lemons, but also the tactical 
ingenuity of his position taking. 
Once we allow Nerval’s confrontation with the law to become a question in this way, it 
becomes clear that we cannot look only at the features of his writing and of the law to which he 
draws our attention—that is, we cannot think only in terms of the novel. Nerval, after all, was not a 
novelist and did not intend to write a novel in Les Faux Saulniers.18 When he laments the “beau 
roman” [“fine novel”] that might have been written by combining the raw data of the abbé’s story 
with a love plot to motivate his actions, the irony of his depiction of the novel and its predictable 
narrative processes is nearly as cutting as his irony regarding the law itself.19 If Nerval’s 
confrontation with the law in Les Faux Saulniers is a voluntary engagement, it must be motivated by 
something more than the prohibition of the serial novel, to which he demonstrates no great loyalty. 
The great critical force of the text must counter the authority of the law on a higher-stakes matter. 
                                                
15 Le récit excentrique, 406. 
16 These readings are still very few, though the decision to publish the version of Les Faux Saulniers that ran in Le National 
in the second volume of the new Pléïade edition has brought increased attention to a text that was, up until that edition, 
largely ignored as an early draft of “Angélique.” The publication of the text in its feuilleton form (now doubled by 
Sieburth’s English translation) signals a new interest in the occasional dimension of Nerval’s writing by not absolutely 
privileging the more “timeless” or “literary” iteration of the text in Les Filles du feu.  
17 See especially Brix, “Nerval et la réflexion politique”; Chambers, Room for Maneuver; and Sieburth, “Translator’s 
Postface” to The Salt Smugglers. Blanc’s Nerval in the Newspaper goes the furthest in this direction, noting the ways in which 
Nerval changes the terms of the debate on fiction established by the National Assembly; but even she does not call into 
question the primacy or significance of the ban on the novel for Nerval’s text. 
18 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:18/The Salt Smugglers, 17. 
19 Ibid., 138/101. Though some scholars read this as an authentic lament for the novel Nerval could have written, his 
general indifference to the novel (evinced by the early abandonment of his only foray into the genre with the Marquis de 
Fayolle in 1849, as well as by his more general resistance to the delimitation of a purely fictional literary space) suggests 
that irony is at work here, too, and that “quel beau roman” is intended as a send-up of the novel. Cf. Dunn, “Nerval: 
Transgression and the Ammendement Riancey”; and Blanc, Nerval in the Newspaper. 
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This confrontation has sometimes been understood as representative of Nerval’s non-
specific oppositional politics. In such readings, Nerval is seen to take a critical stance in relation to 
any manifestation of arbitrary power, from censorship to passport inspections to incarceration, 
without there being any specifically literary stakes.20 The remove at which Les Faux Saulniers seems to 
stand from Nerval’s other works might tempt us to follow this lead and focus on the thematics of 
opposition qua opposition that permeates the text, but the distance between the concerns of Les 
Faux Saulniers and the work of a more literary Nerval is only apparent. The specific terms of Nerval’s 
confrontation with the law here have everything to do with his literary endeavors, and particularly 
with the relationship of Nerval’s work to culturally dominant forms like the novel (though not in the 
terms he makes explicit). In order to uncover this relevance, we must revive the richness of the 
issues at stake in the July 1850 Press Law.21 We must unearth the unique discursive features of the 
mid-century press that troubled the National Assembly (the imbrication of fact and fiction and the 
collective nature of authorship) as well as the terms in which the law sought to repress those 
features. Only then can we think alongside Nerval about the relationship of journalistic writing to 
other forms, including the novel, and about the relationship of individual to collective voices, and 
recognize the specific opposition he makes in Les Faux Saulniers to the marginalization of the unique 
literary space still constituted by journalism during this period. 
 
Political Guarantees and Literary Constraints 
The Press Law of July 1850 must be understood as part and parcel of the increasingly repressive 
policy of France’s Second Republic.22 Following the violent defeat of the proletarian uprising in Paris 
in June 1848 and its echo in the defeat of the petty-bourgeois and proletarian insurgency in June 
1849, the forces of socialism and democracy were overpowered in the National Assembly by the 
conservative Party of Order.23 With the abolition of universal manhood suffrage at the end of May 
1850, the summer announced the death of the dream of a democratic republic and the consolidation 
of conservative parliamentary authority. The July Press Law played a crucial role in this 
consolidation, limiting the political power of the press, the National Assembly’s great opponent in 
“la lutte sourde des deux grands pouvoirs de l’Etat” [“the mute struggle of the State’s two great 
powers”].24 The Assembly used this piece of tax policy to target political and economic papers, 
making no secret of its intentions to weaken press influence, or, as proponents of a free press had it, 
to attack liberty and repress political dissent. Given the political climate during that summer, when 
the legitimate means of popular political participation through voting had just been eliminated and 
the politicizing of the people was much to be feared as a force capable of destabilizing the republic, 
the baldness of the anti-press rhetoric framing the Assembly’s discussion of this law is not 
                                                
20 This thematics of opposition, strongly associated for Nerval with the Valois region, runs throughout Les Faux 
Saulniers: from Angélique’s refusal to succumb to paternal authority, through the interventions of arbitrary state power in 
Nerval’s own life in the form of gendarmes asking for papers and his eviction justified by eminent domain, to the abbé 
himself, that paragon of opposition. For readings of this politics of opposition, see especially Brix, “Nerval et la réflexion 
politique”; and Chambers, Room for Maneuver. 
21 This focus on the world of the press is not a matter of introducing questions foreign to Nerval’s text; as a writer who, 
like many of his generation, made his living through the ongoing work of journalistic writing, Nerval was without doubt 
proximate enough to the press to feel the full impact of the July 1850 press law. 
22 Loi du 16-23 juillet 1850, sur le cautionnement des journaux et le timbre des écrits périodiques et non périodiques. [Law of 16-23 July 
1850, On the Bond on Newspapers and the Stamp Tax on Periodical and Non-periodical Writing.] For more on this law within the 
context of press reforms during the Second Republic more broadly, see Christophe Charle, Le siècle de la presse (1830-
1939). 
23 Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte remains an invaluable account of the complex jockeying that took 
place during the short-lived Second Republic; see also T. J. Clark’s The Absolute Bourgeois for a detailed chronology. 
24 Le National, July 16, 1850. 
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surprising. What is perhaps surprising, however, is the way that the Party of Order, openly fearful 
that newspapers had become too influential in shaping the public’s political ideas in view of 
fomenting discontent, sought to rein in the press. The Press Law did not primarily target specific 
political content (though there were certainly elements of such censorship within it), but instead 
used tax measures to take aim at two formal features of journalistic writing that were believed to be 
dangerous to the government and to order. The overall structure of the law was borrowed from 
earlier legislation that regulated the press in ways that made sense given the way the press operated 
during the period, but the law also contained two amendments that sought to force fundamental 
changes in the newspaper’s operations. These amendments, much more explicitly political and moral 
in ambition than the rest of the tax law, demonstrate the disjunctures between the press as it existed 
and the press as the National Assembly wanted it to exist, disjunctures that imply a need to 
transform (i.e., neutralize) the unique discursive space of the press.25  
The first, proposed on July 10 by Charles-Louis Tinguy de Nesmy, required that the author’s 
signature appear at the bottom of every printed article.26 Tucked into the section on the collective 
cautionnement (bond money), the Tinguy amendment contradicts the entire logic of that section. 
There, the law set the rates of the bond paid by newspaper owners on behalf of their entire staff, 
against the risk of legal transgressions like libel. The cautionnement thus treated the agents behind the 
newspaper collectively, reflecting the reality of an editorial voice that transcended individual writers. 
At this time, as Marie-Ève Thérenty and Alain Vaillant observe, “dans la presse, il sembl[ait] aller de 
soi que l’écriture journalistique [était] du côté du collectif, du reproductible, du non-identifiable” [“it 
seemed to go without saying in the press that journalistic writing was on the side of the collective, 
the reproducible, the unidentifiable”].27 The collective voice of the press was the product of various 
forms of collaborative authorship: one writer might compose an article based on another’s notes, for 
example; what’s more, the shape of an article might be greatly determined, not by the man who 
wrote it, but by the editor who assigned it and then gave it its final form. It is in light of these kinds 
of practices that the voice of the paper was most often represented by a nous, a first person plural 
that reflected the complex forms of collaboration that produced it.  
The collective accountability of the editorial staff in the cautionnement also recognized the 
complexity of the relationships of individual writers to their work through the use of pseudonyms. 
Articles were often signed under false names or initials, with many authors (including Nerval) using 
different signatures for different genres of writing, different collaborative writing arrangements, and 
                                                
25 For contemporary analysis of the politics of the July press laws, and the Riancey amendment in particular, see 
Claudin, Le Timbre Riancey; and Chassan, Lois sur la presse depuis le 24 février 1848. 
26 Titre I. Cautionnement, Article 3. “Tout article de discussion politique, philosophique ou religieuse, inséré dans un 
journal, devra être signé par son auteur, sous peine d’une amende de 500 fr. pour la première contravention, et de mille 
fr. dans le cas de récidive. Toute fausse signature sera punie d’une amende de mille francs et d’un emprisonnement de six 
mois, tant contre l’auteur de la fausse signature que contre l’auteur de l’article et l’éditeur responsable du journal.” 
[“Every article treating politics, philosophy, or religion inserted in a newspaper must be signed by its author, liable to a 
fine of 500 francs for the first offence, and 1000 francs for repeated offences. For any false signature, the author of the 
false signature and the author of the article, as well as the managing editor of the newspaper, will face a fine of 1000 
francs and a six month prison sentence.”] The reach of the Tinguy amendment was then extended by Article 4. “Les 
dispositions de l’article précédent seront applicable à tous les articles, quelles que soit leur étendue, publiés dans les 
feuilles politiques ou non politiques, dans lesquels seront discutés des actes ou opinions des citoyens, et des intérêts 
individuels ou collectifs.” [“The provisions of the preceding article will apply to all articles, whatever their content, 
published in political or non-political papers that treat the acts or opinions of citizens, or individual or collective 
interests.”] For transcripts of the National Assembly’s discussion of the Tinguy amendment, see “Assemblée nationale 
législative. Séance du mercredi 10 juillet 1850,” Le Moniteur universel, 2357-59; for the article in its final form with analysis 
of the Assembly debate, see Chassan, Lois sur la presse depuis le 24 février 1848, 124-137. 
27 1836 : L’an 1 de l’ère médiathique, 85. 
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different periods of their careers.28 These pseudonyms were not necessarily meant to disguise the 
authors, to deceive the public as to their “real” identities; nor can they be explained by the supposed 
shamefulness of collective writing practices that Marie-Ève Thérenty groups under the heading of 
supercherie (scams). She attributes these “dishonest” practices of signature to the deceptive motives of 
authors who wanted to sell the same book to more than one publisher under different names, or to 
remain at a distance from writing they did not want to claim as their own; first and foremost, these 
“false” signatures indicate, for Thérenty, a devaluation of the writing to which they are attached. 
However, the logic that only values “authentic” individual authorship is one foreign to the mode of 
production of the press at this time, a standard imposed upon it by the Press Law and by other 
literary discourses, in order to find journalism lacking—morally and literarily suspect. To move 
beyond the critiques of 19th-century politicians and poets, we must set aside their moralizing logic to 
consider how journalism functioned, according to practices and logics of authorship with their own 
integrity.29 Looked at from this point of view, pseudonyms were incredibly productive, allowing 
writers to consolidate their careers around multiple centers (political journalism, criticism, narrative, 
etc.), in multiple registers, and in multiple relationships to the commercial writing markets.30 One 
young writer could be more than one author—not in the sense of wearing masks to hide his real 
face, but in the sense of exposing multiple facets of a single talent or career. Along with the 
anonymous nous of journalistic writing, pseudonyms thus helped create a journalistic space in which 
the editorial staff was indivisible into simple individuals and so had to be treated legally as a whole. 
For the conservative National Assembly, this collective voice was a primary source of the 
newspaper’s dangerous power, and so Tinguy proposed an amendment to counteract the lack of 
individual accountability that the bond generally enabled. The central issue at stake was that of the 
irresponsible anonymity of the journalistic nous, whose unearned authority was the root of the press’s 
evils: 
 
Eh! mon Dieu! quelle est la puissance véritable de la mauvaise presse ? quel est son 
danger ? C’est le prestige de l’anonyme pour la majeure partie des lecteurs. Un 
journal n’est pas l’œuvre de tel ou tel individu, c’est une œuvre collective, c’est une 
puissance mystérieuse, c’est le prestige de l’inconnu. Voila la puissance de la presse, 
elle n’est que cela. 
 
[Well! My God! What real power does bad journalism have? What makes it 
dangerous? It is the prestige that anonymity holds for the vast majority of readers. A 
newspaper is not the work of this or that individual, it is a collective work, a 
                                                
28 Nerval is, of course, itself arguably a pseudonym—though Gérard Labrunie had ceased to sign anything but letters to 
his father with his family name by the time he made the definitive move to signing all of his literary and journalistic 
output Gérard de Nerval, making the distinction between a public (pseudo) and a private (authentic) name more complex. 
Until that time, he drew on a shifting set of shortened signatures that moved from Gérard and G.-D. in the late 1830s, to 
G. de N. and Gérard de Nerval in the mid 1840s; the constant use of the one nom de plume (Nerval) by which we know him 
did not begin until 1850. 
29 See Thérenty, Mosaiques: Etre ecrivain entre presse et roman (1829-1836). Daniel Couégnas begins to acknowledge the 
distinctiveness of the pseudonymous or anonymous signature’s function with regard to the roman-feuilleton in particular, 
but ultimately attributes it to the practical demands of a commercial literature; see his Introduction à la paralittérature. The 
studies of writer-journalists undertaken by Marie-Françoise Melmoux-Montaubain share, and even intensify, this over-
emphasis on the practical constraints of journalistic writing, seen to make of the press an anti-literature; see 
“Chroniqueurs et romanciers” and L’écrivain-journaliste au XIXe siècle. 
30 This sort of practice of pseudonymy finds its closest descendent in the 21st-century U.S. in music, and particularly 
among singer-songwriters who often take on different names to distinguish multiple solo and/or collaborative projects 
with distinct sounds or inspirations. 
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mysterious force, the prestige of the unknown. There you have the power of the 
press, it is no more than that.]31 
 
The newspaper’s power came from the prestige of an anonymous, authoritative voice—one that 
bore all the weight of a respected author without being attached to any individual whose honor 
might justify its respectability. This supposed voice of authority was in fact, Tinguy argued, no one’s 
voice, the voice of insincerity: without the attribution of articles to individuals, nothing prevented 
writers from leading the public astray in favor of any cause that would pay.32 Diffusing the 
troublesome power of the newspaper, then, was as simple as eliminating that anonymous voice, and 
so Tinguy demanded a radical and unprecedented form of simplified individual accountability for 
journalistic articles: the name of the author—his real name. Signed articles, Tinguy imagined, would 
ensure that the value of opinions espoused be evident, since the public would be able to judge the 
validity of the argument by the honorability of the author’s name. The signature thus promised 
nothing less than the restoration of truth to the press: “Ainsi vous aurez établi dans la presse la plus 
complète vérité: chacun répondra de son œuvre” [“In this way you will have established the most 
complete truth in the press: everyone will be accountable for his own work”].33 
In the Tinguy amendment, the National Assembly acted on its discomfort with the forms of 
authority deployed by the newspaper through the collective mode of writing that the bond itself 
acknowledged, pointing to the undue power associated with that mode and the unfair advantage the 
press therefore had over its parliamentary opponent. The amendment reduced the collective voice of 
the newspaper to the individual rhetorical voice of the parliamentary debate, backed by the presence 
(at least in name) of a speaker whose identity would testify to the credibility of his arguments. It thus 
aimed at nothing less than a transformation of the epistemology of political journalism, toward a 
rhetorical model in which the mark of truth would be the author’s first person singular. But where 
Tinguy presented the thought of an individual, identifiable writing subject as unquestionably more 
valid than the deceptively anonymous thought of a collective, France’s major liberal dailies insisted 
that such an individual subject never had been and never should be at stake in journalism: “Le public 
ne voit pas la main qui tient la plume; il ne cherche pas dans un article la pensée personnelle d’un 
                                                
31 “Assemblée nationale législative. Séance du mercredi 10 juillet 1850,” Le Moniteur universel, 2357. 
32 This view of the press as a field of inauthentic writing aimed at making a profit and in which even opinions are for sale 
is epitomized by Balzac’s portrait of journalism in Illusions perdues. On one hand, this portrait contains a significant truth, 
which is that journalism was for writers of Nerval’s generation a way of making a living and so the features of 
journalistic writing were marked by economic necessity; but there is a risk of going too far in privileging this fact, as 
Melmoux-Montaubain does in her studies of writers who worked as journalists. The unique features of journalistic 
writing cannot be reduced to an improper influence of the market on literature, according to a binary of pure, authentic 
literature and fallen journalism. While many writers were critical of the forces that influenced journalistic writing, it is 
more productive and, I believe, more true to the close ties these writers had to a journalistic writing practice, to see their 
critiques as indicative of an ambivalence about the complexities of journalism rather than a condemnation of it. The 
newspaper of the July Monarcy also provided a freedom that many writers found invigorating, as Thérenty and Vaillant 
note: “L’essentiel—et l’inattendu—est là : parce qu’il est absolument informe et polymorphe, le journal de 1836 est un 
extraordinaire espace d’invention et de liberté scripturale.[… C]’est grâce au journal que l’homme de lettres, sous la 
monarchie de Juillet, jouit, avec une jubilation d’ailleurs aussi perceptible que communicative, de la liberté d’écriture, à 
l’intérieure des limites légales imposées, par ailleurs à la liberté d'expression : pour cette liberté, que revendique par 
vocation tout écrivain, il intéresse au premier chef le spécialiste de littérature.” [“This is the most important—and 
suprising—thing: because it is absolutely formless and polymorphous, the newspaper of 1836 is an extraordinary space 
of invention and scriptural freedom. It is thanks to the newspaper that under the July Monarchy, the man of letters 
enjoyed, with an obvious and infectious jubilation, a freedom of writing, within legal limits, and a freedom of expression: 
this freedom, by nature demanded by all writers, is of primary interest to the literary specialist.”] (1836 : l’an 1 de l’ère 
médiatique, 19.) Cf. Melmoux-Montaubain, “Chroniquers et romanciers” and L’écrivain-journaliste. 
33 Ibid. 
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écrivain” [“The public does not see the hand that holds the pen; it does not look to articles for the 
personal reflection of a writer”].34 This vindication by La Presse of journalistic discourse’s difference 
was echoed by Le National (where Nerval would publish Les Faux Saulniers later that fall): “La pensée 
d’un journal n’est jamais, on le sait, une pensée individuelle, mais une pensée collective. Par 
conséquent, en individualisant la responsabilité, on ment aux faits eux-mêmes” [“We know that a 
newspaper’s thought is never an individual thought, but a collective thought. As a result, in 
individualizing responsibility, we are putting the lie to the facts themselves”].35 Given the unique 
collective operation of journalism, Le National argued, Tinguy’s maneuver did not constitute a 
revelation of journalistic truth (searching out and bringing to light the real journalistic agents), but 
rather a misrepresentation and a falsification that “ne tend à rien moins qu’à rendre tout journal 
impossible” [“aims at nothing less than rendering any newspaper impossible”].36 
What the newspapers recognized was the profound contradiction between journalism’s 
mode of production (as acknowledged by the collective nature of the cautionnement) and the demands 
of the new law. By insisting on signatures, the Tinguy amendment aimed to bring journalism under 
the logic of the public sphere of which the National Assembly was itself the model, and so to 
destroy its singularity as a discursive space. There is something unexpected in this approach to 
censoring the press, which did not simply seek to take away its oppositional power by restricting the 
political content available to it, but which rather aimed to reshape it formally as a political adversary. 
The National Assembly here seemed to admit the press’s superior cultural authority (the efficacy of 
the tools available to journalists but not to politicians) and to try to use its legislative authority to 
level the cultural playing field. In a sense, in saying, “We must hobble the press,” the deputies 
continuously said, “We must make the press more like us.”  
The National Assembly’s ambivalent relationship to the political role of the newspaper also 
played out in the other major amendment to the Press Law, introduced by Henry Camusat de 
Riancey just a few days after that of Tinguy.37 This amendment came in the section on the timbre, 
which set the stamp tax rates for different categories of newspapers (political, literary, etc.) 
depending on where and how widely they were circulated, and straightforwardly targeted political 
papers with higher taxes. Undermining the profitability of newspapers whose focus was economic or 
political, the stamp tax made it more difficult for those papers to remain financially buoyant and 
encouraged a shift in press production toward politically innocuous forms that focused exclusively 
on art and culture. In the midst of this clear attack on the viability of political journalism, the 
Riancey amendment looks like a strange digression, calling for an additional one-centime tax on all 
political and economic newspapers that printed romans-feuilletons. Since the one-centime tax exceeded 
                                                
34 La Presse, “La loi contre la presse. (Troisième séance). L’amendement de M. de Tinguy,” July 11, 1850. 
35 Le National, July 11, 1850. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Titre II. Timbre, Article 14. “Tout roman-feuilleton publié dans un journal ou dans son supplément sera soumis à un 
timbre de un centime par numéro. Ce droit ne sera que d’un demi-centime pour les journaux des départements autres 
que ceux de la Seine et de Seine-et-Oise.” [“Any roman-feuilleton published in a newspaper or a supplement will subject to 
a stamp tax of one cent per issue. This duty will be only a half-cent for newspapers in departments other than Seine and 
Seine-et-Oise.”] For transcripts of the National Assembly’s discussion of the Riancey amendment, see “Assemblée 
nationale législative. Séance du lundi 15 juillet 1850,” Le Moniteur universel, 2423; for the article in its final form with 
analysis of the Assembly debate, see Chassan, Lois sur la presse depuis le 24 février 1848, 147. It is also worth noting that the 
discussion of the Riancey amendment is preceded by discussion of the proposed prosecution of the newspaper Pouvoir 
for printing an article critiquing the National Assembly (“Affaiblissement graduel de l’Assemblée nationale”) that very 
day. This discussion throws into all-too-stark relief the political motivations of the press laws, which are explicitly 
designed to repress critiques such as this; the vote to prosecute Pouvoir is also central in framing the press’s reaction to 
the Riancey amendment, intensifying the sense of open conflict no longer masked by the bad-faith moral justifications of 
the legislators. See, for example, the leading articles of July 16, 1850 in both La Presse and Le National. 
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the profits rendered by all but the most successful romans-feuilletons, it effectively functioned as a 
prohibition of the serial publication of novels, aimed at political dailies. This amendment’s absurd 
contradictions—penalizing political periodicals for publishing literary works though it was placed 
within a section of the law that favored literary periodicals—were not lost on La Presse: “Il faudrait 
cependant se mettre d’accord. Qui est-ce qui est dangereux? Est-ce la littérature? est-ce la politique?” 
[“But we must get this straight. What is dangerous? Is it literature or is it politics?”].38 Of course, the 
incoherence of the Riancey amendment was (as the editorial staff of La Presse was certainly aware) 
only apparent: the danger that the National Assembly identified was precisely the collusion between 
two discourses (the literary and the political) that should have been distinct but that were largely 
intertwined in the mid-century newspaper. 
This interrelation of literature and politics in the press took two major forms that made the 
roman-feuilleton a particular target for the Assembly’s restrictions. On one hand, the serialized novel 
played a central role in the transformation and expansion of the political press over the first half of 
the 19th century. From La Presse’s introduction of the first serialized novel in a political daily in 1836 
(Balzac’s La Vieille Fille [The Old Maid]), the roman-feuilleton was an enormous resource in attracting 
new readership to a new kind of newspaper.39 The large new public for mass journalism was not 
necessarily a politically minded one, especially since poll taxes throughout the July Monarchy had 
kept many of its members from voting. The roman-feuilleton thus served as an essential supplement to 
a newspaper’s politics by drawing in more subscribers.40 Doing away with serialized novels was thus 
not simply an attack on the roman-feuilleton as a literary form; it was also an attack on the political 
dailies that thrived on the readership won, in large part, with seductive serials. By eliminating one of 
the greatest attractions of the political dailies, the Riancey amendment aimed at reducing the number 
of readers for their politics. 
On the other hand, however, the literary specificity of the roman-feuilleton must be taken into 
account, since it was by no means politically neutral. Though many different kinds of literature, 
many of them novelistic, were serialized during the heyday of the roman-feuilleton, the runaway hits of 
the genre were of a marked political content and consequence.41 While the serial novel would go on 
to align its interests with those of the ruling authorities under the Second Empire, many of the most 
successful romanciers-feuilletonistes of the July Monarchy and Second Republic, including Paul de Kock, 
wrote novels treating popular and petit bourgeois subjects that were seen as tools for revolutionary 
politics.42 The exploration of the plight of the lower classes in France for democratic ends was 
deployed most spectacularly by Eugène Sue in his best-sellers of the feuilleton genre: Mystères de Paris 
[The Mysteries of Paris] (Journal des Débats, 1842-43) and Le Juif errant [The Wandering Jew] (Le 
Constitutionnel, 1844-45).43 For conservative politicians, there was no question that a direct line could 
be drawn from Sue’s novels to the revolution of 1848.44 The power of social unrest that had been 
                                                
38 La Presse, July 17, 1850. 
39 For the history of the roman-feuilleton from its emergence in France, see Couégnas, Introduction à la paralittérature; Olivier-
Martin, Histoire du roman populaire en France; and Queffélec, Le roman-feuilleton français au XIXe siècle. 
40 Garnering ongoing loyalty from its readership sufficient to motivate subscription (as opposed to a day-to-day interest 
sparked by sensational stories glimpsed at the newsstand) was especially important prior to 1848 when it was illegal to 
sell newspapers in the street by the issue to unsubscribed customers. For more on the transition to sales by the issue 
after 1848, see Kalifa et al., La civilization du journal, 195-203. 
41 Richard Sieburth offers an insightful analysis of the broader political situation that might serve as a third answer to the 
question: “in a fake Republic, presided over by a fake president who was very likely merely the fake descendent of the 
great Napoléon, no subject was more politically sensitive than the legitimacy of fiction”; see the “Translator’s Postscript” 
to The Salt Smugglers, 144. 
42 Olivier-Martin, Histoire du roman populaire en France, 20. 
43 Adamowicz-Hariasz, From Opinion to Information, 164 and 160. 
44 Ibid., 160 and Queffélec, Le roman-feuilleton français aux XIXe siècle, 35. 
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unleashed would not subside as long as it was being constantly aroused by novels like Sue’s (as 
evidenced by the uprising of June 1849, also blamed on the serialized novel). The elimination of the 
roman-feuilleton was thus an essential part of repressing political dissent.45 
What made the serialized novel such an effective and, for the Assembly, problematic 
political tool was its unique brand of fictionality, which was by no means predicated on an autonomy 
from the daily vicissitudes of political life. Its power was seen to derive from the combination of its 
fictional status and its treatment of real subjects. Throughout the July Monarchy and Second 
Republic, the roman-feuilleton tended to treat political subjects in close proximity to the news; indeed, 
fiction d’actualité (topical fiction) went so far as to directly address and incorporate, day by day, the 
news that occupied the page above it, thereby blurring the line between fiction and journalistic fact 
in the press.46 The imbrication of social and political actuality in the novel was especially powerful 
because it moved the matter of politics into a different discursive space where it could reach a larger 
audience in compelling ways. For the National Assembly, the insidiousness of this new political 
mode lay precisely in its ability to operate beyond the boundaries of explicitly political discourse and 
so to evade the kinds of analysis to which that discourse was subject. The novel was, in Riancey’s 
words, “à l’abri de la curiosité qu’inspire les affaires et les débats politiques” [“sheltered from the 
curiosity inspired by public affairs and political debates”], and so able to arouse political feelings 
without passing through critical political debate.47 The fictionality that might at first glance seem 
opposed to politics acted, instead, as a unique tool for generating political engagement beyond the 
means and audience of political journalism proper. Suppressing the roman-feuilleton, then, was a 
matter of eliminating an aberrant (and fearsome) form of political discourse. 
In the Riancey amendment, as in the Tinguy amendment before it, the undue political 
influence of the newspaper was to be neutralized, not simply by censoring its political content, but 
by controlling the form of its discourse. However, the prohibition of the roman-feuilleton presented a 
much greater challenge to enforcement than the parallel demand for authors’ signatures. How was 
the roman-feuilleton to be defined for the purpose of the law? How could it be distinguished from 
various historical genres on the basis of form alone? This problem was evident to the National 
Assembly itself, and even the commission assigned to consider the amendment argued against it on 
the grounds that, “il est impossible de distinguer quelles sont les limites véritables entre le roman-
feuilleton et l’histoire” [“it is impossible to distinguish the real limits between the roman-feuilleton and 
history”]. The spokesman for the commission went so far as to demand of his fellow assemblymen, 
“Ne nous laissons donc pas entraîner en dehors des limites du juste, du vrai, du possible” [“Let us 
not get carried away beyond the limits of the just, the true, the possible”] in attempting to draw such 
a distinction.48 In a literary market where the historical novel and the roman d’actualité reigned 
supreme precisely because of their intertwining of fact and fiction, the possibility of making an 
apparently commonsense distinction between the novel and history could not be taken for granted. 
In addition, fiction and fact were bound together in the newspaper during this period: the great 
popularity of the serialized novel had already transformed the whole of journalistic writing, so that 
“factual” genres were now variously marked by writing procedures and reading habits drawn from 
fiction.49 The imbrication of fact and fiction both within and beyond the space of the feuilleton 
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complicated enforcement of the law, making it a weapon aimed at many things amongst which it 
would be hard to identify its stated target, the serialized novel. 
The newspapers faced with reinventing their feuilletons to accommodate the formal constraint 
of the Riancey amendment immediately recognized this ambiguity, as well as the political use to 
which it would be put. The editorial staff of Le National argued that, even if the ambition to sort 
novel from history in the newspaper was so ridiculous as to have necessarily been intended as a joke, 
there was nonetheless no question as to what kind of sorting the amendment would enable: “M. de 
Riancey aurait bien dû nous dire à quel caractère on reconnaîtra le genre d’ouvrages qu’il veut 
proscrire, et si, par exemple, la Vie de sainte Elisabeth de Hongrie, de son ami M. de Montalembert, 
la Vie de sainte Philomène et les récits des miracles de Rimini, sont ou ne sont pas romans” [“M. de 
Riancey should have told us by what mark we are to recognize the sort of works he wants to forbid, 
and whether, for example, the Life of Saint Elizabeth of Hungary by his friend M. de Montalembert, the 
Life of Saint Philomena, and the tales of the miracles at Rimini are or are not novels”].50 The 
government could certainly not be expected to prosecute for the saint’s lives written by Riancey’s 
conservative friends, though many people would certainly consider them fictional. Thus the 
inefficacy of the criterion of fictionality was not really a weakness in the amendment, but its strong 
point: the ambiguity it created allowed the National Assembly to enforce it selectively and so hit its 
real target, which was not fiction per se, but the oppositional political content and force of fiction as 
it was singularly deployed by political newspapers. 
Like the collective voice of journalistic writing, the political deployment of fiction came 
under attack in the July Press Law as one of the formal features of the political press that 
differentiated it from the political discourse of parliament and made it a fearsome rival. The National 
Assembly put forth a demand for proper political discourse in the press, discourse characterized by 
an individual identity able to act as guarantor of its validity and a clear division of fact and opinion 
from fiction, in hopes of neutralizing the dangerous force of a journalistic discourse marked by the 
anonymity of a collective voice and the real vitality of fictional stories. 
 
Historical Fiction 
In the midst of this battle between the discourses of political rhetoric and the press, the questions of 
voice and factuality at play in Les Faux Saulniers appear in all their complexity. Rather than a forced 
evasion (however playful) of the novelistic form that has been forbidden, the text appears as a 
complex critique of both the assumptions about the proper limits of fictionality implied by the 
Riancey amendment, and the conception of authorial authenticity put forward by Tinguy. The 
evasion Nerval undertakes in Les Faux Saulniers is, I have argued, entirely voluntary: the ostentation 
of his obedience to the law in fact marks the position he maintains always on the verge of breaking it 
(like the child with her hand right in front of her brother’s face: “I’m not touching you!”).51 But 
Nerval’s gleefully flagrant provocation-by-submissiveness is not provocation for provocation’s sake, 
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and the particular forms of fiction that he uses to challenge the law here contribute to a reflection on 
the relationship between fact and fiction. Nerval draws on forms of popular belief in which fiction is 
in a vital relationship to life and to history in order to put pressure on the terms of the Riancey and 
Tinguy amendments, challenging the National Assembly’s conception of fact. But at the same time, 
Nerval also challenges the literary establishment’s conception of fiction as a technical procedure 
entirely separate from the world it draws on for material. Men of letters are shown to be complicit 
with politicians in dividing discursive space between fact and argument, on the one hand, and fiction 
on the other, and so breaking fiction’s connections with social life. Les Faux Saulniers has been seen 
to take sides with the novel against the factual logic of journalism, but its critique is more radical 
than this. It examines the restricted notions of truth that operate in both the political and the literary 
fields, as well as their conceptions of “authentic” subjectivity, and it stages modes of fiction and 
collective subjectivity (still present in journalistic discourse in this period) that both fields exclude. 
 The Riancey Amendment, as we have seen, was intended to keep the novel out of the 
newspaper as a space of political discourse, because of the way that fiction (improperly) impacted 
the real world with which it came into contact in this space. It is thus significant that Nerval chooses 
to address this concern for the relationship between the real and the fictional by centering his battles 
with Riancey on the conventions of the historical novel. This is at once the genre that relies most 
heavily on fact as a ground for its fictionalized narratives, and a genre that does not challenge the 
established limit between fact and fiction. The historical novel’s great practitioners, most notably 
Dumas and Sir Walter Scott (who serves as Nerval’s shorthand for the writing procedures he is 
supposedly renouncing), undertook extensive research to generate detail about the places and history 
depicted in their books, so that the invented plot of the novel is intricately woven into a fabric of 
real people, events and places. Since the novel is thus full of real history, fictionalized through plot, 
the trait that might be used to identify novels illegally printed in newspapers is not simply 
fictionality, but the proximity of fiction and history. In his own text, then, he endeavors to protect 
his reproduction of the racy memoirs of the abbé’s great-aunt Angélique from the accusation of 
being a novel by relegating all his comments on her to digressions distinct from her story. He keeps 
the documented historical facts of the memoirs entirely separate from everything else: 
 
Avant de parler des grandes résolutions d’Angélique de Longueval, je demande la 
permission de placer encore un mot. Ensuite, je n’interromprai plus que rarement le 
récit. Puisqu’il nous est défendu de faire du roman historique, nous sommes forcés de 
servir la sauce sur un autre plat que le poisson ;—c’est-à-dire les descriptions locales, 
le sentiment de l’époque, l’analyse des caractères,—en dehors du récit matériellement 
vrai. 
 
[Before going into detail about Angélique de Longueval’s great decision, I wonder 
whether I might be allowed to insert a few words here. I promise that I shall 
hereafter interrupt the narrative only on rare occasions. It being illegal to engage in 
the historical novel, we shall just have to serve up the sauce on some other platter;—
that is, local color, period atmosphere, analysis of characters,— complementing the 
material truth of the facts being related.]52 
 
Nerval displaces the terms of the Riancey debate on the novel here, making novelhood not simply a 
matter of fiction but of the imbrication of the fiction into the “matériellement vrai,” as it is in the 
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historical novel. This shift shows the difficulty of identifying the novel by its relation to facts, as the 
tax authorities had been instructed to do but as even the National Assembly knew they could not. 
 It also articulates what will be one of Nerval’s ongoing critiques of the literary 
establishment’s conception of fiction as plot. The very possibility of serving the sauce on a different 
plate than the fish in the historical novel is for Nerval an indicator of that genre’s limited 
understanding of fiction as unproblematically distinguishable from history.53 This limited view of 
fiction is paradoxically what underpins the mixing of history and fiction in the historical novel: the 
two modes can be combined only insofar as they are entirely distinct. There is no real confusion, no 
elision of the boundaries between vrai and faux in the culturally sanctioned form of the historical 
novel, the way there is in Nerval’s more radical conception of fiction. This was to be the irony of 
Nerval’s retort to Dumas in the dedication of Les Filles du feu three years later, when Nerval defended 
himself from Dumas’s claim that he lost touch with reality, by pointing up the merely technical 
confusion between true and false in Dumas’s own novels: “[vous] avez su si bien vous jouer avec 
nos chroniques et nos mémoires, que la postériorité ne saura plus démêler le vrai du faux, et 
chargera de vos inventions tous les personnages historiques que vous avez appelés à figurer dans vos 
romans” [“you so skillfully handled our chronicles and memoires, that posterity will be unable to 
distinguish true from false and will attribute your inventions to all of the historical figures you have 
called to appear in your novels”].54 Dumas does nothing to challenge the boundaries between history 
and fiction, but rather deploys a banal convention wherein fiction-as-plot mobilizes history-as-fact. 
The historical novel’s imbrication of fact and fiction is invoked by Nerval to challenge the law here, 
not because it is a real threat to Riancey’s logic, but because it is in fact underwritten by the same 
ideology of historical fact as the Riancey amendment itself. 
The complicity of the historical novel with the assumptions of the politicians is further 
articulated in the displacement of the historical novel’s terms operated by the racy memoirs of the 
abbé’s great-aunt Angélique. Whereas the amorous plot line would usually be the author’s 
embellishment of history (as it is when Nerval explains how to turn the abbé’s story into a novel, the 
“beau roman [qu’]on eût pu faire avec ces données” [“fine novel all this material could have made”]), 
in Angélique’s case, the racy love plot is the factually verifiable part, and it is the introduction of too 
many other facts that will make it start to look like a novel.55 The terms of the division between the 
historical element and the novelistic element (the fish and the sauce) are reversed here, and all the 
juicy romance (unimpeachably documented in letters and personal accounts) has to be protected 
from the incriminating introduction of local color. In mocking the strict conventions of plot in the 
historical novel, Nerval also mocks the National Assembly’s reliance on those conventions to 
identify the novel. His location of historical truth in the romance of Angélique’s story flies in the 
face of the logic the government had been using in implementing the Riancey amendment. One of 
its rules, already put into practice, for distinguishing the novel from other commonly serialized 
forms like criticism or historical studies was apocryphally summarized by an official in this way: “‘Ce 
qui constitue le feuilleton-roman, c’est la peinture de l’amour. Le mot roman vient de romance. Tirez la 
conclusion’” [“‘Serial novels have to do with the depiction of love. The word for novel, roman, 
derives from the word romance. Draw your own conclusion.’”].56 The politicians are onto the 
historical novelist’s tactics and know that love is the sign of plot and plot is the sign of the novel, 
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and the conclusion drawn by all about the nature of fictional narrative as romance is, as far as Nerval 
is concerned, “twaddle.”57 
Inverting romance’s relationship to documentable truth by thus making the love story a 
historical fact continues a challenge to the National Assembly’s division of fact and fiction that 
places romantic sentiment on the side of invention, a challenge Nerval begins even before Angélique 
is introduced, in terms silly enough to make his disdain palpable. He recounts a story he was told by 
the woman who runs a fair-ground attraction, about how the trained seal he saw at the Versailles fair 
the year before had to be replaced because he died of a broken heart when the daughter of the 
family left home to be married.58 The seal here cannot help but reference a feuilleton about Eskimos 
that had recently been taxed under the Press Law for its love story, and the displacement of the 
romance from people to animals is at once mirthful and scathing. There is love here, but it is not 
invented by the author: the story of the heart-broken seal is told by its owner as an explanation for 
the real necessity she faced of getting a new animal to show for her business—it had consequences 
in the realm of material facts that seem to guarantee its truth. This factual sentimentality of the seal 
sets up Angélique’s appearance, two installments later, so that Nerval’s constant insistence that her 
memoirs are not a historical novel is already inscribed in an ironic refusal to take the conflict 
between documentable fact and romance (fiction) seriously. 
Nerval’s use of Angélique’s memoirs in Les Faux Saulniers functions as a send-up of both the 
law and at least one of the novelistic forms it is meant to prohibit, insisting that history and fiction 
are less distinct than imagined by either tax officials or historical novelists. It cannot be a question of 
vindicating the novel against the factual logic of journalism, especially since, as we have seen, such a 
factual logic of journalism was not yet solidly established in 1850.59 The epistemology of journalistic 
space was much different in the mid-19th century than in the 20th century, let alone the 21st, and 
Nerval’s critique of the possibility of excluding fiction must be understood in the context of a 
journalistic discourse permeated with fiction of various kinds. This variety is elided, however, by the 
terms of the political crusade against the serial novel, where “fiction” becomes the sign of “novels,” 
which are themselves targeted as a way of getting at the content of certain novels, perceived as 
improperly political. The slippage between the novel and fiction in enforcing the Riancey 
amendment meant that the entire field of fictional journalistic writing, broadly construed, was to be 
the baby thrown out with the bathwater of the novel. What’s worse, the novel already had a stable 
position outside the newspaper in the literary culture of the 19th century, and would no doubt 
continue to thrive in book publication, while other forms of journalistic fiction risked being 
eliminated altogether. Nerval’s critique of the banality of the historical novel, which deploys a 
restricted notion of fiction as (a certain kind of) plot used to animate the raw materials of history in 
counterfactual ways, insists on the possibility of more vibrant models of fiction than this 
combination of narrative and historical banalities. In comparison to the multifarious, sometimes 
strange ways that fiction operated in the newspaper, the novel is for Nerval perhaps the least 
interesting victim of the Riancey amendment’s ban on fiction. 
Journalism can also be seen as a microcosm of the culture at large in Nerval’s thinking, and 
his vindication of the possibility of vital relationships between fact and fiction in the newspaper has 
everything to do with broader cultural transformations. Just as politics was to be protected from 
fiction in the newspaper, so politics was being cut off from imagination more broadly, as France 
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moved away from the visionary, utopian thinking of the early 1800s toward more fact-based 
approaches to its present and future. David Harvey insists that this was true not only of conservative 
elements but also of the culture more broadly: “It is undeniable that some sort of shift in sensibility 
occurred after 1848 in France that redefined what political struggle was about on both the left and 
the right. Socialism, for example, became much more ‘scientific’ (as Marx insisted), … while 
bourgeois thought became much more positivist, managerial, and tough-minded.”60 The pride of 
place given to imaginative discourses in shaping France’s future after the 1789 revolution was 
revoked after the disappointment of utopian hopes in 1848, and forms of modern, scientific 
thinking were increasingly given a monopoly on real world relevance. Thus Nerval battles in Les 
Faux Saulniers not only the conservative push to purify political discourse in the newspaper, but also 
a cultural trend toward relegating fiction and imagination to a closed, aesthetic space, exiling them 
from the real (the realm of action), which scientific thinking could then rule without challenge. 
The forms of fiction that were left without venue in the division of discourses into 
journalism and literature, fact and fiction, by the Riancey amendment were not only stories to be 
read, but relationships to the real capable of pushing back against the increasing hegemony of what 
Harvey identifies as “scientific” trends in thinking. In this regard, Nerval’s interest in them may at 
first glance seem to belong to a nostalgia for a lost Romanticism that dreamed of the imagination’s 
capacity to reshape the world. However, this Romantic nostalgia is troubled by the way his interest 
in these fictions is in fact inseparable from his challenge to authentic writing subjectivity (just as the 
Riancey amendment was inseparable from Tinguy in the July 1850 Press Law). In Nerval’s account, 
the subjectivity that was once at the foundation of Romanticism’s imagination has been made 
complicit in the real defeat of imagination by positivism, so that there can be no question of a 
return. Since a conception of authentic subjectivity has been used to prevent engagement with the 
imagination, the way back to imagination will have to be through a radicalization of fiction that 
erodes even that subjectivity. In this way, Nerval offers in Les Faux Saulniers a glimpse of a way 
forward for literature that is neither Romantic nor Realist (historical), but rather moves in an 
innovative way through the space that journalism once occupied between them. 
 
Popular Fiction 
It is through fiction’s less canonical forms that Nerval explores the vitality of imagination beyond 
the distinction between fact and fiction, and so the installments of Les Faux Saulniers are full of 
diffuse forms of story-telling that have no apparent relevance to the abbé or Riancey. The 
connection these many anecdotes have to Nerval’s position in this text lies in the way he vindicates 
them as fictions outside the novel, in more complex relation than the novel can accommodate to 
both factual, historical reality and dominant conceptions of “authentic” writing subjectivity. We 
might begin by returning to the seal. The story described earlier (the heartbroken seal) is told directly 
to Nerval by the woman whose seal it involves. In the context of the text, then, it is documentation 
of the woman’s testimony of her own experience. It is preceded, however, by another seal story 
(what Nerval calls an “anecdote” told by the Dutch) that functions differently, belonging instead to 
the realm of hearsay. The identifiable originator of the story, in which a seal repeatedly finds its way 
home after its fisherman owner releases it at sea to spare himself the cost of feeding it, is replaced by 
an entire country, and the story becomes attributable to “the Dutch” in general.61 Its character as a 
popular “legend” is only magnified by its similarity to the story of Hansel and Gretel, effectively 
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removing this story from the economy of verifiable truth to which the lovesick seal might still be 
held (humorously) accountable.62 
The legend of the intrepid seal belongs instead to a complex realm of popular belief, a 
proliferation of storytelling practices (including the freak show we saw in Chapter One), 
independent of properly literary genres and especially of the dominant literary conception of fiction. 
The legend is a form Nerval returns to often, giving it a rather expansive definition as we see, for 
example, during his visit to Ermenonville. There, Nerval receives the following information about 
one of the towers at the château: “Un paysan qui nous accompagnait nous dit : « Voici la tour où 
était enfermée la belle Gabrielle… tous les soirs Rousseau venait pincer de la guitare sous sa fenêtre, 
et le roi, qui était jaloux, le guettait souvent, et a fini par le faire mourir »” [“A peasant who was 
accompanying us said: ‘Here is the tower where Rousseau used to come and strum his guitar under 
her window, and the king, who was jealous, used to spy on him and had him killed in the end’”].63 
Conflating the 16th-century history of Henri IV and his mistress, Gabrielle d’Estrées, with the 18th-
century history of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the peasant has created a legend, which for Nerval is not 
at all the same as saying he has told a story that is untrue: 
 
Voilà pourtant comment se forment les légendes. Dans quelques centaines d’années, 
on croira cela.—Henri IV, Gabrielle et Rousseau sont les grands souvenirs du pays. 
On a confondu déjà,—à deux cent ans d’intervalle,—les deux souvenirs, et Rousseau 
devient peu à peu le contemporain de Henri IV. Comme la population l’aime, elle 
suppose que le roi a été jaloux de lui, et trahi par sa maîtresse—en faveur de 
l’homme sympathique aux races souffrantes. Le sentiment qui a dicté cette pensée est 
peut-être plus vrai qu’on ne croit.—Rousseau … a ruiné profondément l’édifice royal 
fondé par Henri. Tout a croulé. 
 
[This is how legends are born. Several centuries from now, this will be taken for 
fact.—Henri IV, Gabrielle and Rousseau are the major names that are remembered 
in this region. A mere two hundred years later, the memory of these two men has 
been conflated and Rousseau is gradually becoming a contemporary of Henri IV. 
Since Rousseau is beloved by the locals, they imagine that the king was jealous of 
him because his mistress preferred this man who felt so much sympathy for the 
sufferings of the oppressed. This imaginary scenario is perhaps truer than one might 
believe.—Rousseau … brought down the royal house founded by Henri. The entire 
edifice came tumbling down.]64 
 
This amalgamation of the key moments of the region’s history, retaining each character in his or her 
original position of oppressor, mistress or revolutionary, recounts the people’s sense of their past as 
an undifferentiated time of opposition to arbitrary power. In straying from the facts, Nerval 
suggests, the peasant has nonetheless said something true. This is not to claim that the truth of the 
legend is truer than the chronology it thwarts (though, given enough time, the one may overtake the 
other). Rather, two different modes of truth, two different functions that truth might serve, are at 
work here, each with its own value. 
 The unique truth-value of the legend is importantly not the truth-value of fiction as we 
commonly understand it, and exists in an importantly different relation to its other: scientific fact. 
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When we talk about novels, we say that they ring true, though we know the characters and events in 
them do not have any empirical existence outside the text. In popular belief, however, we are not 
dealing with suspension of disbelief; we are dealing with real belief that does not, for some reason, 
come into conflict with other knowledge or belief about the world with which it seems 
incompatible. The stories Nerval deploys as “legend” put fiction in a different relation to belief than 
the dominant forms of modern literature that retreat into a separate sphere, leaving unchecked the 
dominance of scientific fact as the truth of reality. These forms of popular belief do not simply 
constitute an idealistic refusal of the modern or of scientific truth, but rather place that mode of 
truth in relationship to others. Such structures of belief are like those discussed in Les Grecs ont-il cru à 
leurs mythes? [Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?], where Paul Veyne refuses to see truth as 
perfectible, a development in which new, more “sophisticated” forms of truth are unproblematically 
superior to older, less “sophisticated” ones. He argues that truth is not natural or objective, but 
constituted by the imagination, making it impossible to pit different modes of truth against each 
other from the outside; the degree of truth of each one depends entirely on its context.65 If truth is 
socially constructed in this way, rather than sought out in its object with ever-increasing accuracy, 
then the scientific model of truth as constantly progressing and correcting itself is only one 
conception among others, and certainly not the most intuitive.66 In this way of thinking, folk belief 
does not appear as a form of stupid backwardness, a refusal to embrace the truth of science, but 
rather as an alternate form of truth that, in the modern world, coexists with that of the scientific 
fetishization of fact. 
Most important for Veyne’s argument and for ours is the possibility of the coexistence of 
multiple modes of truth, even within the same individual. There is no reason, Veyne claims, to think 
that only through bad faith can one person believe things that answer to different conceptions of 
truth. On the contrary, people live more often than not in states of dual belief: “Notre esprit ne se 
met pas au supplice quand, semblant se contredire, il change subrepticement de programme de 
vérité et d’intérêt, comme il le fait sans cesse ; ce n’est pas là de l’idéologie : c’est notre façon d’être la 
plus habituelle” [“Our mind does not torment itself when, seeming to contradict itself, it suddenly 
changes systems of truth and interest, as it does constantly; this isn’t ideology: it is our most habitual 
way of being”].67 The combination of the historically accurate and the historically inaccurate in the 
peasant’s legend of Rousseau and Gabrielle is characteristic of the structures of myth that elicit this 
kind of dual belief.68 The legend elicits real belief from people, though elements of it are false 
according to the mode of scientific and historical truth in which those people simultaneously believe. 
Popular belief thus operates as a kind of fiction that is not relegated to the closed space of a 
suspension of disbelief, but that coexists with other forms of truth. It is the story Nerval hears about 
the former head librarian’s ghost ringing the new librarian’s doorbell at the Arsenal Library: that 
ghost is real enough to Nerval to have material effects, to keep him from going to the Arsenal (“Et 
j’irais, moi, tirer cette même sonnette !... Qui sait si ce n’est pas le fantôme qui m’ouvrira ?” [“And I 
was about to go ring this same bell! … Who knows whether the ancient ghost himself might not 
greet me at the door?”]), though his humor insists that it is not a complete break with the sort of 
rationality that dictates the impossibility of such a haunting.69 
 This mode of fiction characteristic of popular belief does not originate in the newspaper but 
is certainly no stranger to it. Indeed, when the mechanism of legend encounters commerce, it 
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emerges in the form of the freak show or the tabloid—two phenomena in which Nerval shows a 
lively interest.70 The journalistic canard is the epitome of the encounter between popular belief and 
the press, as Nerval explores in the 1844 article “Histoire véridique du canard” [“The True Story of 
the Canard”], where he lays out the whole history of counterfactual legends as the canard’s pre-
history. From Herodotus’ men with tails, through the Biblical Ixion, and up to Fourier’s future men 
with trunks, “Les histoires de tous les peuples ont commencé par des canards. Le canard est la base 
des religions” [“The histories of all peoples began with canards. The canard is the basis of 
religions”].71 These stories—of sea monsters and Big Foot, of Latin-speaking fish being taken to 
meet the Pope—have always challenged the limits of belief according to a standard of factual 
possibility, and yet they compel people and solicit a kind of belief that accounts for their durability. 
They do not originate with the newspaper, but do in some ways find their culmination in it, as the 
newspaper provides a forum for large-scale public engagement with them, as we see in Nerval’s 
account of what he deems the first canard published in a newspaper: 
 
Le premier canard répandu par les journaux a été la dent d’or. Un enfant était né 
avec une dent d’or ; le fait fut constaté, prouvé, étudié par les académies ; on publia 
des mémoires pour et contre.—Plus tard il fut reconnu que la dent était seulement 
plaquée ; mais personne ne voulut croire à cette explication. 
 
[The first canard spread by newspapers was the golden tooth. A child had been born 
with a golden tooth; the fact was stated, proven, studied by scholars; reports were 
published for and against.—Later it was admitted that the tooth was only plated; but 
no one wanted to believe this explanation.]72 
 
The baby’s gold tooth engaged the scientific authorities in a battle over the truth of the 
phenomenon—but it was a battle they could not possibly win, no matter what their answer, because 
the truth of the story would never be scientific. Even though they definitively proved that the tooth 
was only gold-plated, the public at large did not want to believe this explanation because it ultimately 
had nothing to do with their belief in the story.73 
These stories, like the legends to which they are related, act as a productive cultural force, 
populating the social world with the shared symbols and allegories by which the people constitutes 
                                                
70 The fair at Versailles with its trained seal in this text prefigures the woman with Merino wool for hair at the Meaux 
freakshow in Les Nuits d’octobre (Œuvres complètes, 3:342-44). See Chapter One. 
71 “Histoire véridique du canard” in Œuvres complètes, 1:854-55. 
72 Ibid., 856. 
73 It is worth noting that Nerval expresses, in the “Histoire véridique du canard,” a scorn for the papers who all but steal 
the nickels of honest people by selling these stories: “Le canard est une nouvelle quelquefois vraie, toujours exagérée, 
souvent fausse. Ce sont les détails d’un horrible assassinat, illustré parfois de gravures en bois d’un style naïf ; c’est un 
désastre, un phénomène, une aventure extraordinaire ; on paie cinq centimes et l’on est volé. Heureux encore ceux dont 
l’esprit plus simple peut conserver l’illusion” [“The canard is a story that is sometimes true, always exaggerated, often 
false. It is the account of a horrible killing, occasionally illustrated with naïve wood engravings; it is a disaster, a 
phenomenon, an extraordinary adventure; people pay five cents and are swindled. Happy are those whose simpler minds 
are able to preserve the illusion.”] (Ibid., 854). We see here the conventional degree of contempt for the canard, that 
trusty tool for hoodwinking the reading public. And yet this concern seems above all parroted, given the fascination the 
rest of the article shows for this timeless fictional form. The irony of the objection comes, perhaps, from its assumption 
that only a fool would be able to “conserver l’illusion” [“preserve the illusion”] held out by the canard. In order to think 
that tabloid stories wrong their readers, one must think that those readers are being tricked into believing something that 
is simply not true. But, as we have seen, the believer of this kind of story need not be a victim, led astray from truth by a 
talking fish; the lovers of canard journalism participate, on the contrary, in the complex form of dual belief characteristic 
of popular legend, believing in it even as they know it is not, in some sense, true. 
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its own truth, becoming (like Kaspar Hauser and the brigand Schubry) “réels à force d’avoir été 
inventés” [“real by virtue of having been invented”].74 They are what Michel de Certeau identifies as 
superstition, which must be distinguished from rumeur (rumor). While rumor propagates beliefs that 
enforce the dominant order, the stories of superstition trouble and complicate that order: 
 
Par les procès de dissémination qu’ils ouvrent, les récits s’opposent à la rumeur car la 
rumeur est toujours injunctive, instauratrice et conséquence d’un nivellement de 
l’espace, créatrice de mouvements communs qui renforcent un ordre en ajoutant un 
faire-croire au faire-faire. Les récits diversifient, les rumeurs totalisent. 
 
[Because of the process of dissemination that they open up, stories differ from rumors 
in that the latter are always injunctions, initiators and results of a leveling of space, 
creators of common movements that reinforce an order by adding an activity of 
making people believe things to that of making people do things. Stories diversify, 
rumors totalize.]75 
 
It is, for us twenty-first century readers, intuitive to associate newspapers with the ideological 
coherence of modernity that was becoming more and more inescapable in the mid-19th century, 
eradicating traditional culture. And so it is also intuitive to understand the canard as a form of 
rumor, using the public’s petty gullibility to insinuate the social order even further into readers’ lives. 
But Nerval suggests that there remained in the newspaper, in 1850, the last glimmers of a real 
superstition, of popular stories that opposed the dominant order and provided alternatives to it.76 By 
subjecting political newspapers to an ambiguous formal prohibition against “the novel,” the Riancey 
amendment also threatened to do away with these other forms of fiction that had nothing to do with 
the roman-feuilleton. Given the impossibility of absolutely determining the limits of the novel except 
using the criterion of fictionality, Nerval is critical of the new law’s tendency to eliminate any stories 
from the news that are not scientifically documentable—something which may make sense to us 
today as readers of an ostensibly informationalized and factualized press, but which marked a real 
transformation of the press in 1850, and a real impoverishment as far as Nerval was concerned. The 
Riancey amendment participated in a relegation of fiction to a closed, literary space—an 
autonomization of literature. Nerval’s response to the constraint of the Press Law that made 
autonomization not only possible but necessary points to the broader spectrum of fiction whose 
place in public discourse was effectively eliminated in this distribution of fact and fiction between 
the newspaper and the novel. Doing away with fiction in the press meant doing away with a crucial 
site of these forms of popular storytelling, which refused the absolute authority of modern, scientific 
ideology in ways that the novel did not. 
 We need not think of this extinction of popular fiction as an accidental or unwanted 
byproduct of the Press Law, just because it was not one of the law’s stated aims. As we have seen, 
one of the central rationales for marginalizing fiction, according to the supporters of the Riancey 
amendment, was the potential of the novel to espouse political ideas, circumventing the proper 
channels of political discourse. The elimination of popular fiction that Nerval identifies as an 
unintended consequence of the new law was not, then, inconsistent with the law’s intentions. For 
the proponents of a press composed of more straightforward political rhetoric, the forms of popular 
                                                
74 Ibid., 860. 
75 L’invention du quotidien, 161/The Practice of Everyday Life, 107. 
76 For a fascinating account of the importance of the canard to literary sociability around 1830, and its relation to belief, 
see Filip Kekus, “Du Canard Romantique.” 
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fiction and fictionalized news that made up liminal journalistic genres represented another form of 
discourse that could not be easily controlled and monitored, that worked through narrative to 
produce its own brand of truth. Not only that, but popular fictions partook in their own way in the 
problem of authentic authorial subjectivity that concerned the National Assembly. Like the 
collective authorship of journalistic writing, popular fictions had diffuse origins, unattributable to a 
single, authenticating individual: they spoke in a collective voice.77 
 
Authorial Fiction 
The problem of fiction, then, meets up with the problem of subjective authenticity brought to light 
by the Tinguy amendment. Narrative fictions of various kinds (signed or unsigned) appear as 
another way around an injunction to speak one’s opinions directly, in one’s own name. Nerval 
makes this connection palpable in his insistence on the way that the historical truth of what is being 
written requires an identifiable speaking subject to guarantee it. He emphasizes the privilege of the 
first person singular, in the context of the dual restrictions of Riancey-Tinguy, as a unique form of 
writing that does not require any research or any documentation to be truthful. It is in the absence 
of documents, Nerval explains, that he is compelled to write Les Faux Saulniers in the first person to 
begin with, rather than as a third-person étude historique (historical study) like the others in the series. 
When, in the fifth installment, he is still narrating his own search rather than the abbé’s life, he 
excuses himself with the following explanation: 
 
Je suis encore obligé de parler de moi-même et non de l’abbé de Bucquoy. La 
compensation est mince. Il faut cependant que le public admette que l’impossibilité 
où nous sommes d’écrire du roman nous oblige à devenir les héros des aventures qui 
nous arrivent journellement, comme à tout homme,—et dont l’intérêt est sans doute 
fort contestable le plus souvent. 
 
[I am obliged to ramble on about myself without getting to the abbé de Bucquoy. 
Small consolation indeed. But our audience will have to admit that given the 
impossibility of writing a novel, we shall have to become the hero of those adventures 
that befall us every day, as they do every man,—and whose interest is admittedly 
often quite limited.]78  
                                                
77 This collectivity was in fact a feature they shared with the roman-feuilleton, whose reading practices and aesthetics often 
differed significantly from the novel in volume publication and might help explain why it was seen as being so 
dangerous. Because of their broad circulation in daily papers that reached households of various classes and political 
orientations, serialized novels suffused the culture and became a feature of its sociability (Thérenty, La littérature au 
quotidien, 51-52. For more on shifts in reading culture, see Alan, In the Public Eye). The roman-feuilleton was able to 
participate in the lives of its readers on a daily basis, not only through a private activity of reading, but as a shared 
cultural object, a subject of collective discussion and reflection. It also treated characters much closer to the people most 
of its readers knew in the real world than the characters of traditional novels, and the timing of its writing was often 
nearly simultaneous with its publication, giving it a very literal immediacy. The world of the novel was so close in so 
many ways, in fact, that reader sought to intervene in it, writing letters to novelists to try to influence the development of 
the plot. Eugène Sue’s almost day-by-day writing of his serialized novels made it possible for readers to participate in the 
composition by sending their opinions on the story’s development. Readers were even moved to contribute their own 
stories to the novel: Sue drew on the stories readers recounted to him in their letters, using them in his novels and so 
advocating for his readers in real time, so to speak, by revealing their plights (Blanc, Nerval in the Newspaper, 20). The 
novel produced in this way represents not only Sue’s individual creative genius but also the lives of thousands of readers, 
making it a collective epic, just as the canard has the potential to invoke a broader social discourse in which different 
conceptions of truth are negotiated. For more on the centrality of reader contributions to popular novel forms like the 
serial, see Olivier-Martin, Histoire du roman populaire, 36. 
78 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:28/The Salt Smugglers, 24. 
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The protagonist of the third person account he intended to write is not yet proven to have the 
weight of an historical individual, and so the author is forced to step in as hero, lending his own 
being to his still dubious subject. The quest for documentation in Les Faux Saulniers reveals itself as a 
quest for a protagonist who could be one; we must remember that what allows Angélique to step in 
as protagonist for several installments are her memoirs, a first person account of her life. What 
protects her from being identified as the heroine of a taxable historical novel is the simple fact that, 
in the source documents and sometimes in Nerval’s text itself, she speaks in her own name; “her 
implicit integrity and the authenticity of her voice” act as guarantors of truth for the story.79 She, like 
Nerval himself, is cast into the spotlight by the Riancey amendment’s prohibition of fiction. 
This exposure of the writing “I” doubles that of the Tinguy amendment’s call for articles 
signed by their individual authors. The call for signatures is, as Nerval interprets it in a theater 
column in La Presse earlier that fall, an injunction to write in the first person singular, to the 
detriment of journalism.80 The prohibition of the collective voice (the journalistic nous) has resulted, 
he laments, in a foregrounding of the individual writer in the text: “Depuis que la loi oblige tout 
journaliste de signer ses articles, la personnalité de chaque écrivain risque de se développer outre 
mesure. Sans être forcé peut-être de raconter son histoire, on se voit néanmoins conduit à poser 
davantage devant le lecteur” [“Since the law requires all journalists to sign their articles, the 
personality of each writer runs the risk of developing out of control. Though perhaps not forced to 
tell his story, one nonetheless finds oneself driven to pose for the reader more and more”].81 The 
writer has been made visible so that he can be accountable for what he writes, but this turns into an 
obligation to stage himself for readers. The individual subject takes on an undue importance here so 
that even when the writer isn’t writing about himself, the text is always at risk of being overrun by 
his personality. Nerval’s response to this dilemma in the column is to try to defuse it by facing it head 
on. If the law requires it, he says, “Prenons donc, pour l’essayer un instant, ce terrible moi de 
Montaigne et de Pascal, qu’on ne peut faire supporter que par le génie—ou par l’influence 
inattaquable d’une honnête sincérité” [“So, in order to try it out, let’s adopt this terrible self of 
Montaigne and Pascal, that can be made bearable only by genius—or by the unassailable influence of 
an honest sincerity”].82 Rather than allowing the je to suffuse the text with its personality, Nerval 
opts to “raconter son histoire” [“tell his story”] directly, giving an account of his career as a 
journalist. His ostentatious response to the demands of the law is to ironically adopt precisely the 
“honnête sincérité” of which the National Assembly dreamed. 
The approach he takes in this column in many ways prefigures the approach he takes in Les 
Faux Saulniers, where he is, for the complex reasons we have been exploring, obliged to “devenir le 
héros.” Nerval chooses to adopt an epistolary form in the feuilleton, making the person of the writer 
(as well as the person of the directeur to whom he writes) palpably present throughout and 
emphasizing the text’s attribution to an identifiable individual. Though the typographical 
conventions of the letter are not applied to the feuilleton as a whole, the first installment is explicitly 
addressed “Au Directeur du « National »” (“To the Director of the National”), and the writing je is in 
constant relation to the recipient vous.83 The relationship of a disembodied writer, writing to a reader 
                                                
79 Blanc, Nerval in the Newspaper, 146. 
80 “Théâtres,” La Presse, September 30, 1850, 2:1199-1207. 
81 Ibid., 1199-1200. 
82 Ibid., 1200. 
83 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:3. . Of course, many of Nerval’s columns and other journalistic writing are 
marked by the presence of an addressee (as when he publishes a letter to Théophile Gautier in the Journal de 
Constantinople), but more often than not this addressee is the reading public (the readers themselves)—the readers with 
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who can only be imagined (that literary relation of two subjects entirely abstract for one another) is 
supplanted by a concrete relationship between two well-defined subjects.84 The form of the writing 
gives body, in a certain sense, to the communicative act at work within it, insisting on a literalness of 
the relation marked not only by the identity of the writer, as the Tinguy amendment proposed, but 
also by the identity of the addressee. Nerval seems to one-up the law with his letter form, explicitly 
short-circuiting all of the ineffability of address characteristic of journalism (and, we must also 
remark, literature more broadly) with a particular, occasional structure of address.85 By 
foregrounding an obsessive concern with the danger of this exchange of writing—with the possible 
consequences of his feuilleton for the director—Nerval keeps this real relationship between two real 
people adamantly present throughout Les Faux Saulniers. Through his defensiveness, he constantly 
consolidates the writing subject in precisely the terms in which the law imagines it. 
This is perhaps most evident in two strange digressions in the text in which Nerval defends 
himself against criticisms of his previous writing, apparently entirely unconnected to the abbé. It is 
in the terms of the criticisms and his defense that some connection to the rest of the text can be 
found, in the emphasis on the kinds of authorial authenticity demanded by the law. In the first of 
these digressions, Nerval defends himself against the accusation of having changed political stripes.86 
The newspaper Le Corsaire has claimed that Nerval used to write for L’Esprit public, a paper whose 
Republican politics vary significantly from those of the oppositional National. Nerval claims, 
however, that similar names have caused a mix up: “Il y a eu, dans les renseignements qu’a pu 
prendre le rédacteur du Corsaire, confusion entre deux noms. Je ne suis pas ce même M. Gérard 
[…]” [“Whoever wrote the piece in the Corsaire confused my name with someone else’s. I am not the 
same M. Gérard […]”].87 Nerval’s own use of the signature Gérard early in his career has made a 
mess here, allowing him to be mistaken for a M. Gérard, “auquel mon nom a pu faire du tort dans 
son parti, comme le sien risquerait de m’en faire aujourd’hui,—si j’appartenais à un parti” [“whom I 
suppose my name could have hurt in his party affiliations, just as his seems to be affecting me 
today,—that is, if I indeed belonged to a political party”]. The bind Nerval finds himself in here is 
precisely the one the Tinguy amendment was intended to avoid.88 And indeed, he defends himself in 
terms the National Assembly might approve of, assuring readers of the consistency of his (lack of) 
political commitments and even going so far as to justify the only ongoing professional engagement 
he has had with the government (a long battle with the theater censor in 1839). When his integrity as 
a journalist comes under attack in Le Corsaire, he reacts to protect it, showing himself to be an 
authentic writing subject, the journalist of the Tinguy amendment. 
                                                                                                                                                       
whom Nerval is engaged week-to-week, article-to-article, in a sort of “causerie” (“Théâtres,” La Presse, September 30, 
1850 in Œuvres complètes, 2:1201). 
84 Even if the director never speaks directly, Nerval allows us to infer some communication from him, at least in 
forwarding letters from readers: “Vous m’envoyez deux lettres[…]” [“You have forwarded onto me two letters […]”] 
(Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:85/The Salt Smugglers, 64). 
85 This potentiality of the epistolary form to create vivid specificity and reality for its two implied characters is one that 
Nerval had already experimented with by the time he wrote Les Faux Saulniers. Indeed, the epistolary texts that are 
known, following Jacques Bony’s classification, as the “Essais romanesques,” are remarkable precisely for the degree to 
which they create a sense of the real existence of their addressee, in a very concrete relation to their writer. These texts 
from the early 1840s, including “Les Amours de Vienne,” “Un roman à faire” and “Le Roman tragique” take the form 
of love letters. The case of the “Lettres d’amour” is particularly interesting: the beloved addressed in these letter is so 
little the abstract muse of love poetry that scholars long took these letters for ‘real’ love letters addressed to Jenny Colon, 
the woman Nerval is believed to have loved, and failed to recognize them as part of Nerval’s engagement with the 
fictional potential of the epistolary. For the classic refutation of this literal reading of the “Lettres d’amour,” see 
Bomboir, “Les Lettres d’amour de Nerval : mythe ou réalité ?” 
86 “Réponse au Corsaire,” Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:28-39. 
87 Ibid., 29/25. Translation modified. 
88 Ibid. Translation modified. 
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In a parallel defensive digression, he stages himself as a serious historian, compliant with the 
Riancey amendment.89 Here Nerval responds to an article in La Presse, written by Auguste Bernard 
of the National Printing Works, claiming that the account Nerval has given elsewhere of the history 
of printing was mere fable (tall tale): “On me reproche d’avoir, dans un article signalé spirituel (triste 
compensation : nous avons tous de l’esprit, en France) ; on me reproche, dis-je, d’avoir écrit, il y a 
deux mois, des fables,—en parlant de la découverte de l’imprimerie” [“I have been accused, in an 
article of mine deemed quite witty (not much of consolation, this: here in France, everybody is a wit), 
accused, I say, of having told some tall tales some two months ago,—while discussing the invention 
of printing”].90 The importance attributed to this accusation is surprising given that Bernard’s 
dismissal of Nerval’s account was only a sentence long, and yet it makes perfect sense when we see 
how closely this accusation maps onto the terms of the Riancey amendment, with its concern for 
historical veracity. The quicksand-like danger of the law becomes visible here, as fable (awfully close 
to fiction) is used to describe what might also be thought of as simply inadequate history: 
 
[C]eci me fait courir un nouveau danger.—Ainsi, je tenterais de faire de l’histoire sur 
des récits vagues ;—je me livrerais à des fables;—je serais capable d’écrire des 
romans!—Allez plus loin ; dénoncez-moi à la commission chargée de qualifier nos 
feuilletons et d’y découvrir le vrai ou le faux,—selon les termes de l’amendement 
Riancey […] 
 
[I am still navigating through dangerous waters.—I stand accused of turning vague 
hearsay into history, of indulging in fables or worse, of perpetrating novels!—Well, why 
not just go all the way! Go ahead, denounce me to the commissioners whose 
business it is,—faithful to the stipulations of the Riancey amendment […]]91 
 
If the last time he meant to write history, he wrote a tall tale, Nerval jokes, they might as well 
condemn his feuilleton now. Even in his humor here, Nerval seems to acquiesce to the logic of the 
Riancey amendment; Bernard’s characterization of his writing, however offhand it might have been, 
is answered with (mock) seriousness as part of Les Faux Saulniers’ ostentatious obsequiousness to the 
law. And so a new history is given, in an apparent attempt to vindicate Nerval as a historian, as a 
subject of authorized writing. In these twin responses to Le Corsaire and Auguste Bernard, Nerval 
brings to the surface the axes along which his authorial je is officially constituted and makes a show 
of valuing them, protecting them. Constantly obliged, as he says, to talk about himself (“Je suis 
encore obligé de parler de moi-même et non de l’abbé de Bucquoy” [“I am obliged to ramble on 
about myself without getting to the abbé de Bucquoy “]92), he aggressively asserts that self as the 
National Assembly’s paragon of journalistic integrity. 
It might be tempting, then, to see Nerval forced by the Press Law into assuming the je (the 
writing of the self in the first person) that will be associated with his later work.93 But the irony that 
                                                
89 “Réponse à M. Auguste Bernard,” Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:47-50/The Salt Smugglers, 38-39. 
90 Ibid., 48-49/38. 
91 Ibid., 48/38. 
92 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:28/The Salt Smugglers, 24. 
93 It is very much in this sense of a progression toward authentic self-expression that Bony understands the importance 
Les Faux Saulniers, where the given constraint obliges him to tell himself. Nonetheless, Bony’s study of Le récit nervalien is 
invaluable, particularly for its insistence on Nerval as an intentional, rather than purely symptomatic, writer; Bony writes, 
“Ce Nerval-là, cet écrivain lucide, est un artisan, un travailleur de la poétique, on ne l’a pas assez dit, peut-être parce qu’il 
ne le dit guère lui même” [“This Nerval, this lucid writer, is an artisan, a poetic laborer, which has not been remarked 
often enough, perhaps because he rarely says it himself”] (20). Bony analyzes the development of Nerval’s narrative 
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runs rampant in this text is indeed self-ironizing—not in the limited sense in which it is sometimes 
read, but in a radical sense of ironizing the selfhood of the writing subject altogether.94 The je that 
Nerval adamantly assumes in the course of the text is more fraught than it presents itself as being, 
and is in a highly problematic relation to what we might think of as Nerval-himself, or an 
“authentic” subject. This ambivalence is evident in Les Faux Saulniers’ treatment of Rousseau, that 
great writer of the self who cannot help but be evoked by the insistence on a supposedly integral 
“I.” Rousseau epitomizes both the confessional staging of the writing subject and the fictional use of 
the first person in the epistolary form that Nerval deploys in Les Faux Saulniers, and so the text’s 
ongoing gestures to him seem another guarantee of the kind of authentic je at stake. And yet, though 
Rousseau haunts the text, he is conspicuously missing from the tradition of first person writing in 
which Nerval ironically inscribes himself: “Prenons donc, pour l’essayer un instant, ce terrible moi 
de Montaigne et de Pascal…” [“So, in order to try it out, let’s adopt this terrible self of Montaigne 
and Pascal”].95 In one installment, Nerval even sets out to pay homage to Rousseau by visiting his 
tomb, but the ghost never materializes. The tomb, as it turns out, is empty: “Accomplissons le 
pèlerinage que nous nous sommes promis de faire, non pas près de ses cendres, qui reposent au 
Panthéon,—mais près de son tombeau” [“Let us pursue the pilgrimage that we promised ourselves 
to undertake: it shall lead us not to his mortal remains,—which are enshrined in the Pantheon,—but 
rather to the original site of his tomb”].96 With a tomb and no earthly remains, the site of pilgrimage 
to pay homage to the most ostentatious of “I”s is nothing but the inscription of a name: what 
remains of the man (his ashes) is elsewhere. If Rousseau seemed to underwrite an authentic bond 
between a name (a je) and a real subject, his absence from the text in all but name thus emphasizes 
that that bond has been broken.97 
It is in the spirit of this disjuncture between the writing subject and a real individual who 
could authenticate it that, amidst his insistence on the integrity of his journalistic subject, Nerval 
practices a constant alienation of that subject. While some of his apparent digressions lead us to a 
consolidation of the je (as in the defenses against Le Corsaire and Auguste Bernard), others efface the 
je in favor of other speakers. As Richard Sieburth observes, “even as we think we have entered into 
the quotidian intimacy of our narrator, … the Nervalien “I” keeps slipping through our fingers, lost 
in the labyrinth of the Archive, its voice receding into the intertextual murmur of the Library of 
Babel.”98 The number of voices we hear in the first-person narrative Les Faux Saulniers is baffling: 
there is, as I have discussed, Angélique de Longueval speaking for herself in excerpts from her 
memoirs, but also her first suitor writing her a love letter, and her cousin recounting the end of her 
life. There is the lovesick seal’s owner telling its story, and the seal’s audience discussing its 
performance. There is the peasant explaining the significance of Gabrielle’s tower, and the Valois 
peasantry singing songs, as well as Nerval’s childhood friend Sylvain summarizing a play he wrote. 
There is d’Argenson reporting on police activity, and Pontchartrain commenting on it, and even the 
prefect of Paris writing to evict Nerval. There is the abbé’s aunt petitioning for his exoneration, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
practice as it passes through dominant narrative forms, moving toward the strange autobiography of the first-person 
texts toward which Nerval turns after 1850. While Bony’s conception of Nerval’s career as a quest for the appropriate 
form in which to recount the self leads him at times awfully close to the vision of Nerval as a personality in search of a 
form that he is trying to avoid, his taking Nerval seriously as a writer even in the early narrative work is very fruitful; see 
Le récit nervalien. 
94 Cf. Bony, Le récit nervalien, 219. 
95 “Théâtres,” La Presse, September 30, 1850 in Œuvres complètes, 2:1200. 
96 Les Faux Saulniers in Œuvres complètes, 2:91/The Salt Smugglers, 68. 
97 For a thorough and insightful reading of the ways Nerval deploys Rousseau in his writing at various stages of his 
career, including in Les Faux Saulniers/Angélique, see Streiff Moretti, Le Rousseau de Gérard de Nerval. 
98 “Translator’s Postscript” to The Salt Smugglers, 146. 
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finally the abbé himself denouncing arbitrary authority. On and on, these characters’ voices spring 
up in the text, displacing Nerval’s own voice. Chambers places this phenomenon of “elocutionary 
disappearance” at the center of his reading of Les Faux Saulniers, or rather, of its later iteration, 
“Angélique”: 
 
We will see that the source of “Angelique”’s oppositionality as writing lies in its 
textual mimesis of melancholy as the “elocutionary disappearance” [...] of the 
individual self, replaced by an errant, nomadic textual subject whose voice melds into 
the text as “collective enunciation,” as his uncentered identity fuses with the 
wanderings of temporality.99 
 
As it turns out, whenever we are not looking, the adamant je of Les Faux Saulniers is giving voice to a 
quite different subject: to all and sundry, to an indiscriminately inclusive nous. What’s more, even 
when the je seems to be itself, it is only performing as protagonist in place of the abbé, who can’t be 
staged directly. In subjecting himself to and also constantly trying to evade the July 1850 Press Law, 
Nerval is perhaps the most accurate, legal depiction possible of the abbé de Bucquoy, who was 
constantly trying to escape from prison, though he was never arrested for crimes he had actually 
committed. The writing subject of Les Faux Saulniers is thus never just itself, but becomes the site of 
the forbidden fiction, the story it set out to tell. 
For Chambers, this dislocation of the writing subject constitutes its suicide, participating in 
what he calls the “melancholic epistemology” of the work, organized around the central absence of a 
subject.100 Yet we might follow Chambers in his identification of the collective voice generated 
(preserved) in the text without understanding this as a mark of destruction, as a painful departure 
from the ideals of Romanticism. On the contrary, as we have seen, forms of collective subjectivity 
are very much at stake in the transformation faced by journalistic writing in 1850. Both a strictly 
journalistic collective voice (Tinguy’s pesky nous) and the voice of popular (counter-factual) belief 
were being purged from the press during this period. In this context, the kind of “authentic writing 
subject” we might assume to be the desirable sort for writers (and certainly those still influenced by 
Romanticism and Rousseauism) shows itself to be much more fraught. We see the ideological stakes, 
beyond an ideal of self-expression, that are bound up in an emphasis on writing in the first person. 
By placing Nerval within the journalistic universe where such ambivalences are in play, we make 
possible a positive reading of the strange “elocutionary disappearance” of Les Faux Saulniers. The je 
may be compromised here, but it is compromised in favor of a collective voice that is at risk of 
expulsion from the discursive space of journalism, and so from the modern public sphere more 
broadly, a collective voice that generates its own truths alongside the facts put forth by the 
government. Les Faux Saulniers appears, then, not “in terms of a melancholic epistemology—an 
epistemology of loss, unavailability, episodicity, and deferment” through the tension of writing-
while-not-writing a roman-feuilleton, but rather as a recovery, within and against the constraints of the 
law, of the unique journalistic epistemology the National Assembly wanted to destroy.101 This 
collective fiction belongs neither to the modern, informational journalistic discourse that was being 
consolidated during the mid-19th century, nor to the novel that was retreating into an autonomous 
literary space. It is, in the culturally dominant definition of the terms, neither fact nor fiction, but a 
deployment of both to create a mode of fictional discourse that their separation has excluded. The 
subjectivity that lay at the origin of literature for Romanticism is here but a mask in a fiction freed 
                                                
99 Room for Maneuver, 115. 
100 Ibid., 117. 
101 Ibid. 
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from its reduction to plot and restored to its full cultural importance. The faux saulnage (salt 
smuggling, but literally salt counterfeiting) that goes on in the text is not the abbé’s, but Nerval’s 
own—though not in the sense in which some scholars have understood this, as a smuggling into the 
feuilleton of the forbidden novel. What is smuggled in the text is a fiction that opposes both the 
National Assembly and the novel, both the political and the literary authority: a collective subject that 
cannot be reduced to the je for which it passes itself off. This collective subject is not, as I will show 
in Chapter Four, unique to Les Faux Saulniers, but is rather a crucial feature of Nerval’s poetics more 
broadly. In its poly-vocality and intertextuality, this subject expands to include not only the writing 
but also the reading subject, and so to make of the literary text the kind of collective performance 
we saw in Sylvie’s festivals, a fictional practice far more vital than the novelistic one targeted by the 
Press Law.
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Chapter Four 
Performing Authorship 
Les Illuminés and Les Chimères 
 
 
Il était à la fois tous les artistes qu’il avait étudiés et 
tous les livres qu’il avait lus, et cependant, en dépit de 
cette faculté comédienne, il restait 
profondément original. 
 
[All at once he was every artist he had studied and 
every book he had read, and yet, despite that actor’s 
gift, he remained deeply original.] 
  
Baudelaire, La Fanfarlo1 
 
 
Anti-Lyric and Poetic Innovation  
Our readings thus far have created a picture of Nerval that radically differs from the canonical one.  
The canonical Nerval may vary slightly from one reading to the next, but is universally read in a 
lyrical mode: perhaps this is why we know him as a poet despite the fact that poems represent a tiny 
fraction of his writing. The self-expressive Nerval is the best-known one, the one that seems to 
reveal himself in first-person texts like Sylvie and Aurélia, as well as the sonnets of Les Chimères [The 
Chimeras]. It is generally agreed that his is a troubled subject—whether for biographical reasons of 
madness and confinement, or for textual reasons of fragmentation and instability—and that his 
troubled subject is always oriented toward its (impossible) recovery. Even at the moments when 
lyricism breaks down, it remains the primary point of reference for reading Nerval. In canonical 
readings, the je is the thing: both the origin and the goal of Nerval’s writing. In this sense, Nerval 
scholarship has served as a privileged bastion of Idealist-Romantic literary ideals over the past 
century and a half, despite occasional suggestions that Nerval’s writing might have a complicated 
relationship to Romanticism.2 His links to the German tradition in particular are used to justify a 
                                                
1 In Le Spleen de Paris. La Fanfarlo, 41/Fanfarlo, 7. Other translations are my own except where noted. 
2 We might think here of readings like those in Bénichou’s hugely influential Romantismes français: Bénichou’s thoughtful 
and erudite reflections on Nerval’s literary ambitions take into account his break with the hopes of High Romanticism à 
la Hugo, but ultimately situates the significance of his literary choices in his biography and privileges apparently 
autobiographical texts like “Octavie” and Aurélia, so that the authorial subject remains the be-all and end-all of the 
reading; see, in particular, L’École du désenchantement. 
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generally Idealist approach to his work, authorizing literary values like sincerity of expression, 
originality, aesthetic autonomy, and a relative indifference to the real as measures of his success or 
failure as a writer, without calling them into question. 
 My readings have revealed instances of an adamant resistance to certain elements of such 
Romanticism, and particularly its lyrical subjectivity. In Les Nuits d’octobre, I showed the writing 
subject not as integral or self-contained, but as the site of a disorderly encounter between world and 
imagination. In Sylvie, I theorized this porousness of the subject as a form of imaginative practice, as 
a form of lived fiction that opens the self beyond the flatness of sincerity or utility. In Les Faux 
Saulniers, I revealed that fictional self to be composed of a host of other subjects—the site of 
encounter not only of self and world but also of selves, the site of a community that disguises itself as 
the individual the law requires it to be. It is the poetics of this collective subject that I will explore in 
what follows, demonstrating how the local instances of opposition to a self-contained subjectivity 
we have already seen in fact participate in a much broader literary project. They are not simply 
negative responses to particular discourses, but participate in an affirmative poetics that creates a 
porous and mobile subject as a way of transforming literature itself. This is a writing subject that 
operates beyond the relevance of categories like authenticity or sincerity, and that in the process 
reforms the experiences of reading and writing, as well as the relationships established between 
readers and writer. By turning the writing subject into an actor, Nerval’s poetics allows literature to 
function like the collective performance of Sylvie, responding to the desire for lost continuity and 
collective experience done away with by the bourgeois ideology (political, philosophical, and 
aesthetic) that increasingly underpinned mid-19th-century French society. 
 
Intertextuality and Literary Values 
At the center of this transformative poetics lies one of the most unmistakable, and yet least 
theorized, features of Nerval’s writing: its vertiginous intertextuality. Nerval’s writing is as often as 
not some form of rewriting: translation, anthology, adaptation, transposition, recapitulation, 
summary, allusion, citation, and even plagiarism. His tendency toward different forms of what we 
might call textual borrowing shifts over time, but the fact of the borrowing remains constant. He 
publishes translations of Goethe and Heine, and anthologies of renaissance and German poetry; he 
rewrites stories by Jean Paul, Hoffmann, and Scarron, an article by Dickens, and poems by Jean 
Paul, Goethe, and Du Bartas; he passes off one of his own poems as a translation of Bürger, and a 
translation of Sealsfield as his own story; his travel writing lifts whole scenes from William Lane and 
his historical portraits are dense patchworks of existing sources—and the list goes on.3 I will argue 
that the profusion and flagrance of his intertextual gestures are essential to his writing practice as a 
whole, serving as the primary site of the dislocation of the subject that allows for a 
reconceptualization of literature as a fundamentally extra-subjective practice. 
 This feature of the writing is commonly observed, but rarely given much serious 
consideration. It is ignored largely as a kind of shameful detail, the critic passing quietly over the 
                                                
3 I am thinking here of: Faust and Second Faust, Les poesies de Henri Heine, Choix des poésies de Ronsard…, Poésies allemandes, Les 
Faux saulniers/Leben Fibels, des Verfassers der Bienrodischen Fibel, Pandora/Abenteuer der Silvesternacht, Le roman tragique/Le roman 
comique, Les Nuits d’octobre/The Key of the Street (discussed in Chapter One), “Le Christ aux oliviers”/“Siebenkaes,” 
“Delfica” (or “Daphne,” or “à J—y Colonna”)/“Chanson de Mignon,” “à Made Sand”/8th sonnet of the Dialogue des 
Neuf Muses Pyrénées…, “Sonnet” (or “Le Soleil et la gloire”), “Jemmy”/“Christophorus Bärenhäuter im 
Amerikanerlande,” Voyage en Orient/Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, Les Illuminés. The complex relationships 
of Nerval’s writing to source texts are well documented, if not analyzed, in the voluminous notes to the new Pleiade 
edition. The evidence of intertextuality is less abundantly publicized when it comes to his most canonical works, 
however: the link between “Sylvie” and the 1833 George Sand and Jules Sandeau novel, Rose et Blanche, ou la comédienne et 
la religieuse, goes unmentioned. 
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author’s naughty habit. What meaning is attributed to borrowing is almost always negative, and often 
does not go beyond Nerval’s fear of sterility and need to make a living writing day-to-day.4 Jean 
Richer is an exception when he argues that Nerval’s use of references is an attempt to assert textual 
mastery,5 but when considering Nerval’s borrowings more broadly, most modern scholars see them 
through the lens of Nerval’s psychology, attributing them to a failure of identity, failure to 
differentiate himself from what he is not.6 In such readings, Nerval cannot help but disturb the ideal 
of a coherent, expressive subject with his troubling, involuntary readiness to find himself everywhere 
and so to destabilize the self altogether.7 Borrowing is thus seen as a symptom, independent from 
any properly aesthetic intent or effect, indicating either an idiosyncratic psychological problem or a 
more universal problem of the “madness” and subjective loss of textuality, independent from any 
properly aesthetic intent or effect. Even Lawrence Schehr’s understanding of Nerval’s intertextual 
“vampirism,” which interprets these practices as a function of influence and imitation and a crucial 
element of Nerval’s particular mode of literary production, ultimately makes of borrowing a 
weakness: Schehr locates Nerval’s aesthetic autonomy in the ways he distances himself from his 
source texts through misreading, setting aside the moments of more direct, “accurate” transmission.8 
 The Romantic literary values of originality and authentic self-expression thus prevail in 
interpretations of Nerval’s intertextual practices, which unanimously read borrowing as an aesthetic 
failure, a symptom of some lack. The superiority of original writing over rewriting has a self-
evidence that makes itself available to various frameworks, unified by their unconscious (or at least 
unacknowledged) reliance on these historically specific literary values.9 They are values strongly 
associated with the mid-19th century, not only with the height of Romantic aesthetics but also with 
the steady strengthening of intellectual property rights that institutionalized those aesthetics.10 In the 
Tinguy amendment to the July Press Law, we saw the National Assembly’s push for individual 
authorial accountability, but this one piece of legislation was part of a much broader trend, and one 
that did not always act on literature from the outside.11 This period saw the naturalization of the 
                                                
4 For example, Bony takes this position, attributing many of the writing practices that interest us here to “alimentary” 
necessity, though he does acknowledge the experimental use to which Nerval puts these supposedly instrumental 
borrowings; see L’Esthétique de Nerval, in particular “Ecriture et musique : arrangement, combinaisons, creation,” 90-99. 
Even Lawrence Schehr’s substantial analysis of intertextual practice in Nerval reduces it to a “disease” that the writing 
seeks to overcome; see “Romantic Interruptions” in Rendering French Realism. 
5 Richer, Expérience vécue et création ésotérique. 
6 Recall as well our discussion of the self and the non-self in Chapter One. 
7 See, among many others, Malandain, Nerval ou l’incendie du théâtre; and Tsujikawa, Nerval et les limbes de l’histoire. I will 
return to this question in greater depth below. 
8 Schehr, “Le Faust de Nerval: Poésie et Vérité.” 
9 As Hélène Maurel-Indart observes in her historical survey of plagiarism, during the Renaissance, for example, the 
creative dimension of borrowing was often emphasized over the parasitic dimension that stands out in later discourses 
of intellectual property rights. Maurel-Indart’s study is nevertheless tinged by a latent disapproval, a tendency to see 
plagiarism as theft that partakes of a very specific conception of literature and literary property; see Du plagiat. 
10 The 19th century saw a continuous fortification of the legal rights of intellectual and specifically literary property. From 
the ancien régime system of royal privileges under which publishers but not authors were given monopoly printing rights 
over specific works, policy in post-Revolutionary France gave authors rights over their work, framed in terms of 
property rather than privilege—rights that were then strengthened at intervals throughout the century. On this history of 
intellectual property in modern France, see Carla Hesse, “Enlightenment Epistemology and the Law of Authorship in 
Revolutionary France, 1777-1793”; and Christine Haynes, “The Politics of Authorship: The Effects of Literary Property 
Law on Author-Publisher Relations” and Lost Illusions: The Politics of Publishing in Nineteenth-Century France. For 
contemporary analysis of the issues at stake, see Augustin-Charles Renouard, “Theéorie du droit des auteurs sur les 
productions de leur intelligence”; and Joseph Adrien Gastambide, Historique et théorie de la propriété des auteurs; the latter 
provides a detailed survey of the legislative vicissitudes of intellectual property through the early years of the Second 
Empire. 
11 See Chapter Three. 
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conception of literary and other intellectual production as original products of individual labor 
whose authenticity was underwritten by their link to their creator and which had to be duly 
protected like the fruits of other labors. Yet as we see in Les Faux Saulniers and Les Nuits d’octobre, it is 
not at all clear that Nerval’s writing adheres to these values: his writing maintains a troubled 
relationship to valorizations and regulations of authentic self-expression, and it ironizes and evades 
constraints that seek to constitute such authorized expression. 
 If we take the period in question to be synonymous with a conception of literature as 
originating in an individual’s creative labor, Nerval’s apparent opposition might appear profoundly 
anachronistic, suggesting either an untimeliness in his writing or an insensitivity to timeliness in our 
readings. But to cast out Nerval’s resistance to mid-19th-century literary discourses of originality and 
authenticity is to forget the debates on literary property that were ongoing throughout the century. 
The development of intellectual, and specifically literary, property rights might appear, in retrospect, 
as an inexorable forward march, but was in fact mired well past mid-century in disagreements as to 
the nature and proper limits of such property. These debates engaged not only men of letters but 
also political thinkers of all stripes throughout the July Monarchy and Second Empire, interrogating 
the nature of property in general and in particular the viability of public goods.12 One axis of the 
ongoing debates lines up precisely with the issues at stake in our readings of Nerval: the individual 
versus the collective nature of literary production.13 
 The position most familiar to modern readers, because ultimately borne out by the 
development of intellectual property law, identified authors with other producers insofar as they 
labored to create goods that should be defended as private property. The book is a commodity that 
creates value for the publisher who sells it and for the public who purchases it, so it is only right that 
the author who originates that value should own it.14 Such was the view of proponents of extending 
authors’ rights, including well-known writers of the Romantic period like Vigny, Balzac, and the 
great statesman Alphonse de Lamartine.15 Even if it had to be admitted that the content of ideas 
originates in the public domain and returns to it when circulated in print, this camp argued that the 
form given to ideas in books is the result of one person’s labor and has to be protected as such: “[L]a 
pensée n’a pas de tarif. Le livre en a un” [“Thought has no price. A book has one”].16 This 
conception of literary property allows for a certain amount of borrowing in literary production, but 
ultimately insists on the transformation and rearrangement (formal originality) by which 
appropriation must be redeemed. Whatever the author draws into his text must come to be 
recognizably his own, manifest in a distinctly new combination. The proponents of literary property 
thus emphasized the originality of literary production over its derivative and collaborative 
dimensions, arguing that the author has a right to his writing insofar as his primary function is to 
give a unique shape to his ideas. In addition to defining literary production in a way that justifies 
property rights, this conception of literature also serves effectively to regulate literary production, 
defining legitimate and, by implication, illegitimate, authorial practice. It implies that derivative, 
                                                
12 See for example Alphonse de Lamartine’s 1841 speeches before the National Assembly; and the second part of Louis 
Blanc, Organisation du travail. 
13 Our discussion of the politics of intellectual property in 19th century France is necessarily limited to this one axis, 
emphasizing the ideological dimension of the debate rather than the incredibly complicated economic relations between 
corporatist and liberal forces within the publishing industry and the various ways that writers and other public figures 
positioned themselves in those economic conflicts. For more on the messiness of the liberalization of the book trade, 
see Christine Haynes’s instructive work.  
14 Lamartine, “Sur la propriété littéraire,” paragraph 13. 
15 Haynes, “The Politics of Authorship,” 102. 
16 Lamartine, “Sur la propriété littéraire,” paragraph 13. 
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citational writing, in which what is public and what is private cannot be distinguished, lies outside 
the realm of literature. 
 This view of literature and of the legitimacy of literary property stood in stark opposition to 
a collectivist view of literary production, shared by such unlikely fellows as conservative jurist 
Augustin-Charles Renouard and socialist politician Louis Blanc.17 At the heart of this conception of 
literature (motivated by vastly different political projects) is an emphasis on ideas as public goods 
that cannot and should not be converted to private property. For Renouard, this refusal of intellectual 
property was grounded in a defense of property more broadly as a natural and not a conventional 
institution: ideas, like everything else, the argument went, come from God and can be rightly held as 
private property only insofar as that is necessary, i.e. insofar as use by multiple individuals is 
mutually exclusive and the right to sole ownership is thereby validated. Since printed ideas can be 
circulated without alienating the ownership of the original holder and so are not naturally, or 
necessarily, private property, they cannot be private property at all.18 Lamartine sums up the position 
held by his opponents Renouard and his conservative colleagues thus: 
 
La pensée est à tous, la pensée est du domaine public, car elle est du domaine divin, 
car elle traverse une tête d’homme, d’un être misérable, borné, transitoire, qui n’en 
est que le réflecteur, pour se réfléchir, pour se rejaillir sur tous les hommes. Elle est, à 
tout œil qui s’ouvre et qui la reçoit, inaliénable comme la clarté une fois reçue. 
 
[Thought belongs to everyone, thought belongs to the public domain, for it belongs 
to the divine domain, for it traverses the mind of a man—of a miserable, narrow-
minded, transient being who is but its reflector—in order to reflect itself and rain 
down on all men. It is, for any eye that opens to it and receives it, unalienable like the 
light once received.]19 
 
This argument holds that authors should be compensated by remunerated copyrights for the social 
utility of their work; they have a moral right, but have no property rights. 
 This was a view largely shared by Blanc, who favored a national system of remuneration for 
writers, independent of a literary market. The non-exclusivity of intellectual property (likened by 
Renouard to fire and air) was also fundamental to Blanc’s reasoning, according to which an idea 
cannot be isolated from the world from which it emerges and in which it circulates: “La propriété de 
la pensée ! Autant vaudrait dire la propriété de l’air renfermé dans le ballon que je tiens dans ma 
main. L’ouverture faite, l’air s’échappe ; il se répand partout, il se mêle à toutes choses : chacun le 
respire librement” [“Ownership of thought! Why not ownership of the air enclosed in the balloon I 
hold in my hand? As soon as I release it, the air escapes; it spreads out in all directions, it mixes with 
everything: everyone breathes it freely”].20 Thought (and, by implication, literature) is above all 
collective property, wont to circulate throughout society and thus deformed by attempts to confine 
it: “soumettre la pensée à la théorie de l’échange, c’est donner une quantité finie pour mesure à une 
quantité infinie” [“to submit thought to the theory of exchange is to use a finite quantity to measure 
                                                
17 This is a view of intellectual property that has come to the fore once again in recent years with movements to revitalize 
the public domain, including Creative Commons and Free Cultural Works. The ease of circulation of intellectual 
property of various kinds enabled by digital media has led to a resurgence of questions about of the nature and 
regulation of intellectual property, reopening debates that had long been largely resolved under the domain of print. 
18 Renouard, “Théorie du droit des auteurs,” 253. 
19 Lamartine, “Sur la propriété littéraire,” paragraph 13. 
20 Blanc, Organisation du travail, 188. 
 101 
an infinite quantity”].21 According to Blanc, the primary goal of any regulation of literature should be 
to maximize the circulation of good ideas, which realize their value precisely by dispersing and 
escaping the grasp of the person who “originated” them. Counter to the liberal view of intellectual 
property put forth by Lamartine, Blanc envisioned a strong public domain composed of the best 
works made available to all. The essential nature of literature here lies not in its origin in an 
individual but in its capacity for circulation and diffusion, for appropriation by many people. So it is 
that the restrictions on legitimate forms of literary production implied by literary property do not 
emerge here, and the possibility of sharing and reiteration appears as a positive literary dynamic. 
 This conflict about the nature of literature, individual or social, must provide the backdrop 
for our reading of Nerval’s poetics, which cannot simply be interpreted in terms of the liberalized-
Romantic model of authentic, individual literary production, but must be positioned between these 
two divergent conceptions. The evidence upon which we might base an assessment of Nerval’s 
political views is admittedly sparse: he never made explicit statements on the matter, and was 
certainly not an outspoken proponent of either position. Yet what testimony we do have to Nerval’s 
attitude toward writing suggest a resistance to the liberalization of literature and an evasion of its 
mandate for individualistic production. 
 What is known about Nerval’s direct involvement with the politics of intellectual property is 
that it skirted the central question posed above, despite the ongoing polemic. Nerval’s recorded 
activity and reflection on issues pertaining to literary property exclusively concern the problem of 
the black market or pirated French books printed in Belgium that dramatically undercut the French 
publishing industry.22 His correspondence clearly attests to his interest in the problem of 
counterfeiting and its effect on the livelihood of French writers, particularly around the time of his 
1840 travels in Belgium, where he planned to produce a report on la contrefaçon belge (Belgian 
counterfeiting) that would launch his (unrealized) diplomatic career.23 It does not, however, 
necessarily follow from Nerval’s engagement with the problem of pirated books, or from his taking 
(at least instrumentally) a position friendly to the French government’s protectionism, that he 
favored an expansion of authors’ rights conceived as individual property. On the contrary, the 
debates surrounding international pirating and domestic intellectual property regulation often 
unfolded at cross-purposes, making it impossible to deduce his position in the second from the 
first.24 The authors and publishers who were so at odds (at least rhetorically) at home found 
themselves allied in their opposition to the Belgian threat: whether one preferred to think of literary 
property as belonging to the individual or to society as a whole, there was agreement that literary 
property was national property and that its appropriation by foreigners at the expense of domestic 
economic interests was unacceptable. So it is that Nerval’s involvement in seeking solutions to the 
problem of la contrefaçon belge implies very little about his thinking regarding intellectual property 
beyond a concern for the economic viability of literature in France. 
                                                
21 Ibid., 195. 
22 This problem of la contrefaçon belge worsened with Belgian independence from Holland in 1830 and reached its peak in 
1840; see Haynes, Lost Illusion, Chapter Two: The Battle Between Corporatists and Liberals, 48-91. 
23 It is unclear whether this report was ever written; it has, at least, yet to be located. For more on Nerval’s brief 
diplomatic ambitions, see Gérard Cogez, Gérard de Nerval; see also Janin, “Gérard de Nerval”. 
24 In the case of piracy, increased regulation was intended to protect the French book market against foreign producers, 
while in the case of intellectual property, regulation was advocated as a way to protect the livelihood of writers against 
the forces of the domestic book trade. What’s more, it was argued that measures increasing authors’ property rights in 
France tended to increase the price of domestic books and so weaken the French industry’s ability to compete with the 
international black market – and so, too, weaken the prospects of authors who depended on a legitimate market. Haynes 
makes it clear that the impression relentlessly promoted that literary property rights were meant to protect authors (and 
their descendants) was largely a screen for internal power struggles in the publishing industry; public debate nonetheless 
centered on intellectual property as a benefit to the authors themselves.    
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 A concern for the livelihood of writers is also the only position Nerval is shown to take in 
the 1841 article in which Jules Janin addressed both Nerval and the question of literary property.25 
There, Janin paraphrased a recent conversation among several friends, including Nerval, about 
intellectual property. The conversation was sparked, Janin writes, by Nerval’s enthusiasm on his 
return from Belgium about the question of pirated books, but the conversation immediately 
entangles the stakes of la contrefaçon with those of the duration of authors’ domestic property rights, 
with each friend expounding on his position in the face of Nerval’s constant, good-natured ridicule. 
When Nerval finally does intervene directly to dismiss the anti-intellectual property arguments of his 
fellows, his argument hinges on the viability of literature as a career: the writer who sells his services 
day-to-day (writing for newspapers, as Nerval often did, or selling his manuscripts without the 
promise of significant royalties) has no future, lives “au hasard” [“at random”]. This is the difficulty 
of the profession that drives even the most successful writers (think Lamartine or Hugo) into 
political life in search of a surer outlet for their ambition, a difficulty that must be answered by 
protecting the rights of writers. No principles are invoked here as to the nature of intellectual work 
or the essence of creative production; rather, Nerval extolls the usefulness of intellectual property 
solely as a way of making the writer’s career viable. In Janin’s depiction, Nerval entirely sidesteps the 
incendiary rhetoric of intellectual property debates, making no argument for an individualist model 
of literary production but simply advocating the social utility of ensuring writers a livelihood. 
 If he takes no explicit position in favor of literary property rights and the aesthetics that 
underpin them, it is also true that neither his interest in the black market nor the arguments Janin 
attributes to him constitute a clear opposition to literary property, either. Perhaps Janin did not 
know what Nerval’s position was, or perhaps Nerval did not clearly have one; more likely still, 
perhaps it was not in the interest of Janin’s portrait of Nerval to attribute a coherent political 
position to him. The figure Nerval cuts in Janin’s “biographie anticipée” [“preemptive biography”] is 
a hapless one: a wandering, impractical eccentric who stumbled into his talent; a profligate who 
squandered his inheritance and gave wildly to his friends’ literary projects rather than investing in his 
own renown.26 He appears here as a childlike figure, ill-suited to the demands of real life, and it 
would certainly be inconsonant with this depiction for him to be politically conscious, let alone 
radical. But even in the traits that Janin uses to dismiss him here, a shadow of Nerval’s position 
becomes visible. 
 Janin plays on the caricature of Nerval that Dumas was so influential in creating: the writer 
modest to the point of ineffectuality, who seems to evaporate at the mere mention of his name.27 
Nerval’s prime characteristic seems to be a lack of personal ambition: he is not driven as befits the 
young writer of the July Monarchy (think Lucien de Rubempré). Rather, Janin observes, he invests 
freely in his friends’ work without worrying about receiving credit or compensation:  
 
[I]l se passionnait pour les livres d’autrui bien plus que pour ses propres livres ; quoi 
qu’il fît, il était tout prêt à tout quitter pour vous suivre. “Tu as une fantaisie, je vais 
                                                
25 “Gérard de Nerval”; see also Nerval’s response 11 years later, “À Jules Janin”, preface to Lorely in Œuvres complètes, 3:3-
12. Janin’s article, written on the occasion of Nerval’s first confinement to a mental institution in 1841, must be read 
with caution: Nerval describes it bitterly as a premature obituary and it certainly makes him fodder for readers’ appetites 
for tragic figures of the poète maudit, that fragile idealistic child unsuited for the brutality of real life—a recognized 
phenomenon long before Verlaine named it in 1884 but treated inevitably with a mix of romance and scorn—and so 
does not necessarily have accurate representation as its primary motivation. The discussion of intellectual property 
“reported” in the article itself seems highly fictionalized and stands in an unclear relationship to the treatment of Nerval 
more broadly, although I will suggest one important link. 
26 “À Jules Janin,” Lorely, in Œuvres complètes, 3:4. 
27 Théophile Gautier, Histoire du Romantisme, 74. 
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me promener avec elle, bras dessus, bras dessous, pendant que tu resteras à la maison 
à te réjouir”; et quand il avait bien promené votre poésie, ça et là, dans les sentier que 
lui seul il connaissait, au bout de huit jours, il vous la ramenait calme, reposée, la tête 
couronnée de fleurs, le cœur bien épris, les pieds lavés dans la rosée du matin, la joue 
animée au soleil de midi. Ceci fait, il revenait tranquillement à sa propre fantaisie qu’il 
avait abandonnée, sans trop de façon, sur le bord du chemin. 
 
[He was fascinated by others’ books much more than by his own; whatever he might 
be doing, he was always ready to set it all aside to follow you. “You have a fancy, I 
shall take her walking, arm in arm, while you stay at home and revel”; and after a 
week, when he had taken your fancy for a stroll here and there, down paths known 
only to him, he would bring her back to you, calm, rested, her head crowned with 
flowers, her heart full of love, her feet bathed in the morning dew, her cheek 
brightened by the midday sun. With that done, he would quietly return to his own 
fancy, which he had unceremoniously left by the wayside.]28 
 
Despite his multifarious successes as a translator, poet, journalist, and playwright, Nerval appears 
here as the sort of anti-Hugo or anti-Dumas, unconcerned with his own reputation and his own 
project, eager to share in his friends’ endeavors, apparently for the sheer joy of it. This is a 
characteristic that appears again in Eugène de Mirecourt’s 1854 biography, in an image that 
succinctly captures the essence of the comparison being made by Janin: “Les uns sont les frelons, les 
autres sont les abeilles. Butinant ça et là, chaque jour, au milieu des plaines fleuries de l’imagination, 
Gérard apporte des richesses à la ruche et garnit les alvéoles du suc le plus pur.[…] Plus qu’un autre 
il avait droit à la récompense, et nous voyons les mouches paresseuses manger son miel. Il en rit le 
premier” [“There are wasps, and there are bees. Gathering nectar here and there amidst the flowered 
plains of the imagination, Gérard brings riches to the hive and fills the honeycomb with the purest 
nectar.[…] More than others, he has earned a reward, and we see idle flies eating his honey. He is 
always the first to joke about it”].29 
 For Janin, as for Mirecourt years later, Nerval’s refusal to prioritize his own work signals his 
eccentricity and incompetence. It is a symptom of his failure to be a real writer, nothing more. But in 
the context of our discussion of intellectual property, these paired images of “promenant ta 
fantaisie” and “l’abeille altruiste” suggest that Nerval had a concerted allegiance to a collectivist 
model of literary production, albeit misunderstood by his contemporaries. It is not a question here 
of symptoms but of values, and Nerval is represented by both Janin and Mirecourt as valuing 
collaboration and engaging in an un-self-centered literary practice. Ideas for him appear to be 
shareable, borrowable, revitalized by their circulation among different writers; it seems to be the 
ultimate fruitfulness of the literary endeavor as a whole that matters, rather than the limited 
subsection of it that appears under his own name and that could constitute his personal property. If 
Nerval had a position in the debates surrounding literary property, then, it seems clear that he 
aligned himself (explicitly or not) with a conception of literature as a public good, maximized and 
realized by its free social circulation. 
 
 
 
                                                
28 “Gérard de Nerval,” Journal des Débats 1 March 1841: 1–3, 1. Cited in Nerval, “À Jules Janin,” Lorely in Œuvres complètes, 
3:3-12, 6-7. 
29 Gérard de Nerval, 23. 
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The Writing Subject as Impersonal Actor 
It is in the context of this conception that we can begin to understand Nerval’s poetics and to 
appreciate the central role that intertextuality plays within it. The derivative and citational nature of 
so much of Nerval’s writing begins to appear as an aesthetic choice rather than as a failure of 
subjectivity or of writing. It contributes to local instances of opposition and evasion, as we have seen 
in Les Faux Saulniers where the insistently integral “I” is a screen for a polyphonic collective voice; or 
in Les Nuits d’octobre where ironic voicing of dominant discourses on the subject’s relationship to the 
world creates a space for the imagination that they exclude. But the oppositional force of his 
intertextual gestures is not limited to these two serials, and in fact suffuses his entire body of work, 
bringing its productivity to bear in every one of the disjunctures between author and text listed 
earlier—each rewriting, each allusion, each citation. His is a writing practice that refuses to 
appropriate what it takes in, that refuses to transcend its borrowings with formal innovation, but 
rather retains the traces of its derivative gestures. These evident textual borrowings are central to the 
experiences of both writing and reading in Nerval’s œuvre, establishing an alternative to the 
increasingly dominant model of individualist production and originality—a mode in which the 
collective process of circulation is kept in constant motion. 
 In its refusal to absolutely privilege the individual as the originator of literary creation, 
Nerval’s writing practice based on citation transforms the writing subject. It becomes a kind of non-
subject that denies itself, reduces itself to what Antoine Compagnon describes as a “répétiteur” 
[“repeater” or “rehearser”] or “rapporteur” [“reporter”], voicing another and so making of itself a 
mere medium.30 It is this change in the function of the writing subject that is so often read as a 
failure of some sort; in psychological readings, it appears as a literal breakdown of the author’s 
subjective identity. But if we approach it as a feature of the text rather than of the author, it needn’t 
have this negative valence. It can be thought in relation to other textual practices that displace the 
clear presence of writerly authority within the text, like Bakhtinian dialogism.31 Nerval’s borrowings 
do not function in a manner precisely analogous to the one Mikhail Bakhtin attributes to 
Dostoevsky’s independent characters. While Dostoevsky is the creative origin of the characters to 
whom he gives apparent autonomy, Nerval invites preexisting autonomous voices into his texts, 
either directly or by allusion. Nevertheless, the approaches of these authors share a displacement of 
the writing subject as the perceived creator and arbiter of all that is written, a displacement that does 
not disrupt the text, but becomes one of its fundamental features.32 This displacement is everywhere 
at stake in Nerval’s intertextual practices, his borrowing drawing its significance precisely from its 
effect as an enunciative gesture of repetition or reference rather than simply from the content it 
brings into the text.33 The effect of this gesture is not purely ironic, as it is in what Terdiman 
describes as Flaubert’s counter-discursive parroting; it does not signal the presence of writerly 
authority as what must distance itself from the language it dismisses by repeating it.34 Rather, in 
Nerval’s case, the repetition of, allusion to, and adaptation of others’ words shift from one source to 
another so vertiginously as to make fixing a single relationship between writer and source 
                                                
30 Compagnon, La Seconde main ou le travail de la citation, 40. Compagnon’s reflections on citation as a practice inherent to 
reading itself, as a fundamental element of our relationship to all text, are thought-provoking and provide an intriguing 
model of the activity of reading. 
31 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. 
32 Below I will explore further the specificity of Nerval’s textual practice as one that thus displaces the writing subject 
even as it proceeds in the first person. 
33 For more on the primacy of enunciation over enounced in the citation, see Compagnon, Seconde main.  
34 See Terdiman’s treatment of citation as satire in Marx and Flaubert in “Counter-Humorists,” Discourse/Counter-
Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France, 198-226. 
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impossible. The effect is not one of monolithic irony that allows us to situate the writing subject, but 
of a mobility in which the writing subject is always slipping away toward its next borrowing. 
 The function of intertextuality in Nerval’s writing as I have described it may seem liable to 
collapse into a post-structuralist conception of text. We seem to encounter here precisely Julia 
Kristeva’s displacement of the expressive subject of the “work” in favor of a de-subjectivized 
productivity of “text.”35 And indeed, Nerval has been of great interest to post-structuralist scholars, 
Kristeva and Shohana Felman in particular.36 They have not, however, taken into account the 
citational practices I am interested in here and which seem so perfectly emblematic of the textual 
phenomena that interest them. This is because both Kristeva and Felman read the subjective 
displacement that characterizes Nerval’s writing not as a properly textual phenomenon, but as a 
mimetic one, preceded by, and corresponding to, Nerval’s psychological state, understood in broadly 
Lacanian terms. By locating the significance of Nerval’s writing practice in his psyche and the ways 
in which it reflects the underlying fissures within language itself, these readings cannot help but 
divorce the writing from the specific historical situation to which, as we have already seen, it so 
clearly responds. Even if we were to try to read Nerval as a historically-specific instance of the 
emergence of text (in opposition to the increasing dominance of just the sort of ideologies to which 
Kristeva claims text provides the only “outside”), our historicizing project would require a clean 
break with the Lacanian categories that are, according to Kristeva, the only way of thinking that 
“outside” of rationalist epistemology. As I have already shown, the moment at which Nerval found 
himself writing was one in which the far-reaching bourgeois ideologies to which both he and 
Kristeva respond were still in the process of solidification. There certainly was, by the early 1850s, a 
sense of the oppressive ramifications of the social, political, and cultural transformations taking 
place in France, but the possible forms of opposition and the alternate logics on behalf of which 
such opposition might have been made were not yet restricted as they have come to be since. Thus, 
we must not limit our understanding of the logic of Nerval’s opposition to a hermeneutic that grew 
out of a later stage of development of the social conditions that were still nascent during this period. 
We must instead seek out a picture more complex than our broad narratives of capitalism and its 
discontents, attending to the surprising, local sites where emergent ideology was opposed, and to the 
particular values on behalf of which that opposition was made.37 Only by considering Nerval in the 
specificity of his historical moment can we appreciate the complex phenomenology of the 
ideological changes he experienced in their early stages and the way in which he sought to transform 
literature in response to them. 
* 
 To read Nerval historically in this way, we must avoid as much as possible projecting 
preconceived logics of opposition (our ideas about what was to be opposed during this period, and 
on behalf of what) and seek instead a way of conceiving the particular oppositional gesture made by 
Nerval’s writing practices themselves. We must look within Nerval’s writing for models that might 
help to make sense of the decentering intertextuality of his texts. We have already encountered the 
                                                
35 Kristeva, Semiotike, 15. 
36 See Kristeva, Soleil Noir. Dépression et mélancolie; and Felman, La Folie et la chose littéraire. Gilles Deleuze is worth 
mentioning as another post-structuralist reader of Nerval, though he never produced a sustained reflection on Nerval’s 
work. Like Kristeva and Felman, his interest in Nerval seems to derive largely from the eccentricity of Nerval’s 
psychology taken as a revelatory limit case, albeit of very different psychological structures. 
37 Terdiman’s studies in Discourse/Counter-Discourse, for example, tend to rely on a monolithic conception of capitalist 
ideology that limits the nuance of his readings of counter-discursive practices of different thinkers in different moments; 
the dynamism of the ongoing unfolding of modern ideological institutions throughout the July Monarchy, Second 
Republic, and Second Empire—and the corresponding partialness of those manifestations at any given moment—is 
subsumed into the vague and seemingly timeless category of discourse. 
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germ of such an approach in our discussion of the aesthetics of acting, where Nerval seems to 
indicate a non-nostalgic way out of the impasse of Romantic sincerity. In Sylvie, Nerval’s narrator 
imagines a mode of collective performance in which neo-Classicism and Romanticism might be 
bridged, combining in each actor conscious artifice with a real experience of the illusion produced.38 
Performance as imagined by Nerval corresponds neither to the Diderotian model of actorly 
impassibility nor to Romanticism’s total sympathy, neither to absolute distance nor to total overlap 
of actor and character. It is rather a synthesis of the two, in which artifice allows the performer to 
get outside the limitations of his real, lived experience while maintaining the intensity of lived 
experience. As I have discussed, Sylvie demonstrates the difficulty of creating this collective 
performance, but opens the way for a textual practice that would achieve the desired synthesis. 
 In such a translation of acting into the space of the text, the writing subject can be 
understood as an actor, in various possible relationships to the role to which he gives voice. The 
ideal of authentic self-expression would correspond, then, to the sincere actor in Sylvie who can act 
only what he already feels. In this case, the link between the writing subject and the content of its 
enunciation can be only nominally broken: the writing subject, like the actor, might take on a 
different character, but only insofar as that character were like him.39 On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, the actor who unfeelingly produces an illusion felt only by his audience would correspond 
to a rhetorical writing subject, one whose statements would take their significance entirely from the 
effect they were able to produce, regardless of their relationship to the subject himself. This rough 
mapping of acting onto the text makes very clear that Nerval’s own writing must fall somewhere in 
between, in some complex synthesis like the one he advocates with regard to acting. If no reader of 
his texts would ever mistake him for a cold rhetorician, neither is his writing reducible to a sincere 
autobiography, as so many scholars have assumed. Nerval’s writing practice occupies a third position 
in our schema, one that meets the demands of the oppositional impulses I have already observed in 
specific texts. This position opens the writing subject beyond the confines of a sincere, expressive 
individual, allows for the multiple, contradictory truths of the imagination, and creates the pleasure 
of a lucidly shared illusion, through its reconfiguration of the relationship between the writing 
subject and its many roles, as well as between writer and readers. 
 To understand this third position, it is useful to return to Rousset’s classification of acting in 
the European tradition. As we have already explored, Rousset enriches the dualism of neo-
Classicism and Romanticism with a consideration of the Baroque, which he characterizes most 
broadly as an aesthetic of constant transformation and simulation.40 Its emblems are the paired 
figures of Circe and Proteus, propagating changefulness in the world and the self, and demonstrating 
that being exists only in a state of metamorphosis: “tout se décompose pour se recomposer, entrainé 
dans le flux d’une incessante mutation, dans un jeu d’apparences toujours en fuite devant d’autres 
apparences” [“everything breaks itself apart and puts itself back together, pulled along in the flow of 
a ceaseless mutation, in a play of appearances always fleeing before other appearances”].41 The series 
                                                
38 See Chapter Two. 
39 As I will explore at further length in our discussion of syncretism, this is the position most often attributed to Nerval: 
the proliferation of characters he writes is reduced to a host of other selves, significant only for the identity that 
overrules all apparent differences. It is according to this logic that even the third-person historical portraits of Les 
Illuminés can be read as autobiographical texts. 
40 See the Introduction and Chapter Two. As I discuss there, Rousset’s work aims to reconceive the Baroque, making it a 
positive value rather than simply the imperfect transition to classicism; in so doing, it is also invaluable for our purposes 
in expanding the aesthetic values of the ancien régime beyond the cold classicism described in the Romantic manifestos 
and so proliferating the possible meanings of drawing on pre-Revolutionary literary traditions. See especially La 
Littérature de l’âge baroque en France. Circé et la paon; see also L’Aventure baroque. For more in-depth treatment of Baroque 
theater’s difference from the Romantic, see L’Intérieur et l’extérieur. Essai sur la poésie et sur le théâtre au XVIIe siècle. 
41 Rousset, La Littérature à l’âge baroque, 16. 
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of appearances that motors the Baroque is never brought to a halt by an underlying truth, but 
progresses only from appearance to appearance, like the play whose disguises are only revealed 
through a more complex play of disguise.42 Likewise, in Rousset’s analysis, the actor’s Protean being 
is located in the series of masks he wears rather than in a face that they hide. It is the figure of Don 
Juan that best exemplifies what is striking about this paradigm.43 The Baroque Don Juan, 
exemplified by Molière’s depiction, locates his being in the shifting personas he uses to seduce 
woman after woman.44 Rousset notes the resistance we cannot help but feel to this use of 
dissimulation to inspire love, but he argues that this is an anachronistic response: 
 
Comme il faut peu tenir à soi, nous semble-t-il, pour accepter d’être aimé comme si 
l’on était un autre ! Propos de moderne, de romantique ; dans le monde du Baroque, 
l’homme-acteur s’identifie sans peine à ses moi d’emprunt ; il se quitte si bien qu’il 
n’est pas moins lui-même dans chacun des personnages que lui proposent les instants 
successifs et sans mémoire de sa durée. 
 
[How little one must think of oneself, it seems to us, to accept being loved as if one 
were someone else! A modern remark, a romantic one; in the world of the Baroque, 
the man-actor painlessly identifies with his borrowed selves; he leaves himself so 
completely that he is no less himself in any one of the characters offered him 
moment by moment and with no memory of its duration.]45 
 
The actor’s identity is not falsified by the multiplicity of his appearances, but inhabits those 
appearances fully in turn. Identifying with the role does not imply that the role double the self that 
precedes it; nor is the self protected from identification, a master of “se prêter sans se donner” 
[“lending himself without giving himself”].46 The self is rather a mobility expressed through the 
series of identifications that seem to replace identity entirely.47 
 As Rousset observes, this Baroque conception of the power of theater and its identificatory 
force comes with certain risks. The actor who gives himself fully to his role gambles on his ability to 
limit that identification to the realm of the play.48 Rotrou’s Le Véritable Saint Genest [The Real Saint 
Genest] exemplifies the danger of being overtaken by one role, as its protagonist identifies 
permanently with the character he is playing and so goes beyond the role as written and acts in his 
own name. In the process of rehearsing, the Roman actor really undergoes the conversion 
experienced by his character, and so makes a real confession of faith that results in his martyrdom. 
The space of the theatrical illusion of identification is completely destroyed when the identification 
loses its mobility and becomes delusional.49 For the Baroque actor, healthy control over his identity 
requires that that identity remain in motion; madness befalls him only when his identity is fixed. 
                                                
42 Ibid., 54. 
43 See Rousset, “Entre baroque et romantisme: Don Juan ou les métamorphoses d’une structure” in L’Intérieur et 
l’extérieur. 
44 Ibid., 137. 
45 Ibid. The resistance Rousset describes here echoes in many ways the resistance I have observed in Janin, Dumas, and 
Mirecourt toward Nerval’s lack of ambition of self-interest (“Comme il faut peu tenir à soi”). 
46 Rousset, L’Intérieur et l’extérieur, 161. 
47 Likewise, in ways that recall our discussion in Chapter Two, the significance of the series of Don Juan’s conquests is 
very different in the Baroque instantiation of the myth than in the Romantic one: rather than a series of inherently 
meaningless substitutes for a desired ideal, the women seduced by Molière’s Don Juan are “relais indifférenciés le long 
d’une chasse sans autre but qu’elle-même” [“undifferentiated relays in a chase with no end but itself”] (Ibid., 148). 
48 Ibid., 159. 
49 Ibid., 156. 
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 The protagonist of Sylvie never arrives at this limit of Baroque acting, where one of the 
actor’s roles sticks to him and becomes a delusion, but it is an extreme about which Nerval writes 
much elsewhere. The on-stage conversion of Genest bears, in fact, much resemblance to the textual 
conversion Nerval recounts in his portrait of Jacques Cazotte in Les Illuminés [The Illuminati]. The 
overblown and even comical mysticism of this 18th-century writer does not precede the composition 
of his novel Le diable amoureux [The Devil in Love], but emerges from it: what begins as a merely 
textual phenomenon for Cazotte becomes, through the writing, a real belief.50 Nerval turns to the 
metaphor of acting to describe this transformation of the author by the roles he takes on in writing: 
Cazotte and the other great authors of his period “jouaient leur rôle au sérieux, comme ces 
comédiens antiques qui tachaient la scène d’un sang véritable pour les plaisirs du peuple-roi” 
[“played their roles seriously, like those classical actors who stained the stage with real blood for the 
enjoyment of the people-king”].51 In Nerval’s account of Cazotte’s case, writing invites the same 
identification as acting does in Rotrou’s play, and so comes with the same risk of allowing illusion to 
pass into delusion. 
 The metaphor of the actor who plays his role seriously returns in a later discussion of 
Nerval’s own writing practice, where he dramatically reverses the terms of Romanticism in favor of 
this Baroque model. This discussion comes in 1854 in the preface to Les Filles du feu, where Nerval 
responded to the way Dumas had characterized him in an article a few weeks earlier. In the tradition 
of Janin’s necrology, Dumas had portrayed Nerval as a kind of kook, “le plus rêveur” [“the 
dreamiest”] of all poets, to the point of losing his identity and forgetting himself in his character: 
“Tantôt […] le roi d’Orient Salomon, […] tantôt […] le sultan Ghera-Gherai, comte d’Abyssinie, 
duc d’Égypte, baron de Smyrne […]” [“Sometimes [...] the Oriental King Salomon, […] sometimes 
[…] the Sultan Ghera-Gherai, Abyssinian count, Egyptian duke, Smyrnaean baron […]”]52 Nerval’s 
propensity to identify with his characters was depicted as a kind of double-edged sword, both the 
source of his skill as a story-teller and the sign of his madness. Speaking from a position of great 
cultural authority and from the editor’s seat at his newspaper Le Mousquetaire, Dumas pitied Nerval 
for his propensity to identification and for the troublesome instability of his identity. Nerval’s 
prefatory letter “À Alexandre Dumas” thus faced the arduous task of self-justification, which it 
undertakes by pointing up Dumas’s misprision of the identification about which he is so 
condescending. 
 Nerval agrees that he and Dumas are very different sorts of writers. Nerval is prone to 
“s’incarner dans le héros de son imagination” [“incarnate himself in the hero of his imagination”] 
and thus to implicate himself in the blurring of fact and fiction in his writing, while Dumas remains 
master rather than object of the “jeu” through which he draws history into his inventions.53 In other 
                                                
50 Nerval, “Jacques Cazotte,” Les Illuminés in Œuvres complètes, 2:1075-1118, 1083. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Dumas, “Causerie avec mes lecteurs,” Le Mousquetaire 10 Dec. 1853: 1. Nerval cites this portion of Dumas’s text in “À 
Alexandre Dumas,” changing “sultan de Ghera-Gherai” to “sultan de Crimée” (Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:450). 
53 Nerval, “À Alexandre Dumas,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:449-458, 3:450. The play on the word jeu here is 
worth nothing: in Dumas’s case, jeu (“game” or “acting”—homophone for je or “I”) and jouer (“to play” or “to act”) are 
restricted to their significance with relation to games, but the terms cannot help simultaneously marking the acting, the 
real engagement with literary illusion, that Nerval claims is absent from Dumas’s practice. This critique thus returns to 
the one Nerval makes in Les Faux Saulniers of the superficial significance of fiction for historical novelists, and Dumas 
first among them: fiction is for them but one half of a facile and absolute opposition with history. Just as Nerval 
articulates a realm of popular fiction beyond such an opposition in Les Faux Saulniers, so he puts forward here a 
relationship between the subject of writing and his characters that refers neither to the fiction writer’s distance from his 
third person creations nor to the autobiographer’s (or poet’s) self-expression.  The fiction thus produced will not be that 
of the suspension of disbelief, but will operate in the complex and productive space of the multiple belief of popular 
fiction. See Chapter Three. 
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words, Nerval writes fiction in the first person. However, Nerval insists that, while Dumas was right 
to note Nerval’s tendency to identify with his characters, Dumas misunderstood that identification. 
What might be mistaken for a delusional belief in the transmigration of souls, represented by 
Pythagoras and Pierre Leroux, is quickly shown to belong instead to the realm of writing, as Nerval’s 
list of his fellow “mystics” shifts to include Voisenon, Moncriff, and Crébillon fils, authors who 
wrote fictional “adventures” about mysticism without clearly believing in it.54 The fluidity of identity 
that Dumas mistook for a delusion must thus be understood as a textual phenomenon rather than a 
psychological one. To clarify the mechanism of this phenomenon, Nerval turns to the figure of the 
actor, invoking the exemplary case of Brisacier through a long citation from his incomplete novel 
Roman tragique [Tragic Romance], which begins thus: 
 
Renonçant désormais à la renommée d’inspiré, d’illuminé ou de prophète, je n’ai à 
vous offrir que ce que vous appelez si justement des théories impossibles, un livre 
infaisable, dont voici le premier chapitre […] jugez-en: 
 “Me voici encore dans ma prison, madame; toujours imprudent, toujours 
coupable à ce qu’il semble, et toujours confiant, hélas! dans cette belle étoile de 
comédie, qui a bien voulu m’appeler un instant son destin.” 
 
[Renouncing henceforth the reputation of visionary, illuminato, or prophet, I have 
nothing to offer you but what you so justly call impossible theories, an impracticable 
book; here is the first chapter […] judge for yourself: 
 “Here am I still in my prison, madam, still reckless, still apparently guilty, and 
still confident, alas, in that beautiful, theatrical star, who was willing for a moment to 
call me her destiny.”]55 
 
 The citation interrupts Nerval’s first person writing with the character’s own, playing up the tension 
between identification and distance inherent in the writer’s relationship to his characters. The 
citation thus seems to respond directly to Dumas’s critique of Nerval’s identificatory practice, and 
yet it is not at all clear what kind of response the citation is meant to be. 
 Nerval claims to cite Brisacier as an example of a character with whom he had identified, but 
Brisacier’s exemplary status is confused by the fact that he, too, is wont to identify with his 
characters, even to the point of disaster. The example thus creates a kind of nesting effect (Nerval 
identifying with Brisacier, who identifies with his own roles), and Nerval offers no explicit guidance 
for interpreting this structure. It might seem, given the apparent analogy between Brisacier’s story 
and Dumas’s version of Nerval’s story, that the identification between the two is simply the sign of a 
deeper identity—that the nesting is in fact mere doubling. The actor might seem to stand in for the 
writer, so that in recounting Brisacier’s disastrous slippage of identity with one of his own roles, 
Nerval is really confessing to Dumas’s accusation.56 We would be mistaken, however, in thus 
reducing Brisacier’s je to a mere disguise for Nerval’s own, and his story to a simple mea culpa, for 
Nerval troubles the passage from identification to identity with his character by containing Brisacier 
in a well-marked citation. Nerval demonstrates identification by lending his voice to the character, 
temporarily substituting one je for the other, but the quotation marks prevent any blurring between 
                                                
54 Ibid., 451. I will return to the difficulty of the question of belief in Nerval’s relationship to mysticism below. 
55 Ibid., 450-51. 
56 In his reading of “À Alexandre Dumas” in Subjects of Terror: Nerval, Hegel, and the Modern Self (88-96), Jonathan Strauss 
acknowledges the irony of the letter, while nonetheless reading the confession earnestly. The irony with which Nerval 
treats Dumas’s writing practice in Les Faux Saulniers excludes a sincere reading of his ostentatious deference here and 
rather reinforces a more strategic reading of the letter. See Chapter Three. 
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the two “I”s. The care with which Nerval maintains Brisacier’s difference suggests that the two 
levels of nested identifications cannot be collapsed into the writer’s loss of identity, but rather that 
the actor’s story has significance of its own. Indeed, it is through the story of Brisacier, and the 
theory of acting it suggests, that Nerval draws out the complexities at stake in identification and so 
positions his writing practice. 
 Brisacier’s is importantly not the story of one identification, nor even of one kind of 
identification, but of a veritable transformation of identification itself. Brisacier begins as a 
successful actor and ends in madness. There is nothing in his initial acting practice that necessitates 
its eventual breakdown; he seems to become the role while safely maintaining his difference from it. 
The vitality of his performance emerges from the careful balance he strikes between sympathy and 
distance. Brisacier writes intimately of the characters he played, describing the kinship he felt with 
them, but he also describes the reserve he experienced, the ways in which the artifice of the play 
inserted itself between him and his roles. Playing Achilles, for example, 
 
Moi, je m’indignais parfois d’avoir à débiter de si longues tirades dans une cause aussi 
limpide et devant un auditoire aisément convaincu de mon droit. J’étais tenté de 
sabrer pour en finir toute la cour imbécile du roi des rois, avec son espalier de 
figurants endormis! Le public en eût été charmé; mais il aurait fini par trouver la 
pièce trop courte, et par réfléchir qu’il lui faut le temps de voir souffrir une princesse, 
un amant et une reine; de les voir pleurer, s’emporter et répandre un torrent d’injures 
harmonieuses contre la vieille autorité du prêtre et du souverain. 
 
[It sometimes outraged me to have to deliver such long monologues on behalf of 
such a lucid cause, in front of an audience easily persuaded of my claim. I was 
tempted to be done with and saber the whole idiotic court of the king of kings, with 
its gallery of sleepy onlookers! The audience would have been delighted; but in the 
end they would have found the play too short and considered the time it takes to 
witness the suffering of a princess, a lover, and a queen; to witness their tears, their 
outbursts, and the torrent of insults they hurl at the old authority of priest and 
king.]57 
 
The actor certainly feels sympathy with the character here (perhaps even more than most actors), 
but this does not imply that he loses all distance. The effect he aims to create for the audience (and 
the implausible delay required to produce it) prevents him from merging with the character in 
spontaneous action. There are thus strict limits on the continuity between the actor and his role, 
making the identification palpable, but partial. The balance between sympathy and distance, sincerity 
and artifice, is what makes Brisacier an actor, able to merge with his character, but only temporarily, 
so that the series of his roles might continue. This relationship to role as serial, partial identification 
appears as the norm of Brisacier’s career, operating up to a point even in the disastrous case of Nero 
that causes his downfall. 
 The break in his healthy practice of provisional, actorly identifications comes only in a 
moment of crisis, when the actor’s self-conscious artifice is disrupted and his series of identifications 
is halted in a single role. A hiss from the audience cuts him deeply, following as it does on a snub 
from his lover, and all at once the space between actor and character collapses. He is spurned by the 
audience and by his beloved, just as Nero was spurned by the people of Rome⎯and suddenly 
Brisacier and Nero are one. Brisacier is overtaken by his role, inspired to rise to the level of Nero’s 
                                                
57 Nerval, “À Alexandre Dumas,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:453. 
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murderous desire and undertake an action as great as the burning of Rome: “j’ai eu un moment 
l’idée, l’idée sublime, et digne de César [Néron] lui-même, […] l’idée auguste enfin de brûler le 
théâtre et le public, et vous tous! […]” [“for a moment I had the idea, the sublime idea worthy of 
Cesar [Nero] himself, […] the noble idea of burning the theater and the audience, and all of you 
[…]”].58 The actor loses control of his identification and mistakes it for his identity: “mon rôle s’est 
identifié à moi-même, et la tunique de Néron s’est collée à mes membres qu’elle brûle […]” [“my 
role identified itself with me, and the tunic of Nero stuck to my limbs, which it burns […]”].59 The 
monstrous force of Nero’s love and pride in Britannicus infects the actor, who is compelled to behave 
like Nero, but on his own account. Writes Brisacier, “Mes amis! comprenez surtout qu’il ne s’agissait 
pas pour moi d’une froide traduction de paroles compassées; mais d’une scène où tout vivait, où 
trois cœurs luttaient à chances égales, où comme au jeu du cirque, c’était peut-être du vrai sang qui 
allait couler” [“My friends! You must understand above all that it was not for me a cold translation 
of stuffy lines; but a scene where everything was alive, where three hearts were fighting and it was 
anyone’s fight, where, like at the circus, real blood might flow”].60  What happens onstage is no 
longer bound, set apart by the demands of the play, but is indistinguishable from the realm of the 
actor’s life.  The series of provisional identifications that characterizes the actor’s craft stops, and the 
actor is stuck in a delusion. 
 What Brisacier’s story reveals, then, is the danger that lies, not in the mobility of 
identification, but in its fixity. The actor becomes a madman at precisely the moment when he loses 
the dynamism of the “tantôt, tantôt” [“sometimes, sometimes”] of Nerval’s imaginative 
identification, which Nerval himself does not seem to have lost. Even in his relationship to Brisacier 
in the preface, Nerval’s coincidence with his character is provisional: he stages the actor (as the actor 
stages a role) just for the length of a citation, without mistaking Brisacier for himself. Indeed, 
Brisacier fulfills his explanatory role in “À Alexandre Dumas,” not because he is Nerval, but because 
his story demonstrates the difference between delusion and a mode of identification as mobility. The 
latter is the mode of identification at work in Nerval’s writing, in which his identity never fully 
coincides with that of a character. This is importantly not to say, that his is a voice apart or a face 
hidden behind these masks. Rather, the writing subject’s identity, like the healthy actor’s, lies in the 
series of roles he plays insofar as they are serial (“le prince ignore, l’amant mystérieux, le déshérité, le 
banni de liesse, le beau ténébreux” [“the unknown prince, the mysterious lover, the man 
dispossessed, the exile from jubilation, the handsome man of gloom”]61); his identity lies nowhere if 
not in his identificatory capacity itself, in the “tantôt, tantôt.” What Nerval’s writing subject voices is 
thus neither authentic self-expression nor a deceptive appropriation; his writing subject is strictly 
neither authentic nor inauthentic, just as Rousset insists that Molière’s Don Juan acts neither 
sincerely nor in bad faith.62 The relation between writing subject and characters is one of illusion, 
which does not pass into delusion (except in extreme cases like Brisacier’s), but rather maintains the 
mobility of the series of illusions acknowledged as such. 
 The writing subject here resembles not only Rousset’s Baroque actor, but also the 
impersonal actor of Gilles Deleuze’s Logique du sens [Logic of Sense], an actor who is none of his roles, 
                                                
58 Ibid., 455. 
59 Ibid., 456. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 452. 
62 Rousset, L’Intérieur et l’extérieur, 149. On the relevance of Rousset’s Baroque to Nerval, see Chamarat-Malandain. Our 
use of the Baroque as a third term distinguishes our reading from Mizuno’s reading in Gérard de Nerval, poète en prose (65-
77), which insightfully places the Roman tragique in the context of the renewed battle between Classical and Romantic 
theater sparked by the revival of tragedy in 1844; however, Mizuno’s reading of the Roman tragique as a polemical gesture 
in favor of Romanticism disregards the disastrous consequences of Brisacier’s convergence with his character. 
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but rather the point of their reflection. Deleuze distinguishes what the actor participates in from 
what is normally called illusion—illusion understood as mere appearance, a kind of untruth (what we 
might align with the mere fiction of Dumas that Nerval maligns). He associates the actor instead 
with simulation, which exists apart from truth and untruth as an effect: 
 
Que le Même et le Semblable soient simulés ne signifie pas qu’ils soient des 
apparences ou des illusions. La simulation désigne la puissance de produire un effet. 
Mais ce n’est pas seulement au sens causal, puisque la causalité resterait tout à fait 
hypothétique et indéterminée sans l’intervention d’autres significations. C’est au sens 
de ‘signe,’ issu d’un processus de signalisation ; et c’est au sens de ‘costume,’ ou 
plutôt de masque, exprimant un processus de déguisement où, derrière chaque 
masque, un autre encore... 
 
[That the Same and the Similar may be simulated does not mean that they are 
appearances or illusions. Simulation designates the power of producing an effect. But 
this is not intended only in a causal sense, since causality would remain completely 
hypothetical and indeterminate without the intervention of other meanings. It is 
intended rather in the sense of a “sign” issued from a process of signalization; it is in 
the sense of a “costume,” or rather a mask, expressing a process of disguising, where, 
behind each mask, there is yet another….]63 
 
The series of masks that does not resolve into a face (because it does not bely one) is assimilated 
here to the production of effects through simulation.64 These effects cannot be judged as false in 
comparison to something originally true, but enjoy their own status, that of the simulacrum. They 
partake in the lack of individuality or personality of the event, which is instead composed of 
nomadic, pre-individual singularities. This status independent of truth and falsehood offers another 
way of understanding Nerval’s actorly writing subject. This subject gives voice to characters who are 
not Nerval, which may mean that they are not true in the sense of sincerity or authenticity. But it 
does not follow from this that those roles can be dismissed as false. The writing subject’s 
relationship to its characters through simultaneous distance and identification operates, not in 
violation of the criteria of truth, but independently of them. Voicing the fiction and acknowledging 
its fictionality are inseparable in the gesture of writing here, as we saw them to be in the lucid 
performance of the festival in Sylvie. 
 
The Syncretic and the Hybrid (or, Je  versus I l) 
In “À Alexandre Dumas,” the writing subject explicitly takes on the voice of Brisacier by setting off 
the character’s monologue (letter) from the rest of the preface. But the relationship of writing 
subject to character in this instance also helps shed light on citation in Nerval’s writing more broadly 
(whether marked or unmarked), offering a model of writing as a practice of simulation. The endless 
borrowing that characterizes Nerval’s writing thus appears as a kind of textual acting: the staging of 
a repertoire of existing roles and plots. The question of authenticity becomes irrelevant, as does the 
question of deception: the writing subject takes up other voices not as part of a narcissistic 
identification or misidentification, but as the mobile identification of the actor who is the changing 
of his masks. There is not one single mechanism by which this textual staging operates throughout 
Nerval’s œuvre. The relationship to other writers is made quite differently, for example, in an 
                                                
63 Deleuze, Logique du sens, 304/The Logic of Sense, 263. The ellipsis is Deleuze’s. 
64 Cf. Guillaume, Nerval. Masques et visage. 
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anthology than in an unacknowledged citation. Nonetheless, these varying gestures all partake in a 
displacement of the writing subject as the original source of authentic writing, in favor of a 
proliferation of other voices, openly indicated or not. In its permanence, the writing subject, like the 
actor, appears as a kind of receptivity, a site of reflection for these other voices. 
 The porousness of the subject in Nerval’s writing can thus be understood as a textual 
phenomenon, a feature of his poetics: it is not narcissism or a failure of identity, but a productive 
simulation. This conception liberates the writing, not only from its author in a strictly 
autobiographical sense, but also from the coherence of the writing subject’s identity. The diversity of 
Nerval’s œuvre is not superficial; it is neither the residue of countless failures at articulating a singular 
truth, nor that singular truth in multiple guises. A narcissistic logic is so often attributed to Nerval’s 
writing, a logic of identity according to which the texts are outward-looking only insofar as the 
reflection of the self is to be found in the world, and any apparent multiplicity is reducible to the 
same. But what becomes evident here is rather a logic of difference, in which the writing subject 
makes itself the very site of diversity. Literary production is not limited to the confines of the 
individual subject, but opened onto its collective circulation. 
 We reencounter here the relationship between self and non-self that is at stake in Les Nuits 
d’octobre. There, Nerval vindicates the disorderly imagination as the core of the self, receiving and 
transforming the non-self without ever formulating itself as a coherent entity in opposition to the 
non-self.65 The imagination is not a faculty that manages and regulates the multiplicity of the world, 
but one that encounters it in its irreducibility. This conception of the self (the writing subject) as a 
receptivity to the non-self that is taken in without being assimilated (without collapsing into the self) 
provides an illuminating way of understanding Nerval’s relationship to his characters, and one that 
departs starkly from existing readings. Nerval’s characters have long been read either as 
autobiographical or as avatars of the autobiographical subject. The first group includes the first 
person narrators of not only Les Filles du feu and Aurélia, but also texts of more problematic status 
like the Lettres d’amour [Love Letters] (long assumed to be real Lettres à Jenny Colon, but more likely an 
unfinished epistolary novel66), while the second group includes the protagonists of Les Illuminés and 
the Histoire du Calife Hakem [The Tale of Caliph Hakim]. As the story goes, Nerval never escaped the 
progressive and inexorable “rétrécissement, … la cristallisation des préoccupations […] autour de la 
problématique de moi” [“constriction, […] the crystallization of his preoccupations around the 
problematic of selfhood”].67 Nerval, it has been understood, only ever wrote je, even when he 
appeared to be writing il, and the trajectory of his career was toward the increasing explicitness of 
that je.68 We might rather think, however, that Nerval was always crafting a sort of communal subject 
irreducible to any of its members, and that the trajectory of his career was toward the development 
of a je that might contain a complex of ils. He never ceased to write the other as the other, but only 
found a way to do so in the first person. 
 I will return below to the way that the social relations of literature (those between writer and 
readers, and among readers) are transformed by this shift to an impersonal “I.” But first we must 
consider how fully this shift in perspective alters the traditional view of Nerval, both in the way it 
                                                
65 See Chapter One. 
66 Regarding the dubious status of the Lettres, see Bomboir, Les Lettres d’amour de Nerval: Mythe ou réalité? 
67 Tritsmans, “Impasses Narratives dans les Nuits d’octobre,” 163. 
68 This mechanism works differently for different scholars, but the readings across the board come down to a 
problematic of the narcissistic self. This is evident in readings of Les Illuminés: even short of the strong syncretist readings 
of Richer and Jean-Marie Schaeffer, to which I will return, scholars like Jeanneret and Malandain see Nerval constantly 
defining himself against his references, demonstrating the force and identity of his self by mastering and transforming 
them. See Jeanneret, La Lettre perdue; Malandain, Nerval ou l’incendie du théâtre; Richer, Expérience vécue et création ésotérique; 
and Schaeffer, Une double lecture de Nerval: Les Illuminés et Les Filles du feu. See also Bony, Le Récit nervalien. 
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reads identity and in the way it treats belief. Replacing the narcissistic “I” with a porous one 
constitutes a complete reversal of forces within the texts: what has long appeared as an irresistible 
centripetal movement by which the non-self is obliterated by the self in a static black hole of 
narcissism, appears instead as a force of attraction on the self exerted by the non-self—but only ever 
temporarily, resulting in a continual motion. This motion does away with both the expressive Nerval 
and his supposed mystical beliefs. 
 The profound reorientation brought about by our understanding of the writing subject as an 
actorly one is most evident in Les Illuminés, a collection in which the question of coherence 
insistently poses itself. The motley crew of oppositional and mystical figures treated in Les Illuminés 
never definitively accounts for its own composition: what does the incarcerated madman of “Le roi 
de Bicêtre” [“The King of Bedlam”] have to do with the mystico-political leaders of “Cagliostro” 
and “Quintus Aucler,” or the confessional writer of “Les Confidences de Nicolas” [“The 
Confessions of Nicolas”]? Though we can constellate some of the text’s figures around motifs of 
mysticism, madness, and revolution, it seems we can never constellate those three motifs into any 
stable configuration that would give the collection as a whole a fixed shape. And yet the logic of 
selection seems to bear the entire burden of the collection’s coherence, since the vast majority of the 
content of the portraits is borrowed from other sources: 
 
Quintus Aucler consiste, pour une large part, en une longue citation de La Thrécie, 
l’ouvrage majeur de Quintus Aucler. L’Histoire de l'abbé de Bucquoy est, comme l’a 
montré Jacques Bony, un assemblage d’extraits de l’Evènement des plus rares [...] et 
d’autres écrits et témoignages de l’époque. Quant à Cagliostro, il contient, comme Jean 
Richer l’a remarqué, un chapitre entier recopié, avec des modifications, de l’ouvrage 
de La Roche du Maine, marquis de Luchet : Mémoires authentiques pour servir à l’histoire 
du comte de Cagliostro. 
 
[Quintus Aucler largely consists of a long citation from La Thrécie, Quintus Aucler’s 
major work. L’Histoire de l’abbé de Bucquoy is, as Jacques Bony has shown, an 
assemblage of extracts from Evènement des plus rares […] and other texts and 
testimonies from the period. As for Cagliostro, as Jean Richer has remarked, it 
contains an entire chapter copied, with modifications, from a work by La Roche du 
Maine, Marquis of Luchet: Mémoires authentiques pour servir à l’histoire du comte de 
Cagliostro.]69 
 
If the writing is not Nerval’s own, that is to say, if spontaneous creation is not the principle 
regulating the work, then there must be some other mechanism by which these disparate elements 
are brought into unison. For Max Milner, as for many scholars, this mechanism is the force of 
attraction of similar elements, “la similitude même, c’est-à-dire la rencontre du semblable dans 
l’autre” [“similarity itself, that is, the encounter with the similar in the other”], evidenced by the 
figure of the double in “Le roi de Bicêtre.”70 But the presence of one instance of doubling within the 
collection does not necessarily trump all the other portraits in providing its underlying structure: not 
all of the work’s diversity can be reduced to the sameness of this one portrait, itself a figure of 
                                                
69 Tsujikawa, Nerval et les limbes de l’histoire, 32-33. Tsujikawa’s reading of Les Illuminés as a response to the rationalization 
of culture at the start of the Second Empire is enormously useful and evocative, moving away (though never definitively) 
from psychological explanations in favor of meticulous readings and historical contextualization that retain the text’s 
complex strangeness. 
70 Milner, “Notice aux Illuminés” in Nerval, Œuvres complètes, 2:1701. 
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sameness. Readings of Les Illuminés must account instead for the diversity of the portraits and the 
complex and shifting articulations of politics, mysticism, and literature they put forward. 
 In order to read Les Illuminés in this way, we must rethink not only Nerval’s relationship to 
the historical figures he represents, but also the status of the beliefs he attributes to his characters. In 
other words, reading for the diversity and mobility of the collection displaces not only Nerval’s 
supposed narcissism but also his supposed syncretic mystical belief. This second element has been a 
cornerstone of Nerval studies since Richer’s 1947 Nerval et les doctrines ésotériques. Based primarily on 
readings of Les Illuminés and the Voyage en Orient, this conception interprets Nerval’s interest in 
religion and mysticism as a quest for a spiritual unity, drawing traditions past and present into one 
great mystical synthesis. Richer’s comments from 1981 are characteristic of this approach:  
 
[L]e « syncrétisme » nervalien est souvent une mosaïque d’emprunts assez disparates. 
Le poète ne vise pas à exprimer des théories cohérentes, mais à créer, à suggérer, une 
certaine atmosphère de mystère et d’originalité essentielle. Le lien entre toutes ces 
études variées est dans la personnalité de l’auteur, dans son tempérament d'artiste. 
C’est l’attirance du semblable pour le semblable. 
 
[Nervalian “syncretism” is often a mosaic of rather disparate borrowings. The poet 
does not attempt to express coherent theories, but to create, to suggest a certain 
atmosphere of mystery and essential originality. The link between all of these various 
studies is in the personality of the author, in is artistic temperament. It is the 
attraction of like to like.]71 
 
The references in Nerval’s work to esoteric doctrines, ranging from the Tarot to Freemasonry, are 
read as confessions of authentic belief, a series of tenets to which he is drawn by their resonance 
with his existing core of belief (often related to the structure of his madness) and the possibility of 
integrating them with it.72 
 This way of reading draws together citations regarding religion and mysticism from 
throughout Nerval’s œuvre without regard to differences in register, attribution, or irony, on the 
assumption that all statements made by the writing subject represent (at some level, at least) his 
sincere belief. But we need not think that everything Nerval says in the name of every one of his 
characters (the many accounts of others’ beliefs that are treated with varying degrees of distance) is 
attributable to him as either a biographical or a writing subject. On the contrary, Nerval’s citational 
writing practice invites us to read these multifarious statements of a mobile subjectivity as an 
irreducible multiplicity of positions. Even when the statements are attributed to the “I,” they cannot 
be situated on a solid ground of authentic belief, but partake of the illusory (simulated) existence of 
the actor’s roles. Such beliefs are tried on, in a sense, adopted in an entirely provisional manner that 
                                                
71 Richer, Expérience vécue et création ésotérique, 131. 
72 Nerval was diagnosed during his lifetime with the melancholic affliction demonomania, or its ecstatic variant 
theomania. Both are forms of monomania, meaning a single form of madness, a partial affliction of an otherwise sound 
mind. If the first is a disease of religious fearfulness and anxiety, the second is a subset of spiritual audacity and violence. 
The grandiose visions of the theomaniacal pole seem more in keeping with Nerval’s documented crises (like his quest to 
unite himself with the eastern star, and his quasi-biblical struggle with the friend who tried to restrain him in Aurélia, 
3:699), though as I have noted elsewhere, scholars have tended to move with ease between multiple and apparently 
contradictory interpretations of Nerval’s mental illness. What is most important for us here is to note the partial 
dimension of both these diagnoses, which speak only to a state of crisis and leave open the possibility of a quite different 
relationship to spirituality during periods of health. For contemporary diagnoses of démonomanie and théomanie, see the 
Dictionnaire des sciences médicales par une société de médecins et de chirurgiens, 8:294-318 and 55:85-87. 
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does not cancel them out or refute them by abandoning them. Belief here is no more subject to the 
judgment of authenticity or inauthenticity than is the writing subject’s mobile identity.73 This 
multiplicity of provisional beliefs does not constitute a unified coherence (of belief or even of 
“atmosphere”), but generates instead a proliferative variety. In this way, the text is composed of 
foreign elements (non-self) that are not assimilated (to the self), but rather retain their difference. 
 Displacing the concept of syncretism, this multiplicity appears as a kind of hybridity. This 
conceptual shift opens the possibility of genuine diversity in the beliefs Nerval writes about, not 
requiring any of them to be his “real” belief. But it also casts his writing more broadly in a very 
different light, providing a way of understanding the tendency toward borrowing (of characters, 
words, ideas), not as one designed in some way to shore up the unity of the writing subject, let alone 
of any particular text, but as one enamored of true diversity. The hybrid is not first composed of the 
writing subject and his spontaneous creations, then modified by external elements; it rather puts the 
apparently authentic contributions of the writing subject to use on equal terms with the other textual 
materials, so that whatever belongs distinctively to the writing subject is not a component of the 
hybrid but the act of combination itself. The radical multiplicity of the writing need not be reducible 
to, or a departure from, some authentic source or origin, but is itself a value affirmed by the writing 
against the constraints of an individualist conception of literary practice. This is what makes of the 
literary text a site of real encounter, of circulation and community. 
* 
 Nerval’s poetics of hybridity, with its positive valuation of mobility and difference, has been 
no more visible to scholars in the last century and a half than it was to Dumas in 1853. The value of 
a coherent, lyrical subject has been taken for granted to such an extent that it has entirely obscured 
the innovative dimension of Nerval’s writing, even in the places where it is most flagrant. So it is 
with his most famous collection of poems, Les Chimères, where the title’s announcement of an 
interest in multiplicity has not prevented the collection from being understood as a site of 
(attempted and/or failed) subjective consolidation. The chimera poems have most often been read 
as lyrical expressions of Nerval’s unique brand of madness, the dreams and illusions of his 
unmoored imagination that signal his ailing subjectivity, or the poetic forms through which he 
sought to counteract that ailment.74 And yet the framing of the collection strongly resists such 
readings, aligning the poems with Brisacier’s letter in the preface as part of Nerval’s response to 
Dumas’s misprision of his writing practice. By taking seriously the invocation of hybridity in the 
collection’s title, we can see the profoundly anti-lyrical thrust of the poems, which participates in 
Nerval’s broader affirmation of an alternative poetics. 
 Les Chimères closely mirror the citation of Brisacier in the prefatory letter, seeming to answer 
Dumas’s critique on its own terms (those of delusion), while in fact demonstrating the limitations of 
his understanding. We must recall that it is as another rejoinder to Dumas that the Chimères are 
published in Les Filles du feu at all: their inclusion as a strange appendix to the volume of stories is 
explicitly attributed to the fact that Dumas included one of these poems in his “Causerie,” against 
                                                
73 This provisional belief echoes the internally inconsistent popular belief we encountered in Chapter Three, where 
mutually exclusive beliefs were negotiated without difficulty. No belief is absolute, but neither is its validity absolutely 
called into question when it is supplanted by another. 
74 This reading of the word “chimera” as an illusion of which one is disabused by experience corresponds to its use in 
the “Dernier Feuillet” (“Last Leaf”) of “Sylvie” (“Telles sont les chimères qui charment et égarent au matin de la vie” 
[“Such are the chimeras that beguile and misguide us in the morning of life”]). But, as I have previously discussed, the 
vigorous irony of that final chapter suggests, if anything, the need for a certain skepticism of “chimera” as a 
straightforward name for illusion. See “Sylvie,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:536-79; see also Chapter Two. 
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Nerval’s intentions and express request.75 Nerval announces the poems at the end of the preface 
thus: 
 
Et puisque vous avez eu l’imprudence de citer un des sonnets composés dans cet état 
de rêverie supernaturaliste, comme diraient les Allemands, il faut que vous les 
entendiez tous.⎯Vous les trouverez à la fin du volume. Ils ne sont guère plus 
obscurs que la métaphysique d’Hegel ou les Mémorables de Swedenborg, et perdraient 
de leur charme à être expliqués, si la chose était possible […]. 
 
And since you were careless enough to cite one of the sonnets composed in this state 
of what the Germans would call supernaturalist reverie you must hear them all.—You 
will find them at the end of the volume. They are hardly more obscure than Hegel’s 
metaphysics or Swedenborg’s Memorabilia, and would lose their charm in being 
explained, if that were possible[…].76 
 
The evident irony of this framing (“here are my poems, interpret them if you think you can”) is 
invoked again when we arrive at the poems to find they have been named “chimeras”: the word 
“chimère” is borrowed directly from Dumas’s “Causerie,” where it was apposed to “hallucinations” 
to describe the mad world into which Nerval’s stories led.77 Nerval’s allusion to Dumas’s critique is 
often read as a kind of confession to the crimes with which Dumas charged him, but given our 
reading of “À Alexandre Dumas,” this redeployment of a word so strongly implicated in Dumas’s 
dismissal of Nerval can only appear as a kind of provocation, ironizing and problematizing it as a 
category through which Dumas understood the failure of identity he saw as characterizing Nerval. 
Let Dumas try to read the sonnets, but with his false understanding of Nerval’s identificatory 
practice and the chimera it produces, the poems will be as accessible as Hegel’s metaphysics.78 
 The title, Les Chimères, thus anticipates the ways in which it, as title, and the poems under its 
sign, will be misunderstood, even as it clearly puts forward the meaning it seems to know will remain 
invisible. The literal sense of chimera, as a name for the monstrosity of the hybrid, is hidden in plain 
sight in this title: a mythical monster with the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a 
serpent.79 The reference to this composite beast puts Nerval’s collection under the sign of hybridity, 
                                                
75 Dumas included “El Desdichado” in his “Causerie,” claiming that Nerval had scrawled it at his (Dumas’s) office as a 
sort of calling card. Dumas put the poem forward in the context of that highly charged article as a scrap that would shed 
light on Nerval’s eccentricity. This despite Nerval’s request, in a letter dated 25 November 1853, that the poem be 
discarded. Nerval insists in the letter, with a kind of tense good humor, that the sonnet was all in good fun—a fanciful 
payment for money borrowed from Dumas—and should not be printed as anything more than that: “Mon cher Dumas, 
Je vous prie de me rendre un service, c’est de ne pas insérer dans votre journal et de détruire même les plaisanteries que 
j’ai dictées ou écrites à votre bureau. Je ne suis ni un bouffon⎯ni un Brutus⎯. Et surtout, j’ai à garder pure la gloire de 
mon nom” [“My dear Dumas, I beg you to do me favor: don’t publish and ruin, really, the jokes I dictated or wrote at 
your office. I’m neither a buffoon nor a Brutus.—And above all, I have to keep the glory of my name untainted”] 
(Œuvres complètes, 3:825-26). See the Prologue. 
76 “À Alexandre Dumas,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:458. 
77 “Causerie avec mes lecteurs,” 1. 
78 As I will discuss more below, little criticism since Dumas has done much to elucidate these poems so as to make them 
feel more manageable than the texts to which Nerval facetiously compared them. 
79 This literal sense of the word chimère remained the primary definition in the mid-19th century, the constantly 
acknowledged basis for the figurative usage to mean illusion, and so it must be allowed to resonate in our readings of the 
collection. See the 1835 Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (6 ed.) and Littré’s 1872-1877 Dictionnaire de la langue française. 
The use of chimère to refer to a hybrid creature is echoed in the first of the sonnets, “El Desdichado,” where the figure of 
Mélusine herself (half woman, half serpent) is evoked by references to fairies and to the Lusignan family into which she 
married. 
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emphasizing the combinatorial process through which the images are created (a process not erased 
by any apparent, post facto unity), as much as it emphasizes their oneiric origins.80 The valorization of 
multiplicity in this claim to hybridity echoes the insistence on mobility in “À Alexandre Dumas.” 
Just as Nerval’s model of the actor favors many provisional identifications over any stable 
conception of identity, so does the figure of the hybrid resist coherent lyric expression in favor of 
assorted composition. In the sonnet’s spatialized expression of shifting subjectivity, the proliferation 
of roles appears as a simultaneous multiplicity. 
 The resonance between the hybridity of the Chimères and the actor of the prefatory letter is 
certainly clearest in the first sonnet (the one Dumas printed in his “Causerie”). “El Desdichado” is a 
poem that explicitly addresses identity, or the problem thereof, presenting itself as a series of 
assertions and interrogations that pose the question of the writing subject’s identity without every 
seeming to answer it: 
 
Je suis le ténébreux, ⎯le veuf⎯l’inconsolé, 
Le prince d’Aquitaine à la tour abolie: 
Ma seule étoile est morte,⎯et mon luth constellé 
Porte le Soleil noir de la Mélancolie. 
 
Dans la nuit du tombeau, toi qui m’as consolé, 
Rends-moi le Pausilippe et la mer d’Italie, 
La fleur qui plaisait tant à mon cœur désolé, 
Et la treille où le pampre à la rose s’allie. 
 
Suis-je Amour ou Phébus? … Lusignan ou Biron? 
Mon front est rouge encor du baiser de la reine; 
J’ai rêvé dans la grotte où nage la syrène … 
 
Et j’ai deux fois vainqueur traversé l’Achéron: 
Modulant tour à tour sur la lyre d’Orphée 
Les soupirs de la sainte et les cris de la fée. 
 
[I am the man of gloom—the widower—the unconsoled, 
The Prince of Acquitaine, his tower in ruins: 
My sole star is dead—and my constellated lute 
Bears the Black Sun of Melancholia. 
 
In the night of the tomb, you who consoled me, 
Give me back Posilipo and the Italian sea, 
The flower that so pleased my desolate heart, 
And the arbour where the vine and the rose are entwined. 
 
Am I Amor or Phoebus? … Lusignan or Biron? 
                                                
80 In Nerval’s double invocation of the “chimera” as the literal and figurative creation of the imagination, surpassing the 
limits of the real, we can see a strong Hugolian legacy. Hugo’s insistence on the hybrid, dating back to his 1830 preface 
to Cromwell, called for a combination of high and low, sublime and grotesque, not as a superior mimetic principle (a way 
of representing the diversity of the real) but as a principle of literary creation. See, for example, Viegnes, Hugo et la 
chimère. 
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My brow still burns from the kiss of the queen; 
I have dreamed in the grotto where the siren swims … 
 
And I have twice victorious crossed the Acheron: 
Modulating on Orpheus’ lyre  
Now the sighs of the saint, now the fairy’s cry.]81 
 
This sonnet is often read as a crucial scene of self-identification for Nerval’s lyric subject, the 
moment where his attempts at self-definition come up against their own negativity and the crisis of 
identity that is taken to be at the heart of the poet’s psychological experience.82 However, the sense 
of the poet’s lyric identification announces itself in relationship to that of Brisacier, echoing the 
actor’s description of himself in his letter to Aurélie:  
 
Où sont les aventures, désormais? où est la charmante misère qui nous faisait vos 
égaux et vos camarades, mesdames les comédiennes, nous les pauvres poètes 
toujours et les poètes pauvres bien souvent? Vous nous avez trahis, reniés! et vous 
vous plaigniez de notre orgueil! Vous avez commencé par suivre de riches seigneurs, 
chamarrés, galants et hardis, et vous nous avez abandonnés dans quelque misérable 
auberge pour payer la dépense de vos folles orgies. Ainsi, moi, le brillant comédien 
naguère, le prince ignoré, l’amant mystérieux, le déshérité, le banni de liesse, le beau ténébreux, 
[… je n’ai pas été mieux traité que ce pauvre Ragotin, un poétereau de province, un 
robin! 
 
[Where are the adventures, henceforth? Where is the charming poverty that made us 
your equals and your companions, dear actresses, we who were always to be pitied 
and sometimes downright poor? You have betrayed us, denied us! And you complain 
about our pride! You began by following rich lords, embroidered, gallant, and bold, 
and you abandoned us in a miserable inn to pay the cost of your wild orgies. So it is 
that I, once a brilliant actor, the unknown prince, the mysterious lover, the man dispossessed, the 
exile from jubilation, the handsome man of gloom, […] I have been treated no better than 
poor Ragotin, a provincial rhymester, a fool!]83 
 
Brisacier identifies himself by the roles he played before being abandoned by his troupe, comparing 
the dignity of those characters, however marked by loss and a certain darkness, with the humiliation 
he has suffered. The je of “El Desdichado” returns to some of these same characters, and certainly 
to their shadowy gravity: the title itself alludes to “le déshérité,” while the divested “prince” and the 
“ténébreux” are directly repeated. In defining the identity of its subject, then, the sonnet demands to 
be understood on the model of the actor that Nerval put forth in the preface by way of Brisacier.   
The metaphor of the actor is not uncommon in readings of “El Desdichado,” but our 
reading of Nerval’s treatment of the actor in “À Alexandre Dumas” implies a theorization of his 
writing and a reading of “El Desdichado” that differ significantly from the ones often built on the 
                                                
81 “Les Chimères,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3 :645/Selected Writings, 363; I have formatted Sieburth’s prose 
translation to correspond roughly to the versification of Nerval’s sonnet, to facilitate analysis. All ellipses are Nerval’s. 
82 For any biographically- or psychoanalytically-minded critic, such readings are encouraged by the fact that the Chimères 
seem to have been written during Nerval’s two principal periods of psychological crisis, 1841 and 1853. On Nerval’s two 
poetic phases (that of the odelette and that of the sonnet), see Steinmetz, “La double poésie de Gérard de Nerval” in 
Reconnaissances. 
83 Nerval, “À Alexandre Dumas,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:451-52. Emphasis added. 
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metaphorics of theater. The theater has often provided a figure for the apparent failure of Nerval’s 
writing to coincide with itself, figuring the artifice that signals his dispossession of a coherent lyric 
subject. In Kristeva’s reading of fragmentation, for example, “« Je » s’affirme alors sur le terrain de 
l’artifice : il n’y a de place pour le « je » que dans le jeu, le théâtre, sous le masque des identités 
possibles, aussi extravagantes, prestigieuses, mythiques, épiques, historiques, ésotériques 
qu’incroyables. Triomphantes, mais aussi incertaines” [“‘I’ affirms itself in the field of artifice: there 
is no place for the ‘I’ but in play, in theater, under the mask of possible identities as extravagant, 
prestigious, mythical, epic, historical, and esoteric as they are incredible. Triumphant, but also 
uncertain”]84 The stability of an authentic lyric subject is certainly missing from Nerval’s poem, 
replaced by a je that is staged like an actor and so simultaneously asserts and undermines itself. For 
Kristeva, this fragmentary nature of the poem’s subject signals an existential loss: the break with 
plenitude (the archaic mother) and the passage into language.85 The disjunctive subject of the poem 
strives to compensate for the lost object by creating a synthetic symbolic object—but this is a 
victory over its dispossession that can never be definitively achieved, as evidenced by the tension 
between triumph and uncertainty in the subject’s multiple identities.86 
Restoring the poem’s relationship to the Brisacier of the preface suggests, however, that the 
actor’s significance lies elsewhere. Nerval’s treatment of Brisacier does not present the provisionality 
and artifice of the actor’s identifications as obstacles to identity or signs of its failure; it rather poses 
identity itself as a failure, the breakdown of identification. The series of roles is not significant in its 
difference from an authentic je-face that it either hides or surreptitiously reveals, but rather as the 
mobility of the je-masks. The only possible identity is the faculty of identification that binds them 
together in their difference. Through its allusion to Brisacier in the opening verses, the subject of 
“El Desdichado” thus declares itself to be an entirely different sort of subject than the one Dumas 
criticized Nerval for failing to be. Echoing Brisacier, the subject of the poem presents itself from the 
outset as a kind of hybrid, spatializing the actor’s mobility in the form of a sonnet. The poem 
inscribes the series of provisional roles as a composition of disjointed parts with no identity except 
in its capacity for this disjunctive conjunction, just as the actor is no one but his faculty of 
receptivity. 
 This hybrid subject, already evoked by the mythological chimera that lends its name to the 
collection of sonnets, provides a way of understanding the tensions in “El Desdichado” between the 
assertion of subjective identities and their partialness, without seeing in it an erosion of logical 
predication itself by multiplicity or a failed attempt at unity. As an alternative to the concepts of 
subjective disintegration and narcissistic syncretism that often structure readings of this poem, the 
concept of hybridity allows the fragmentary nature of “El Desdichado” to appear as the affirmation 
of an aesthetic in which fragmentation need not be transcended. It brings our reading much closer 
to Jonathan Strauss’s critique of Kristeva, in which he argues that the poem provides no stable 
ground, even in its form, but instead puts forward “a subject that, as supported on the lyre-poem, 
remains irreducibly plural, that always involves indeterminate fragmentation and a pointless 
displacement.”87 Here, the poem and its subject retain their disjunctive character and the lyric subject 
is abolished by the presence of negativity within it.88 We find ourselves faced not with a Romantic 
                                                
84 Kristeva, Soleil noir, 157. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 173. 
87 Strauss, Subjects of Terror, 194. See also his “Singulières périodiques.” 
88 Subjects of Terror, 196. Our reading of “El Desdichado” owes much to Strauss’s, with its emphasis on subjective 
displacement and plurality. Strauss maintains, however, the mimetic significance of the poem’s lack of subjective 
coherence, reading it always in relation to a horizon of normative psychology. Given the primacy he gives to Nerval’s 
supposed distress at his own (lived) lack of subjective coherence, Strauss reads the poem as both a demonstration of and 
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poem, putting forth a subject and a symbol; nor with an attempt to overcome the impossibility of 
such a poem, transcending the lack of such a subject and such a symbol. Instead, “El Desdichado” 
appears as a refusal of the lyric and of the symbolic, capable through the figures of the actor and the 
chimera of gesturing to its own refusal and declaring the operations that Shoshanna Felman 
attributes to it, albeit in a more unconscious form: 
 
Puisque l’allégorie déconstruit sciemment la prétention de la métaphore; puisque, 
consciemment, elle postule non une identité mais une citation qui se donne comme 
telle, qui assume sa textualité, la possibilité de substitution allégorique d’un texte à un 
autre devient infinie. Le «  je » n’est que cette permutation, cette substitution infinie 
de citations sur « la lyre d’Orphée ». 
 
[Since allegory deliberately deconstructs the pretention of metaphor; since, 
conscious, it posits not an identity but a citation that presents itself as such, that 
assumes its textuality, the possibility of allegorical substitution of one text for 
another becomes infinite. The “I” is nothing but this permutation, this infinite 
substitution of citations on “Orpheus’ lyre.”]89 
 
However, far from harboring its allegorical displacements secretly, as the unconscious of its 
language, “El Desdichado” flaunts them, offering the figures of the actor and the chimera to 
embody the displacement of lyricism and symbolism in the ceaseless circulation of identities and 
images. 
 This is the mobility, not to be stopped or synthesized, that makes itself evident in the 
unruliness of the sonnet’s intertextual references. Any reading of “El Desdichado” must contend 
with the difficulty these references cause, the sense that the poem is always eluding our interpretive 
grasp. This difficulty is often attributed to the supposed esoterism and intimacy of the poem’s 
intertexts, which could be understood only by meticulously reproducing Nerval’s field of personal 
references. Reading the poem in this way, however, renders it at once more arcane and more 
manageable than it is. On the one hand, it overemphasizes the obscurity of the poem’s references, 
which are drawn as much from the cultural mainstream (classical mythology, fashionable literature, 
and iconic images) as from oneiric or hermetic sources, and which are ostentatious rather than 
concealed: the poem’s very title is an allusion to Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe, and three of the poem’s 
references are placed in italics in the version published in the Chimères, as though to point them out 
to readers who might have missed them in Le Mousquetaire. The references make an open invitation 
to culturally literate readers of Nerval’s day, referring to a collective body of readerly experience 
(Scott, Hugo, Shakespeare). Even what seem to be autobiographical allusions refer, we must not 
forget, to Nerval’s previously published texts and so belong to a shared, literary imaginary as much 
as to a purely private one. 
 On the other hand, attempting to decrypt the poem tames its multiplicity by referring it to a 
coherence that lies elsewhere: the symbolic significance that the poem thwarts through its constant 
motion is simply sought out on another plane, in a unified symbolic imaginary elaborated over all of 
                                                                                                                                                       
a textual remedy for that lack: “I, but really I and not the mere image of I, am structured and self-similar in these jokes 
and monsters that are only words” (198). I am concerned here rather with the possibility that identification might not 
lead circuitously to identity (“self-sameness”), but displace it entirely as a literary value. 
89 Felman, La folie et la chose littéraire, 84-85. The chapter on “El Desdichado” is not included in the English version, 
Writing and Madness (Literature/Philosophy/Psychoanalysis). 
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Nerval’s works.90 The tradition of this kind of hermetic reading locates both the sonnet’s obscurity 
and its ultimate coherence in a private symbolic universe, and in so doing produces unity only by 
bracketing the poem’s existence as a text to be read. The difficulty readers encounter is simply 
attributed to their difference from Nerval, who is assumed to be the ideal reader, the only one 
capable of fully operating the promised synthesis. This approach is never wholly satisfying because it 
discounts the significance of the experience (compelling and strange, inviting and challenging) of 
reading the sonnet. It fails to take seriously the irresolvability of the intertextual references in their 
overwhelming proliferation. 
 Take the myriad resonances between Nerval’s works (girls, vines, seas, gods), which seem to 
suggest an established stable of images: no matter how carefully we trace them, they tend to spiral 
out of control, to follow one after another, creating series and branches of references that never 
arrive at any fixed symbolic universe (even an extra-poetic one). So it is, for example, that the 
references to Italy in the second quatrain of “El Desdichado” (to Posillipo and the sea, to a trellis 
covered with vines and roses) do indeed reach out toward the Neapolitan stories of “Octavie” and 
“Un Roman à faire,” but both of those texts imply so many of the particulars of their narratives that 
they introduce more complexity than clarity into the quatrain.91 Then, too, this Italian quatrain also 
resonates with the “hollyhock” of the sonnet “Artémis” and the Posillipo and intertwining 
hydrangeas and myrtles of “Myrtho,” as well as the grotto of “Delfica” and the Vatican trellis of the 
novella Pandora. No amount of cataloguing makes this Italian landscape feel like solid ground for 
readers. 
 These intertextual connections do not so much explain the Italy of “El Desdichado” as set it 
in motion, revealing its relations with other elements and its transformation by them. The 
intertextual energy of Nerval’s writing does not assimilate meaning so much as disperse it: the 
proliferation we observe opens up each moment of the text onto a variety of other moments that 
undermine its singularity. The fairy that closes “El Desdichado” is the hybrid Mélusine (half woman, 
half serpent), locked in a tower as in “Angélique,” but she is also the prophetess Manto, i.e. Daphne, 
who figures in the sonnet “Delfica.” Webs of meaning open up between these works, not signaling a 
unified symbolic imaginary, but initiating a ceaseless motion. The sonnet escapes the enclosure of a 
single symbolism (even one that transcends it) by keeping its images in circulation, referring each 
one to another without ever allowing the series to stop in a definitive origin. 
 This motion not only short-circuits the symbolic coherence of the poem, throwing it open to 
an unsynthesizable figural hybridity, but also evades the coherence of a writing subject that might be 
identified by its own expression. The relentless intertextuality of “El Desdichado” reaches beyond 
Nerval’s own works, so that in identifying itself by way of these disparate citations, the sonnet’s 
subject itself becomes a hybrid of other writing subjects. So it is that the title character of the poem 
is not simply an avatar that proclaims the subject’s self-identity, but can be seen to open the poem 
outward through its allusion to Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe, just as the title of an earlier version of the 
poem, “Le Destin,” alludes along with the “star” of the third verse to the lover-actors of Scarron’s 
Le Roman comique [The Comic Romance] (as well as, of course, to Brisacier and Nerval’s Roman tragique). 
In the same way, the “Soleil noir de la Mélancolie” [“Black Sun of Melancolia”] refers to the famous 
engraving by Albrecht Dürer, while the “prince d’Acquitaine à la tour abolie” [“prince of Aquitaine, 
                                                
90 Such an a priori imaginary is epitomized by the erudite scholarship of Jean Richer, but is to be found far beyond the 
usual bastions of thematic reading and relies not only on Nerval’s biography but also, for example, on the mythological 
genealogy. 
91 In the case of texts like “Octavie” and “Un Roman à faire,” the tendency to synthesize images across works relies on 
biography as its extra-textual plane of coherence. 
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his tower in ruins”] recalls the medieval Black Prince with his ruined lighthouse who figures in 
Shakespeare’s Edward III, opening the poem’s subject to include a host of others.92 
 These wide-ranging textual references partake in the same proliferation and undecidability as 
the networks of figures within Nerval’s own corpus, referring readers always outside of the poem, 
beyond its limits, but not to any place where they might rest.  Take, for example, the series of figures 
in the first verse of the first tercet: “Suis-je Amour ou Phébus? … Lusignan ou Biron?” [“Am I 
Amor or Phoebus? … Lusignan or Biron?”] Though this set of figures can be initially divided into 
pairs of mythological and historical references, it begins to bloom on further inspection as it invokes 
a great network of intertexts. “Amour” suggests not only the god Eros, but also a character in the 
Roman de la Rose [Romance of the Rose] (where the beloved is, of course, a “fleur”). “Phoebus” is not 
only Apollo but also the Captain Phoebus of Hugo’s Notre-Dame de Paris and Phoebus de Lusignan, a 
fifteenth-century marshal who was a cousin of the Guy de Lusignan of Boccaccio’s Decameron, who 
figures in the verse as well. Likewise, “Biron” calls to mind the duke of Biron, who figured in the 
“Chanson de Biron” in “Chansons et légendes du Valois,” but also Berowne, the character he 
inspired in Shakespeare’s Love’s Labor’s Lost, as well as perhaps Lord Byron himself. Though some of 
the many intertexts suggested by these names may seem more plausible than others, what is essential 
is that none of them cohere clearly enough to rule out the rest. Readers are left with a sense of the 
multiplicity and unruliness of the references that make of the poem not a unified symbolic 
expression, but a many-headed creature. “El Desdichado” thus seems composed not to establish its 
own meaning or to predicate or produce the identity of its own writing subject, but to serve as a site 
of encounter between other texts.  
 These moments are, importantly, drawn from readers’ own readerly experience as much as 
from Nerval’s. They are not the coded symbolic allusions to esoteric doctrines that Richer discovers 
throughout Nerval’s writing, which necessitate for the text’s actualization a reader who is himself an 
initiate. They are rather a dense fabric of references to a broad collective experience that would have 
been evident to any reasonably culturally literate reader of Nerval’s day (though this would have 
been, of course, a relatively small group compared to the French population). The poem flaunts its 
intertextuality, sometimes aggressively—“El Desdichado” is the poem’s title, and the words “étoile” 
[“star”], “Soleil noir” [“Black Sun”], “Mélancolie” [“Melancholia”], and “fleur” [“flower”] are placed in italics 
–and references familiar sources like Greek and Roman mythology, fashionable literature, and iconic 
images. The poem’s hybrid nature is made abundantly obvious to readers: what the poem sings here 
is (unlike Orpheus) not its own song, but a compilation of “Les soupirs de la sainte et les cris de la 
fée” [“the sighs of the saint” and “the fairy’s cry”].93 
 The sonnets of Les Chimères thus announce themselves not as works of lyrical self-
expression, but as instances of the hybrid intertextual practice that is also to be found in Nerval’s 
other writing. “El Desdichado” crystalizes into a concise poetic form the incessant displacements of 
the writing subject’s performance, shunning the stability of the symbol just as the writing subject 
elsewhere refuses to resolve into a face behind the series of masks. The economy of the intertextual 
gestures is very tight in the sonnets, limited primarily to allusions (with one notable exception, 
Delfica, that I will discuss below). But the mechanisms at work here can help us to think the grander 
citational gestures elsewhere in Nerval’s œuvre. Indeed, many of his texts appear upon closer 
examination as hybrids, composed of various elements that seem in some way not to have the same 
                                                
92 Likewise, the “exile from jubilation,” who is not included in the list of predicates for the actor-subject in Brisacier’s 
letter, alludes to two poets who used banni de liesse as a sobriquet: Jean Meschinot (1420-1491) and François Habert 
(1510-1561). Even the double passage of the Acheron in the final tercet echoes Pückler-Muskau’s account of twice 
traversing the funereal Lake Qarun (a scene that Nerval mistakenly attributes to Lettres d’un mort when he cites it in “À 
Jules Janin,” Lorely, in Œuvres complètes, 3:11). 
93 “Les Chimères,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3:645. 
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status, to be of the same kind. So it is with the portraits of Les Illuminés, written in such different 
styles, some of them lifted almost wholesale from other sources and some heavily fictionalized by 
their author. So it is, too, with other first person texts like the Voyage en Orient, where great chunks of 
the plot (and not the least memorable) are borrowed from William Lane. What might at first appear 
to be the relatively smooth surface of the first-person travel narrative turns out to be everywhere 
sutured together, combining original expressions of the author’s lived experience with the writings 
of other travelers. These shifts are not signaled in the Voyage—readers do not face the kind of 
interweaving of lived and literary experience found in Chateaubriand’s Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem 
[Itinerary from Paris to Jerusalem], where the author constantly cites authorities—but the shifts are 
nonetheless immediately apparent to any reader of travel literature: the passages borrowed are taken 
from some of the most famous passages of what was arguably the most famous source available on 
the subject. The borrowings are not liable to be confused with creations of the writing subject, nor 
does the writing subject appropriate them by making his borrowing explicit and adding some frame 
of interpretation like Chateaubriand; rather the borrowings remain insistently but not explicitly 
foreign within the text, a constant reminder of the writing subject’s lack of unity. 
 If this subject at times seems to be Nerval himself, it at other times clearly plays other parts 
(gives voice to the words and experiences of others, repeats what is common to all), so that it cannot 
be seen to coincide absolutely with the role of Nerval or with any other, but must be accepted by 
readers as that which circulates among them. Its singularity as a subject comes from the insistence 
with which it implies other subjects and the inevitable relationships between them in their literary 
production. This is true even in what seem to be the most obviously autobiographical of Nerval’s 
texts, the ones where his real subjectivity seems so clearly at stake. We have seen this already in “El 
Desdichado” and find it as well in Aurélia, the text usually taken to be the most sincere, the most 
truly revealing of all Nerval’s writing. Here, amidst the description of his confinement and the 
hallucinations he experienced during his periods of illness, Nerval includes an intertextual borrowing 
that calls straightforward lyrical readings of the text into question. In the middle of a recounted 
dream about the origin of the world, the narrator describes a vision of the biblical flood that harkens 
back to an 1844 diorama on the same subject that Nerval had himself reviewed:94 
 
Un fléau plus grand que les autres vint tout à coup rajeunir et sauver le monde. La 
constellation d’Orion ouvrit au ciel les cataractes des eaux ; la terre, trop chargée par 
les glaces du pôle opposé, fit un demi-tour sur elle-même, et les mers, surmontant 
leurs rivages, refluèrent sur les plateaux de l’Afrique et de l’Asie ; l’inondation pénétra 
les sables, remplit les tombeaux et les pyramides, et, pendant quarante jours, une 
arche mystérieuse se promena sur les mers portant l’espoir d’une création nouvelle. 
 
[A plague far greater than all the others suddenly swept down in order to rejuvenate 
and rescue the world. The constellation of Orion opened cataracts of water in the 
sky; the earth, top-heavy with the ice of the opposite pole, spun backwards and the 
seas overflowed their coastlines and poured into the plains of Africa and Asia; the 
flood waters seeped into the sands, filled the tombs and the pyramids, and for forty 
days a mysterious ark sailed the seas, carrying with it the hopes for a new creation.]95 
 
The incredibly visual account of the dream situates both readers and narrator much as they would 
have been situated at the diorama theater, facing an unfolding spectacle of rising water. The scale 
                                                
94 “Diorama. Odéon” in L’Artiste, 15 September 1844 in Œuvres complètes, 1:840-42. 
95 Aurélia in Œuvres complètes, 3 :695-756, 714/Selected Writings, 283. 
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has been altered, from the single antediluvian city presented in the diorama to entire continents, but 
the stock of images96 relies heavily on the earlier spectacle.97 The shared memory of this collective 
cultural reference (the diorama performance) breaks open the text’s apparent confinement to the 
author’s individual psyche, showing what seems to be the most inaccessibly personal place in 
Nerval’s œuvre to be composed in fact of intertextual fragments.  
  
The Intertextual Community (or, Je  as Nous) 
The literary text here is neither the expression nor the production of an individual, but a space in 
which the free circulation of ideas and images is allowed to be productive. Literary practice functions 
collectively, binding together not only multiple writers, but also all members of the culture at large in 
generating, transforming, and sharing ideas and images. Readers, too, are implicated in this literary 
community, since what circulates in Nerval’s texts has circulated as well in his readers’ prior readerly 
and cultural experience. What Nerval borrows from Lane belongs, so to speak, to any other reader 
of Lane as much as to him, just as he has no special claim on any of the historical figures he 
references or on the experience of the diorama. So it is that in those instances of borrowing, readers 
recognize in the writing subject not an integral and Other subjectivity, but a piece of themselves, 
their own experience. Not even the repeated images from within Nerval’s own corpus are 
exclusively his own, since they refer to previous texts of his that were likely read by the same 
audience and so belong in some way to his readers’ repertoire as much as to his own. His practice of 
republication thus him to be his own intertext, to cast his writing outside of the borders of his own 
subject so that he might find it there—not as a narcissistic reflection, but as the self made foreign—
just as readers find themselves in the text. Readers are thus an integral element of the series kept in 
motion by this writing practice, essential members of the community established. 
 It is in this way that we might understand the enigmatic phrase “je suis l’autre” [“I am the 
other”] that Nerval inscribed above the engraved portrait that served as frontispiece to the Eugène 
de Mirecourt biography published just months after Les Filles du feu and Les Chimères.98 The 
apparently proto-Rimbaldian pronouncement seems to invite readings of melancholy, a 
dispossession of the self that might be in part voluntary (the price of writing or of opposition), but 
that remains fundamentally negative, what Chambers calls suicide.99 But in light of the reciprocal 
operation of Nerval’s intertextual practice, inviting readers to join him in his radical destabilizing of 
the subject, we might see this statement quite differently. The poles of “je” and “l’autre” are 
abolished in this writing practice, with the je opening itself always onto the other and so meeting his 
fellows outside of an opposition predicated on identity. “Je suis l’autre” refuses a je that is formed in 
opposition to its other.100 “You misunderstand me,” this inscription seems to say, “if you look for 
me in this image, in this biography.” It is, like so much of Nerval’s writing, a first-person statement 
that in fact surpasses the subject to state the co-implication of the subject and a broader community. 
                                                
96 This includes the eerily wandering ark that Nerval did not see, since technical difficulties prevented showing the 
diorama’s third tableau on the night he was in attendance; see “Diorama. Odéon” in Œuvres complètes, 1:842. 
97 Other aspects of Nerval’s treatment of the flood in Aurélia also echo the diorama and his review of it: the inclusion in 
the dream of the Eloïm and their struggle to establish a new peace after the flood refers back to the long philological 
discussion of the Eloïm in Nerval’s 1844 article, and the reprise of the flood in the second part of Aurélia (in Œuvres 
complètes, 3:736) seems to entertain the same speculation about how such a flood would play out in Paris as Nerval 
proposes in the review. 
98 Jeanneret, “Nerval et la biographie impossible,” 135. The portrait was engraved by Étienne Gervais from a 
daguerreotype by Adolphe Legros, taken in late 1853 or early 1854 and thus dating from the same period as Dumas’s 
“Causerie” and Nerval’s “À Alexandre Dumas.” 
99 Chambers, Room for Maneuver, 105. 
100 In other words, “je suis l’autre” recapitulates the (unsanctioned) relationship of self and non-self vindicated in Les 
Nuits d’octobre, as well as the forbidden collective subject of Les Faux Saulniers; see Chapters One and Three, respectively. 
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 The actorly writing subject is no one but his masks—masks drawn, through a variety of 
intertextual gestures, from a shared culture. So it is that readers cannot help but recognize them as 
masks: the sheer obviousness of the unacknowledged citations reveals to readers the fiction being 
perpetrated by the writing subject. The text is not designed to fool readers into reading a coherent 
writing subject where there is none (its borrowings are too blatant for that); nor does it demand of 
them that they suspend disbelief and let themselves believe that such a subject exists (pretend for 
themselves to believe that it does). Rather, the text invites readers to go along with a certain kind of 
fiction, the simulation of the writing-subject-as-actor. The flood scene in Aurélia presents this most 
clearly, the quintessentially false hallucination providing an occasion to displace the very opposition 
between truth and falsehood, authenticity and inauthenticity, encouraging readers to relate to the 
narrator’s dream on entirely different terms. The dream is not to be believed or disbelieved as a real 
or unreal part of the narrator’s lived experience, but is rather a fiction that the writing subject here 
performs and that readers are invited both to recognize as a fiction and to believe nonetheless in the 
provisional, mobile way that such a performance requires. The fiction into which readers are invited 
by this flagrant but unacknowledged citational practice is thus one in which they must double the 
actor’s provisional belief, as well as his lucidity about its provisional nature. Just as the actor to 
whom Nerval compares the writing subject identifies fully with his characters, only to pass on to 
another identification, readers here must affirm the writing subject’s performance by believing him 
as each character, knowing all the while that he is liable to become another at any moment.   
 In doing so, readers bring about something like the collective performance of the festival in 
Sylvie. Lucidity and illusion are not divided up between actor and spectators, with the writing subject 
creating an illusion of subjectivity for his readers’ benefit. But neither can readers purport to 
recognize as a fiction what the author mistakenly believes to be real.101 Rather, as in the festival, 
everyone participates on the same terms, with equal portions of lucidity and illusion. Nerval’s writing 
stages a writing subject who knowingly performs a fiction for readers who are called on to 
acknowledge it as a fiction but to engage with it nonetheless. We might even say that the writing 
subject attempts here to perform not for readers, but with them, making of reading itself a process of 
mobile identification and belief akin to writing. This is what the use of widely known intertexts like 
the diorama or William Lane helps to ensure: not only do readers recognize the foreign elements 
voiced by the writing subject as foreign to it, but they also find their own experiences implicated 
alongside those of the author. By placing readerly and lived experience on the same level and 
moving between them without privileging one over the other, the subject of Nerval’s writing creates 
a subjective experience that is neither autobiographical nor strictly fictional, and readers are invited 
to partake in this experience, to move between the intertextual gestures that call on their readerly 
experience as much as the author’s and the elements of the text that are more absolutely foreign to 
them. Readers encounters the writing subject here not by being opposed to it by their mutual 
otherness, but by participating in an othering of themselves that likens them to the writing subject in 
its mobility. Readers and writing subject alike transcend their individual subjectivities to form a 
community of fictional performance.  
 In foregrounding its own intertextuality, the literary text becomes the site of a collective 
experience that can be shared by writer and readers on equal terms. This mechanism is performed 
explicitly in the fifth sonnet of Les Chimères, “Delfica,” where a recognizable intertext generates a 
reflection on that intertextuality itself: 
 
La connais-tu, DAFNE, cette ancienne romance, 
Au pieds du sycomore, ou sous les lauriers blancs, 
                                                
101 Such is the posture of the psychoanalytic reader, who always knows much more than the author himself. 
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Sous l’olivier, le myrthe ou les saules tremblants, 
Cette chanson d’amour… qui toujours recommence! 
 
Reconnais-tu le TEMPLE, au péristyle immense, 
Et les citrons amers où s’imprimaient tes dents? 
Et la grotte, fatale aux hôtes imprudents, 
Où du dragon vaincu dort l’antique semence. 
 
Ils reviendront ces dieux que tu pleures toujours! 
Le temps va ramener l’ordre des anciens jours; 
La terre a tressailli d’un souffle prophétique… 
 
Cependant la sibylle au visage latin 
Est endormie encor sous l’arc de Constantin: 
⎯Et rien n’a dérangé le sévère portique. 
 
[Do you know it, DAPHNE, this old romance, 
At the foot of the sycamore or the white laurel trees, 
Beneath the olive, the myrtle or the trembling willows, 
This song of love … that always rebegins! 
 
Do you recognize the TEMPLE with its immense peristyle, 
And the bitter lemons that bore the imprint of your teeth? 
And the grotto, fatal to its careless guests, 
Where the vanquished dragon’s ancient seed lies asleep. 
 
They shall return, these gods you still bemoan! 
Time will bring back the order of the ancient days; 
The earth has shuddered with a prophetic breath… 
 
Meanwhile the sibyl with the Latin face 
Still sleeps beneath the Arch of Constantine— 
And nothing has unsettled the severe portico.]102 
 
The poem unmistakably invokes a well-known source text, Mignon’s song from Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship.103 The sonnet’s quatrains mimic the stanzas of Goethe’s poem with their call (“La 
connais-tu” [“Do you know it”]) to the addressee’s images of a cherished land, which is Italy in 
Nerval’s poem as in Goethe’s. But “Delfica” does not simply reactivate Mignon’s song by repeating 
it. Instead, the sonnet uses this particular intertext to draw attention to the intertextual gesture itself, 
thematizing its own functioning. The act of reactivation is put front and center, as Italy becomes not 
simply a lover’s paradise, but the land of a promised renewal, the return of the gods and the 
                                                
102 “Les Chimères,” Les Filles du feu in Œuvres complètes, 3 :647/ Selected Writings, 367. As with “El Desdichado,” I have 
reformatted Sieburth’s prose to correspond roughly to the sonnet’s form. All ellipses are Nerval’s own. See also the 
earlier, nearly identical “Daphné” published in 1853 in Petits châteaux de Bohême [Little Castles of Bohemia] in Œuvres complètes, 
3:441-42. 
103 It is worth noting that this poem had already been rewritten within Gautier’s “Chanson de Mignon” of 1833, where 
the paradise invoked is “the land of the poet” to which the muse would lead him. 
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beginning-again of the ceaseless love song. What the poem strives for, then, is not the object of the 
imagination only but also of memory, something to be re-created. 
 So it is that the lady’s invitation to her lover to run away with her into a blissful future 
becomes, when rewritten in Les Chimères, an invitation of a different kind, calling on readers to join 
the poem’s subject in reviving a text from the past without forgetting its pastness. The opening line 
of the Chanson, “Do you know the land where pale citrons grow” becomes “La connais-tu, Dafné, 
cette ancienne romance” [“Do you know it, Daphne, this old romance”], making the Goethe poem 
itself (the song being rewritten) the object referred to in the poem, recalled to the addressee as 
something to be re-actualized in the future. More than a simple wink at readers, this opening line 
with its conspicuous transformation of the original folds the poem back on itself so that readers 
must affirm their own participation in its staging of another text. “Cette ancienne romance” is at 
once recalled and repeated. As in the two-part recollection/invitation of Mignon’s song, “Delfica” 
calls readers to recognize its borrowing while inviting them to participate in the performance that 
borrowing allows. The element of memory at work in this intertext is brought to the fore in the 
second quatrain, when “Reconnais-tu” [“Do you recognize”] replaces Goethe’s “Do you know,” and 
readers through their re-actualization of this past find themselves carrying out the renewal the 
sonnet seeks but claims not to find. Through its rewriting and its readers’ awareness of it, the song 
truly becomes “Cette chanson d’amour … qui toujours recommence!” [“This song of love … that 
always rebegins!”]. 
 “Delfica” thematizes the mode of reading called for by Nerval’s intertextual poetics. It draws 
attention to the experience of familiarity generated by textual borrowings and republications, and 
gestures toward the kind of renewal that this kind of repetition seems to promise. As in Sylvie, the 
renewal recounted here is not successful; it nevertheless creates a model by which we can 
understand what writing might achieve. Familiarity here draws readers into the illusion the writing 
subject lives, with his strange combination of proximity and distance, belief and lucidity. It collapses 
the positions of writer and reader just as the festival collapses the positions of actor and spectator, 
making the literary text, like the festival, a site of collective performance. Writer and readers take the 
same series of ideas out for a stroll, enjoying both the mobility inherent in this literary activity and 
the community it produces between them, fellow strollers. In ceding its primacy and the possibility 
of its lyrical self-expression to a poetics of hybridity, the writing subject produces a literary form that 
acknowledges and performs the relational nature of literature. 
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